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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
influence in Afghanistan and establish a friendly government there,
achieving what was referred to as “strategic depth.” The United States aimed
to prevent the Taliban from remaining the dominant player in Afghanistan,
to banish al Qaeda, and to leave behind an Afghanistan that was reasonably
peaceful, coherent, and capable of keeping terrorism at bay. It hoped to leave
behind a measure of democracy as well.
The gap between these goals deepened the U.S.-Pakistan “trust deficit,”
as the Pakistanis called it. Pakistan’s continuing involvement with elements
of the Taliban and its unwillingness or inability to keep Taliban forces from
using Pakistani territory as a sanctuary led the United States to suspect that
Pakistan was making common cause with U.S. adversaries in Afghanistan.
From Pakistan’s perspective, the U.S. failure to accept its requirement for a
“friendly”—read subservient—government in Afghanistan put the United
States at odds with the goal of strategic depth dear to the Pakistan Army,
long the country’s most important political player.
The year 2011 showcased this strategic divergence and misunderstanding
at its worst. In January a CIA contractor assigned to the consulate general
in Lahore shot and killed two Pakistanis under disputed circumstances. He
was released from prison and repatriated only after a “blood money” deal
brokered by Saudi Arabia. On May 1 of that same year, the United States
raided the house where the architect of September 11, Osama bin Laden,
had been living for years, killing bin Laden. Just as importantly, the raid
publicly embarrassed the Pakistan Army, which was outraged by this
violation of sovereignty. Shortly thereafter, the outgoing U.S. chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his final congressional testimony, charged
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence with maintaining one of the most
hostile elements of the Taliban, known as the Haqqani network, as a virtual
subsidiary. Finally, in November 2011, approximately 25 Pakistani troops
were killed in a U.S.-led NATO attack on a border post between Pakistan
and Afghanistan. A U.S. investigation held that the incident was a tragic
error, but the Pakistan Army deemed it a deliberate assault. Pakistan
responded to this string of disasters by banning the transit of U.S. military
equipment to Afghanistan across Pakistan and by attempting to ban drone
attacks. Although the United States and Pakistan have climbed back from
the 2011 low point in their relations, mutual mistrust remains as the U.S.
government changes hands.
One question for the new administration will be deciding on the role
of the roughly nine thousand U.S. troops that remain in Afghanistan and
the future size of this force. The U.S. Defense Department and military
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