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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
Cracking down on militants or on Pakistan’s Afghan allies could trigger
dangers that Pakistan regards as existential, so the pushback against
confrontational U.S. tactics could be far stronger than expected.
India, Nuclear Weapons, and Kashmir
What Pakistan has most wanted from each of its engagements with the
United States is an effective alliance against India. During the Cold War
alliance in the 1950s and in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the United States expressed some sympathy with Pakistan
on some of its disputes with India. But even in those glory days Washington
stopped well short of an alliance against India. Now, with a quarter century
of dramatically expanding U.S.-India relations, a surging Indian economy,
and a weightier Indian role in global affairs, there is practically no chance
of the United States adopting a hostile policy toward India in order to
accommodate Pakistan. The Pakistan government understands this, but
the realization rankles, and it contrasts unfavorably with China’s more
enthusiastic embrace of Pakistan. Nothing in Trump’s campaign would
suggest that the new administration has any interest in such a policy. There
is also no congressional pressure in that direction, nor would U.S. strategic
interests benefit from such a move.
Historically, Pakistan had sought to involve the United States in
brokering India-Pakistan negotiations over Kashmir, the area the two
states have disputed since partition in 1947. Since the 1950s, India has
strenuously objected to any kind of third-party involvement, which it sees
as an affront to its dignity—and as undercutting its advantageous position
as the stronger of the two contending powers. India, moreover, controls
the most prized parts of the disputed territory. Pakistan still professes to
want U.S. involvement, but the army and others in fact question whether
U.S. intervention would advance its objectives. This dynamic explains why
there has been no serious U.S. effort to broker a Kashmir agreement since
the early 1960s. Consequently, despite the excitement stirred up by the
Trump-Sharif phone call, playing a mediating role is unlikely to be a serious
policy option for the United States.
U.S. crisis-management diplomacy has had more success. In 1999,
negotiations between then president Bill Clinton and Nawaz Sharif,
during his first term as Pakistan’s prime minister, led to a withdrawal of
the Pakistani troops that had infiltrated Kargil in the Indian-controlled
part of the old Kashmir state. Despite Pakistan’s historical quest to
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