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asia policy Senkaku Islands. 5 Importantly, official documents call for more cooperation and coordination between the JMSDF, on the one hand, and the JCG and police forces, on the other. 6 Indeed, the JCG is the primary agency responsible for patrolling and safeguarding Japanese waters: it is at the front line in the East China Sea. As the capabilities of the CCG are set to grow, and as tensions over the disputed Senkakus linger, Japan must reinforce its own coast guard. In addition, Tokyo needs to ensure optimal coordination between the JCG and JMSDF, which will intervene in the event that a crisis worsens. 7 The challenge is threefold: first, to ensure optimal cooperation between the JCG and JMSDF in terms of information sharing and surveillance of the area; second, to allow a smooth transition of responsibility between the JCG and JMSDF without escalating the situation into a military conflict should a contingency arise; and third, to make sure that this overall defense arrangement constitutes an effective deterrent. The question of coping with gray-zone situations was supposed to be at the core of the security legislation adopted in September 2015. However, the series of laws in these reforms did not directly address the issue but instead focused primarily on the limited use of the right to collective self-defense. 8 In the absence of a legal framework, there have been many official, political, and academic calls for more operational coordination between police, the JCG, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). In particular, a series of decisions by the Cabinet to reinforce the maritime security posture all call for closer cooperation. 9 To provide an optimal response to gray-zone situations, Tokyo 5 In particular, the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2010 states that “the SDF will permanently station the minimum necessary units on off-shore islands where the SDF is not currently stationed.” See Ministry of Defense (Japan), “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond,” 14. 6 For example, the National Security Strategy states the following: “To fully protect its territories, in addition to building a comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.” Ministry of Defense (Japan), National Security Strategy (Tokyo, December 17, 2013), 16. 7 Japan’s 2014 defense white paper provides the following guidance: “In the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued promptly and the SDF will respond to the situation in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.” Ministry of Defense (Japan), Defense of Japan 2014 (Tokyo, 2014), 225. 8 The “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” also do not address this issue. See Ministry of Defense (Japan), “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” April 27, 2015. The new alliance coordination mechanism was established especially to allow the alliance to operate from peacetime to wartime. 9 For more on these various cabinet decisions, see Ministry of Defense (Japan), Defense of Japan 2015 (Tokyo, 2015), 315–17, 323–24. [ 114 ]
pajon • japan’s coast guard and maritime self-defense force must bridge legal and operational gaps that still prevent smooth coordination between the JCG and police forces (with respect to law enforcement) and the JMSDF (with respect to national defense). This essay argues that coping with gray-zone situations is particularly challenging for Japan because the country’s security posture is based on a binary, black-and-white system between civilian and military agencies that complicates their coordination. Moreover, if progress in operational cooperation can bridge some of the gaps, the establishment of a legal framework that (1) clarifies the legal definition of what constitute gray-zone situations, (2) articulates the respective roles of the JCG and JMSDF, and (3) expands the rules of engagement of the JMSDF in dealing with these situations would greatly solidify Japan’s deterrence posture in the East China Sea. This essay aims to explain the context of this choice between operational coordination and legal disposition: u pp. 115–19 provide background on gray-zone situations in the East China Sea and context for understanding JCG and JMSDF roles there. u u u pp. 119–24 examine the legal stakes behind JCG-JMSDF coordination, with a focus on the implications of the civilian status of the JCG and the peculiarities of Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law allowing the JMSDF to perform law-enforcement activities. pp. 125–29 address the progress in operational cooperation between the two agencies and highlight remaining challenges. pp. 129–30 conclude the essay by recommending a “whole of government” approach. background on gray-zone situations and the east china sea As explained above, gray-zone situations represent neither peacetime nor wartime situations. In the Japanese political debate on national security strategy, this terminology refers to a number of scenarios. In May 2014 the “Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,” which provided recommendations to revise the interpretation of the constitution and review legal dispositions to strengthen Japan’s security posture, identified six broad cases for discussion. Out of the six, two scenarios touched on the issue of the use of individual self-defense in situations that [ 115 ]
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