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asia policy do not amount to an “armed attack.” 10 The first is when foreign submarines sail submerged in Japan’s territorial seas and refuse to leave despite repeated requests. The second involves an armed group conducting unlawful acts in a sea area or on a remote island where it would be difficult for Japanese civilian authorities (the police forces on land and the JCG at sea) to reply adequately. 11 After the first scenario was shelved by the New Komeito party (renamed simply Komeito in September 2014), the most discussed scenario became the case of armed Chinese fishermen entering Japanese territorial waters and taking control of a remote island. In this scenario, a possible escalation would see the arrest of the intruders by the police forces and the JCG, followed by the deployment of Chinese naval vessels to rescue its citizens. The JMSDF could be deployed on site, at the request of the prime minister’s cabinet, with limited authorization to use force (as law enforcement). This would create a tense situation with a high risk of military incident in which JMSDF and Chinese naval vessels would face off, circling around the islands. Another version would see the JCG overwhelmed by hundreds of Chinese fishing boats from which commandos disguised as fishermen would seize the Senkakus. The dilemma for Japan would be to choose between using force first to displace the intruders and allowing them to remain with the risk of Beijing claiming actual control of the islands. In this version, a clear division between the roles of the JCG and JMSDF, with the latter’s early involvement, would ensure more effective deterrence and a swifter, more consistent response in case of an intrusion. Recourse to nonmilitary tools to advance one’s interest regarding territorial claims or access to natural resources has been used by China to back up its claims in the East and South China Seas. Such tactics have been referred to as “reactive assertiveness” or “salami slicing.” 12 Some experts explain this approach as a form of “hybrid warfare,” by which China uses fishing vessels in combination with paramilitary units such as CCG vessels to gain control of disputed territories. 13 Japan sees this challenge as a core security concern; 10 Later, the number of gray-zone scenarios submitted by the Liberal Democratic Party to discuss with the Komeito party expanded to include the “protection of U.S. warships on alert for ballistic missile launches during peacetime” and “responses to illegal activities that impact on the JSDF when engaged in exercises and other missions in international waters.” Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the “Abe Doctrine” (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 50. 11 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,” May 15, 2014 u http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/ houkoku_en.pdf. 12 Robert Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2012 u http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea. 13 James Kraska and Michael Monti, “The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia,” International Law Studies 91 (2015): 450–67. [ 116 ]
pajon • japan’s coast guard and maritime self-defense force the expansion of Chinese maritime activities since the mid-2000s has resulted in more frequent patrols along the Japanese coastline and incursions into Japanese waters. 14 When a Chinese trawler collided with JCG patrol boats in Japanese territorial waters in 2010, resulting in the arrest of the Chinese skipper and harsh reactions from the Chinese government toward Tokyo, the incident served as a wake-up call. Hereafter, Chinese intrusions in the area happened more frequently. The game-changing move came two years later in September 2012 after the Yoshihiko Noda government’s purchase of three of the Senkaku Islands from their private owner to prevent their acquisition by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara. Beijing reacted harshly, claiming that Japan “broke the status quo in the East China Sea.” 15 During a period of high tension over the next two years, China frequently sent fishing boats and vessels from its maritime surveillance agencies, the CCG (created in 2013), and even the military into waters adjacent to the islands. 16 After Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping met for the first time in November 2014 and reluctantly shook hands, the situation stabilized, and since then maritime intrusions by China have become routinely organized, which will be discussed in more detail below. However, tensions have again escalated since June 2016 with a series of new incursions, beginning with a Chinese warship entering the contiguous water in the East China Sea on June 9. A few days later, a surveillance ship entered Japanese territorial waters off Kagoshima. Then, between August 6 and 10, fifteen Chinese government ships sailed into the Japanese contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands, accompanied by more than 230 fishing boats. 17 In response, the government of Japan issued repeated protests. 14 Among other examples, Chinese naval vessels were spotted patrolling around disputed gas fields in the East China Sea in 2005. Groups of Chinese warships also repeatedly passed through the Tsugaru and Miyako channels in 2008 and 2010 and even circled the entire Japanese archipelago in July 2013. Li Xiaokun, “China Sails through ‘First Island Chain,’ ” China Daily, August 2, 2013 u http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-08/02/content_16863855.htm. 15 The Senkaku Islands have been under Japanese control since 1895. In the 1970s, Beijing and Taipei claimed sovereignty over the islets after a UN report suggested that oil and gas reserves could be found in the surrounding sea areas. While Japan has consistently maintained that there is no territorial dispute, it never posted civilian forces or JSDF troops on the islands. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping proposed to shelve the issue and let the next generation solve it. Tokyo never officially recognized that Deng’s stance could constitute a kind of status quo situation. However, before the purchase of the three islets in September 2012, Tokyo was careful to inform Beijing to avoid any misunderstanding. It was also careful not to follow this move with any buildup on the islands. 16 For an official record of the incursions in the contiguous zone and territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels.” 17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Status of Activities by Chinese Government Vessels and Chinese Fishing Vessels in Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands,” August 26, 2016 u http:// www.mofa.go.jp/files/000180283.pdf. [ 117 ]
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asia policy number 23 • january 2
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