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asia policy up the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) a step further by suggesting that he would be willing to abandon the one-China policy that has guided Washington’s relationship with Beijing since normalization in the 1970s. Accepting a phone call from Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen on December 2 was the first departure, but his statements that followed were even more explicit about his intention to recalibrate the U.S. relationship with the PRC. Second, the Trump administration seems interested in building up U.S. military capabilities, including in the Asia-Pacific. Trump’s Asia advisers have used President Ronald Reagan’s “peace through strength” concept to advocate for a demonstration of U.S. military power. At face value, this strategy may not be all that alarming for allies such as Japan, who prefer that the United States maintain a strong military presence in Asia. How the incoming president intends to use those forces, however, could be more worrisome in the context of a far more contentious U.S.-PRC relationship. Finally, it seems unlikely that the incoming administration will prioritize the Asia-Pacific’s annual multilateral gatherings to the same degree as its predecessor. Support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its related regional meetings, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, is likely to diminish. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Barack Obama have been strong supporters of ASEAN’s efforts to institutionalize a regional summit meeting, and their administrations have supported the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus that seek to find common ground between regional security and military leaders. These broad changes in the U.S. approach to the Asia-Pacific will shape President Trump’s relationship with Japan. First, Washington’s relationship with Beijing will have a significant impact on bilateral ties between Tokyo and Beijing. Should tensions with Beijing rise, Tokyo will feel the impact. A trade war with China would of course be a disaster for most of the Asia-Pacific economies, and Japan’s economy would be badly affected. Any protectionist impulse by the United States would affect China’s exports not only to the United States but also to Japan. Moreover, attempts to levy tariffs on Chinese manufacturers would affect the global supply chain so necessary to Japanese companies operating in the United States. Any strain with the PRC that reduces confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds would shape Japanese exposure as Tokyo is now the largest investor in U.S. government bonds. In short, an economic clash between the United States and China would be harmful to Japan, as it would be to many around the globe. [ 14 ]
oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition Second, tensions with China over Taiwan could shake the foundations of Japanese security. The last time the United States and China disagreed over Taiwan, it led to a military showdown across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s attempts to rattle its sabers at Taipei’s new government unsettle Tokyo. In light of Japan’s continued tensions with China over the Senkaku Islands and in light of China’s vastly improved maritime capabilities, deliberately introducing this level of uncertainty will certainly increase the PRC’s military pressures on Japan. Already Taiwan is being subjected to ever-greater military stress in its waters and airspace. Given the proximity of Japanese southern islands to Taiwan, Japan could easily find itself in the middle of a very uncomfortable military showdown, or Japan itself could become Beijing’s target. On December 9, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force flew six aircraft between Okinawa’s main islands and Miyako Island and another four through the Bashi Strait south of Taiwan. When the aircraft were confronted with Japan Air Self-Defense Force fighters, Chinese officials claimed that the Japanese planes were overly aggressive. Japan denied this version of events. Tensions thus already rose in the East China Sea even before the Trump administration began. Finally, while many in Tokyo may welcome a tougher U.S. posture toward Beijing, there is still considerable concern over how an incoming Trump administration might respond to North Korean provocations. Every new U.S. administration must early on confront Pyongyang’s willingness to provoke Seoul and raise tensions on the peninsula. With the recent announcement of a new UN Security Council resolution, and with Beijing’s acceptance of increasing the economic sanctions on Pyongyang, pressure on Kim Jong-un will rise. China, for example, reportedly reduced its coal imports from North Korea by $700 million in 2016 to conform with the new sanctions. 3 But there are additional troubling signs for the peninsula. The impeachment of President Park Geun-hye has weakened South Korea, and as the Constitutional Court considers Park’s future, a new presidential election looms large, making it likely that a coordinated response to a potential North Korean provocation would be difficult. Raising the temperature of these Northeast Asian relationships over the coming months could lead to a far riskier set of military interactions across the East China Sea. In the absence of military risk-reduction mechanisms between Japan and China, the United States would need to 3 See “China Puts Temporary Ban on North Korean Coal Imports,” Reuters, December 11, 2016 u http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-un-china-idUSKBN14007R. [ 15 ]
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