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asia policy
nuclear weapons in South Korea. 15 But as soon as South Korea declares its
intention to pursue this course, it will face strong headwinds. The nation’s
nuclear power industry would be ruined, as would the country’s traditional
alliance with the United States. The South Korean economy would risk
being dealt international sanctions that could send it into a tailspin.
Moreover, South Korea going nuclear could be a tipping point that leads
other countries in Northeast Asia, namely Japan, to develop their own
nuclear arsenals. Thus, the South arming itself with nuclear weapons is not
a viable response to the North Korean threat.
Dialogue and Negotiation Are Still the Best Option
Sanctions, deterrence, preemptive attacks, and defense, including
THAAD, might not be ideal solutions to the North Korean threat. No
matter how devilish the North is, dialogue and negotiation seem to be the
only viable alternative. The fact that these options did not work in the past
should not be a reason to dismiss them. The United States and regional states
should find common ground against North Korea’s nuclear development.
Sanctions and other pressure should be utilized not as leverage to bring
about the collapse of the North Korean regime but as inducements for
North Korea to return to dialogue and negotiation. By way of conclusion, I
would like to suggest the following ideas. 16
First, we must be frank. We must speak our mind and also hear out
Pyongyang in order to find mutually acceptable solutions. Being deaf to
the North and insisting on unilateral preconditions can lead us nowhere.
Portraying the North as an untrustworthy rogue state would only reinforce
the perception that relations are asymmetrical, hindering meaningful
dialogue and negotiation. We must listen and talk to Pyongyang by placing
ourselves in its shoes.
Second, we must be practical and realistic. The goals for negotiations
must be adjusted to circumstances. We must face the reality that we cannot
make North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities
in the short term. Instead, we should seek a moratorium on its nuclear
program to prevent further production of nuclear materials. Pyongyang has
15 Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, “Korea: Will South Korea’s Non-Nuclear Strategy Defeat North
Korea’s Nuclear Breakout?” in The War That Must Never Be Fought, ed. George P. Schultz and James
E. Goodby (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2015), 377–435.
16 For more on my perspectives on this issue, see Chung-in Moon, “North Korea: A Negotiated
Settlement Remains the Best Hope,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1, 2016 u http://thebulletin.
org/north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-what-now#wt.
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