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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
The U.S.-Australia Alliance in an Era of Change:
Living Complacently?
Michael Clarke
U
.S. primacy is both a strategic choice and an empirical condition, and
thus analysis regarding the future of U.S. primacy should focus on
both ideational (i.e., policy choices) and material variables (i.e., relativities
of power). 1 We are now witnessing significant shifts in the realms of U.S.
primacy that carry great weight for Australia. In material terms, while the
United States remains dominant across a range of measures (e.g., military
spending), 2 it has faced with growing intensity the great challenge of
all hegemonic powers—managing never-ceasing political and military
commitments and maintaining the economic capability to meet them. 3 The
Obama administration has attempted to grapple with this central challenge
via the retrenchment of military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan,
budget sequestration, and a concerted effort to avoid new military and
security commitments. 4
The results of this strategic choice to retrench U.S. commitments
to a more manageable level, however, have been problematic at both the
ideational and systemic levels. Ideationally, as amply demonstrated by the
2016 presidential election, we have seen the rise of a “restraint constituency”
among a significant segment of the U.S. public that openly questions both
the viability and desirability of maintaining U.S. primacy in international
affairs. 5 In a systemic context, perceptions of U.S. retrenchment have
michael clarke is an Associate Professor in the National Security College at the Australian
National University. He can be reached at .
1 Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” International Security 17,
no. 4 (1993): 52–53.
2 In 2015, U.S. military expenditure was $596 billion compared with China’s $215 billion and Russia’s
$66.4 billion. See Sam Perlo-Freeman, Aude Fleurant, Pieter Wezeman, and Siemon Wezeman,
“Trends in World Military Expenditure,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
SIPRI Factsheet, April 2016 u https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EMBARGO%20FS1604%20
Milex%202015.pdf.
3 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500
to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
4 For instance, see Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” Atlantic, April 2016, 70–90; and
Andreas Krieg, “Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in
the Middle East,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016): 97–113.
5 Trevor Thrall, “Primed against Primacy: The Restraint Constituency and U.S. Foreign Policy,” War
on the Rocks, September 15, 2016 u http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/primed-against-primacythe-restraint-constituency-and-u-s-foreign-policy.
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