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asia policy
firms that are known to have a connection to North Korean capital flows.
Tracking the DPRK accounts themselves may be difficult, but as the Banco
Delta Case demonstrates, it is possible to pursue such actions. Second,
governments could target the marine owners, managers, and insurance
providers that operate vessels bound for the DPRK. Payments must be made
to the owners and managers of vessels entering North Korean ports, and if
governments identified and targeted this revenue stream, their enforcement
of sanctions would be much more effective. Finally, governments could target
offshore intermediaries like Orion House that profit from setting up holding
companies. In all three policy options, the target would not be the DPRK itself
but the flow of money from the regime to third parties.
If the international community is to continue to employ financial
sanctions against the Kim regime as a deterrent to nuclear proliferation or
human rights abuses, these connections to offshore capital must be addressed
in a way that impedes capital flows between the regime and vessel owners.
Measures that simply target the regime itself have not proved effective. The
human rights crisis in the DPRK may be beyond imagination, but it is not
beyond resolve. Effectively addressing this crisis, as well as North Korea’s
growing nuclear weapons program, requires actions that expose the links
to broader networks of subaltern capital. The failure to do so will enable the
Kim regime’s survival and the North’s continued violation of human rights
and nuclearization.
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