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Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies
2003, 5 Čapljina 2007). During the presidential campaign in 2009 in Croatia, the major
promise of the (non-elected) presidential candidate of HDZ (A. Hebrang) was to
erect a monument to Tuđman in Zagreb. Željko Kerum, mayor of Split, promised to
erect a Tuđman monument on the seafront promenade, contrary to the opinion of city
urbanists. Th ere are numerous examples of sculptural or name memorialization (a bust
of Tuđman placed in the Croatian Parliament, the bridge at Osjek, etc.).
Th e importance of monument policy can be seen in the decision of Split city council
(October 2007) to erect 21 monuments to important fi gures in Croatian and Split
history, which provoked a huge debate around Miljenko Smoje, a deceased humorist
writer accused of pro-Yugoslavian and left ist statements, as being unworthy of having a
monument in Split. 6
To what extent monument policy was linked to ethnic identity could be seen through
demands for “ethnic purity” in constructing the monuments. When the monument to
the defenders of Makarska (Croatia) was created the rumour was spread that the grass
around the monument had been brought from the Republika Srpska. Th e mayor had to
address the media and guarantee on his honour that it was not the case. On the other
side, the Serbian Church in Kosovo argued that in the reconstruction of the sacral
objects destroyed aft er the riots in 2004 the participation of non-Orthodox workers
should not be allowed.
At the same time in Serbia, monuments had been created to fulfi l several tasks:
- Monuments to Nikola Pašić contribute to the Serbianization of history, as Pašić
was a Serbian political leader opposing the Yugoslavian idea. Nationalists wanted
to promote him as a role-model for today’s politicians. He also had to be a link
towards the “glorious” Serbian past, which had been erased from history books
and the collective memory of the people.
- Th e Draža Mihajlović monument challenged the offi cial history of the communist
anti-fascist partisan movement. It is a monument bringing a completely new
narrative to the collective memory, as well as monuments to Saint Sava, 7
Karađorđe and Nikola Tesla.
At fi rst sight it might seem strange why these personalities have been regarded in the
same category. It is important to underline that the monument policy behind these
projects was the same. Th is policy wanted to inscribe Serbianhood on the face of the
5 Th is was 3.20 metres high, donated by the Diaspora.
6 http://www.glasdalmacije.hr/?show=0&article=4777, 15 October 2007, accessed 27 May
2010.
7 Th e desecularization process was followed by the return of Saint Sava as a public fi gure
(created by the autonomous Serbian Orthodox Church) and celebrated with a great number
of his monuments erected in the 1990s .
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