qui - maria vita romeo

e other Mandeville: the origins of a scandalous thought. Mechanism, ecc. 67
e Metaphysical Principle of Monsieur Des Cartes, Cogito ergo sum, is a very
good one, because it is the first truth, of which a Man can well be sure, and we
all agree, some few Atheists excepted, that matter it self can never think, how
elaborately fine soever it may be supposed. From these two Truths it is a very just
inference to say; that we consist of a Body and a Soul. How they reciprocally
work upon and affect one another, ‘tis true, we cannot tell, and whether the Soul
be seated in some particular part of, or is diffus’d through all the Brain, the
Blood or the whole Body, is likewise not easie to be determined: But tho’ these
things are Mysterious to us, yet from the Experience we have of our Composition,
and what every moment we may feel within our selves, we can assert not
only, that there must be an immediate Commerce between the Body and the
Soul; but likewise that the action of thinking in which all, what we know of the
latter, consists, is to our certain knowledge perform’d more in the Head than it
is in the Elbow or the Knee: From this we may further conclude, that as the Soul
acts not immediately upon Bone, Flesh, Blood, &c. nor they upon that, so there
must be some exquisitely small Particles, that are the Internuncii between them,
by the help of which they manifest themselves to each other. 52
While in the 1730 edition, instead of the above quotation, there is:
But then it is to be consider’d, that human Knowledge can only come a posteriori.
You’ll give me Leave to trace it from the Beginning; and I’ll be content to
start with Monsieur Descartes, and at my first setting out to doubt of every thing.
Now as Doubting must always imply inking, and it is impossible that I should
perceive the first without being confident of the latter, I take this his Metaphysical
Principle, Cogito, ergo sum, to be a very Just one; because it is the first Truth
of which a Man can be well sure: and if from our being conscious that we think,
we may not safely conclude that we exist, then we can be certain of nothing. e
next thing to be enquir’d into is, what it is, which Part of us, that performs this
Operation, this Act of inking. But here, I know very well from what you advanced
Yesterday, concerning our Ignorance, as to all Properties of Matter, I shall
not be able to assert any thing, strictly speaking, without Supposition. 53
ese two passages clearly display that the 1711 distinction between
soul and body, also supported by “animal spirits” conception as intermediaries
between them—i.e. Internuncii—becomes in 1730 more wary and,
52 Treatise 1711, pp. 124-125 (emphasis in the text).
53 Treatise 1730, p. 154 (emphasis in the text).