qui - maria vita romeo

72 Alessandro Chiessi
Cleo. I believe they do, though in a Degree of Perfection far inferior to us.
Hor. What is it, that superintends ought in them? where must we look for it?
which is the main Spring?
Cleo. I can answer you no otherwise, than Life.
Hor. What is Life?
Cleo. Every body understands the Meaning of the Word, though, perhaps, no
body knows the Principle of Life, that Part which gives Motion to all the rest. 67
Recalling two of the argumentative couples, i.e. the flattening of soul
onto body and the related closeness between mankind and brutes implies
a shift from mechanism to a sort of materialism, which sets life as cause
that “gives Motion to all the rest.” So the mechanistic paradigm explains
descriptively the mechanism of “animal spirits,” but at the same time, finds
in the concept of life an explanation of motion, that is a physiological motion
and so natural. is is why I talk about physiological naturalism in
relation to Mandeville’s thought: with this category, I think, it is possible
to trace but also to summarize empiricism, Hobbes’ materialism and
Descartes’ mechanism. 68 Using a reverse process compared to a posteriori
empirical cognitive method, nature can be considered an ontological principle,
which brings to human nature—metaphysically corrupted. Human
nature, in turn, finds in life the causal principle of the mechanical motion
of these particles— “animal spirits”—which, at the end, allow the movement
of body, feelings and thought. So human (and animal) nature is part
of nature tout court and from it flow a mechanical description of the corporeal/material
and mental movements. Nevertheless, in Mandeville’s
thought, there is yet a problem: the relation between human nature and
nature. If human nature can be viewed metaphysically corrupt, 69 the same
67 Ivi, pp. 166-167.
68 From my point of view here I cannot talk about vitalism, because I’m not dealing with a theory
that wants to give priority to the structure in respect to the elements composing it. Mandeville
empirically—as the anatomist of human nature—considers “animal spirits” as instruments that, being
material, mechanically act and find in life their cause. Life itself is part of human nature and the
latter, part of nature tout court. To interpret Mandeville as anatomist of human nature, cf. E. Lecaldano,
Hume e la nascita dell’etica contemporanea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1991. To deepen the Mandeville’s
concept of corrupted (human) nature and its metaphysical implications, again cf. A. Chiessi,
Mandeville e la necessità de vizi, in P. Vincieri (ed), Corruzione, Decadenza, Declino, cit., pp. 167-197.
69 Fable I, p. 166.