PEAK OIL

(B) New conflict factors as a result of substitution
Owing to new or changed factors – in particular efforts to substitute oil – the described
conflict constellations could shift and thus expand their complexity. Oil as a conflict factor
could be replaced in different constellations, for example by the possible factors natural gas
and nuclear energy as early as within the next decades, or, in the long run, by renewable
energies or resources for renewable energies (cf. Chapter 3.1.3). Since future natural gas
deposits will be largely congruent with the Strategic Ellipse, most current oil producer
countries would be relevant for natural gas. Specific differences in the transportability and
usability of gas resources imply, however – as described in Chapter 3.1.3 – different
consequences or cause-effect relations in some cases, for example with regard to the stability
of supply relationships. Nuclear energy could factor in all four of the conflict constellations
above, not so much regarding nuclear fuel or the energy produced, but rather regarding
associated technologies or their risks such as the abuse of nuclear material.
Renewable energies are hardly ever associated with the terms “resource conflict” or “conflict
resource”, owing to their decentralised character and local availability, their environmentally
friendly and sustainable nature. They are generally not finite, which means they can be
exploited over and over again and in this regard are also “divisible”, combine ecological and
economic advantages under favourable conditions, and open up opportunities for economic
and social development. Nevertheless, they – or rather their efficient usage – are often not
distributed equally on the global or regional level. In this context – albeit in a different
manner – importers and exporters could thus evolve, and, along the constellations as
described above for oil, competition between them or even conflicts within exporting
countries could develop. The production of bioenergy in particular is often associated today
with conflicts in the relevant exporting countries. Likewise, intensified conflicts between
importing countries could develop, for example when the exploration of or direct access to
cultivation areas is at stake. 167 Regarding the creation of wide-ranging joint projects to
harvest solar energy, there are possible points of reference with all four conflict
constellations, even though the intention of such projects is often a combination of energy
security for importing countries with development chances for exporting countries. For
critical infrastructure relevant in connection with substitutes it would be possible to draw
conclusions similar to the ones for oil-critical infrastructures, albeit of a slightly different
nature (cf. Chapter 3.1.3).
(C) New player relations in conflict constellations
The potentially shifting relationship between state and non-state actors under peak oil
conditions (cf. Chapter 3.1.2) could also change those conflict constellations that have so far
mainly applied to state actors. The spectrum ranges from relations between state institutions
and large energy companies to the actions of non-state, commercial actors in fragile
statehood environments. New conflict lines could thus also emerge within these
167 Cf. Solveig Richter and Jörn Richert, “Kooperation oder Eskalation? Warum Rohstoffknappheit nicht zwangsläufig zu Konflikten führt”, in Internationale Politik
(November/December 2009), 10-16, here 10, http://www.internationalepolitik.de/ip/archiv/jahrgang-2009/earth--wind-fire/download/1dec21cc7b552a8c21c11dea75b65d7b87564156415/original_11_richter_richert.pdf
(accessed on 13 October 2010).
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