PEAK OIL

4.8. Effects of Peak Oil on Armed Forces
Severe impediments to mobility as a consequence of peak oil would have a considerable
effect on all German security bodies, including the Bundeswehr. 196 In the long run, not only
all societies and economies worldwide but armed forces as well will be faced with the
various and difficult challenges of transformation towards a “post-fossil” age.
Implications for Germany: A markedly reduced mobility of the German Armed Forces
would have various consequences – not only for the available equipment and training, but
also for their (global) power projection and intervention capabilities. Given the size and
complexity of many transport and weapon systems as well as the high standards set for
qualities like robustness in operation, alternative energy and drive propulsion systems would
hardly be available to the necessary extent in the short term. One of the consequences to be
initially expected would be further cutbacks in the use of large weapon systems for training
purposes in all services, thus raising the need for more “virtualised” training. However,
effects on current and planned missions would most likely be even more severe. Deployment
to the theatre of operations, the operation of bases and the mission itself are considerably
more energy- and above all fuel-intensive than the mere upkeep of armed forces. 197 Rapid
operations of highly mobile forces, which are regularly deployed by air, would be particularly
affected, as well as air force missions, laying severe restrictions upon these types of
operations. Despite being common practice, alternative solutions for deployment like
increased rail transport or a markedly more efficient transport of equipment, supplies or even
personnel by ship are unlikely to provide full substitution. 198 Especially with regard to
deployments from railway stations and sea ports into the operations area (“the last mile”)
and deployments within theatres of operations lacking access to sea or railway, combustion
engine based drive propulsion systems will not as easily be substitutable. The same applies to
tactical mobility.
While conflicts in (remote) troubled regions could thus potentially increase with peak oil (see
Chapter 3.3), the corresponding world-wide – including humanitarian – involvement of
armed forces could be even further restricted in terms of resources. Such involvement could
thus become even more politically and economically controversial and harder to put through
– especially if it requires a relatively large commitment of equipment and personnel by the
military in order to succeed. National, non-mission-related deployment over a wide area,
196 In addition to economic problems, some states could see challenged their armed forces’ capacity to act.
197 Currently, especially the transport of fuel to the area of deployment ties up considerable logistic and ultimately military resources. “The example that I like to use is
getting a gallon of gasoline to a Marine front line unit in Afghanistan. You have to put that gallon of gasoline on a tanker. You've got to take it across the Pacific. You have to
put it into a truck, and truck it over the Hindu Kush and down through Afghanistan. Now, as you do this, you've got to guard it.” Ray Mabus, SECNAV Discusses Future Of
Alternative Energy Sources, Navy News Service, June 2010; “Although fuel costs represent less than 3 percent of the Defense Department budget, indirect costs such as
those for transporting fuel to battlefields and distributing it to the end-user, add to the total. When the cost of the army's entire logistics network is added to the cost of
delivered fuel, gas prices are $13-$19 per gallon. In the air force, these costs can be much higher, military grade jet fuel delivered through aerial refueling costs upwards of
$42 a gallon.” Sohbet Karbuz, “Can the U.S. military move to renewable fuels?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/canthe-us-military-move-to-renewable-fuels
(accessed on 14 October 2010).
198 Such as the current relocation of US armed forces from Iraq, with partial relocation of materiel to Afghanistan by sea and rail.
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