PEAK OIL

4.5. The Proliferation of Nuclear Technology and Material
Consequences of peak oil may include a greater reliance on nuclear energy, which could
promote the expansion and proliferation of nuclear technology and materials. This would
not only increase the number of real or potential nuclear powers, but also the risk of
nuclear accidents or the use of nuclear material for terrorist purposes.
Implications for Germany: Germany, as a peripheral player in matters of nuclear power,
can only become involved in international treaties and mechanisms for the prevention of
proliferation as part of a multinational effort. However, the impact of such non-proliferation
and control regimes is very much dependent on context. A central issue is the enrichment of
nuclear fuel, which can potentially lead to the development of nuclear weapons. Large
nuclear powers frequently offer an exchange of enriched fuel elements to states wanting to
use nuclear energy in the future, thus promoting a multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel
cycle. 185 As a supplier of key technologies, which, as dual-use technologies, could be equally
used to enrich nuclear material or build nuclear weapons, Germany would have to continue
to fulfil its responsibility by exerting control over exports. The transfer of technological dualuse
expertise is even harder to detect and prevent than the export of goods – especially in
these times of global networking. Moreover, the enforcement of – usually economic –
sanctions to prevent nuclear armament or proliferation will probably become ever more
difficult under the conditions of peak oil. International obligations and alliance memberships
are likely to be overtaken by emerging bilateral economic relations. Especially the nuclear
ambitions of “problem states” may cause new dynamics of proliferation, including in
cooperation with non-state actors. In this regard, the active prevention of proliferation will be
even less a matter of international treaties. The pursuit of nuclear weapons and the fight for
resources could turn into a self-perpetuating spiral. 186
In light of the threat posed by terrorist attacks and accidents, comprehensive protection of a
nation's own nuclear facilities and materials is an enduring obligation. 187 Since incidents
involving nuclear material can easily have cross-border consequences, international
cooperation in this field is becoming increasingly important. This concerns not only
institutional cooperation but also the exchange of technologies and mechanisms for
radiological security, in Germany’s case especially with Eastern European states. 188 Assuming
that the smuggling of nuclear material will increase further, Germany may in future play an
even greater role as a transit country, owing to its location in Central Europe. The (cross-
185 This recently occurred between the United States and the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, as well as between Russia and Iran. Cf. Sascha Albrecht and Oliver
Trähnert, “Die Multilateralisierung des nuklearen Brennstoffkreislaufs”, SWP-Aktuell 31 (April 2010), http://www.swpberlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=6948,
(accessed on 14 October 2010).
186 Cf. Bundesnachrichtendienst, Proliferation von Massenvernichtungsmitteln und Trägerraketen, (Berlin/Pullach 2002).
187 This includes not only nuclear power plants but also enrichment and reprocessing plants, transport routes, temporary and permanent repositories and especially
research reactors as well as the large number of sources of radiation for civilian and industrial use, which are even harder to monitor. In addition to active facilities, disused
facilities or sources must be factored in.
188 The security of nuclear sources and facilities is generally considered to be a national responsibility. While there are few international treaties on the subject, the
international harmonisation and coordination of security standards and safety measures is a continuing task. Cf. Gebhard Geiger, Radiologische Sicherheit.
Sicherheitspolitische Gefährdungspotenziale radioaktiver Materialien, SWP-Studie 24 (June 2004), 15, http://www.swpberlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=1408
(accessed on 14 October 2010). As part of international cooperation, this may involve the training of security and
emergency response personnel and their cross-border cooperation.
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