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Conference Sessions - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of ...

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■ TC06<br />

Legends Ballroom VII<br />

Competition III: General<br />

Contributed Session<br />

Chair: Vincent Mak, Judge Business <strong>School</strong>, University <strong>of</strong> Cambridge,<br />

Judge Business <strong>School</strong>, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG,<br />

United Kingdom, v.mak@jbs.cam.ac.uk<br />

1 - What if Marketers Put Customers Ahead <strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>its?<br />

Scott Shriver, Stanford GSB, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA,<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America, scott.shriver@gsb.stanford.edu,<br />

V. “Seenu” Srinivasan<br />

We examine a duopoly where one <strong>of</strong> the firms does not maximize pr<strong>of</strong>it, but instead<br />

maximizes customer surplus subject to a pr<strong>of</strong>it constraint. The model assumes<br />

customer willingness to pay for quality is uniformly distributed and that customers<br />

follow a simple decision rule: when presented with two products <strong>of</strong> known quality<br />

and price, purchase one unit <strong>of</strong> the product which maximizes surplus, or if surplus is<br />

negative for both products, elect not to purchase any product. We further assume<br />

that firms’ marginal cost <strong>of</strong> production is convex (quadratic) in quality. Competition<br />

between firms is modeled as a two-stage game, which is solvable by backward<br />

induction. In the first stage, firms choose product quality levels sequentially, fully<br />

anticipating subsequent price competition. In the second stage, firms take qualities as<br />

given and choose prices simultaneously in accordance with a Nash equilibrium. Two<br />

possibilities are considered: (a) the first mover is the pr<strong>of</strong>it maximizing firm, and (b)<br />

the first mover is the surplus maximizing firm. We compare the results to the<br />

corresponding base case <strong>of</strong> Moorthy (1988), where both firms are pr<strong>of</strong>it maximizing.<br />

We find that firms can deliver significant additional value to their customers by<br />

forgoing small amounts <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it. The effectiveness <strong>of</strong> this strategy depends upon<br />

which firm is the first mover. In the case that the surplus-maximizing firm moves<br />

first, 5%-10% increases in customer surplus “cost” 10%-20% <strong>of</strong> potential pr<strong>of</strong>its. By<br />

contrast, when the pr<strong>of</strong>it-maximizing firm chooses quality first, we find that<br />

sacrificing 20% <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its is sufficient for the surplus-maximizing firm to more than<br />

triple the customer surplus it would have provided under a pr<strong>of</strong>it-maximizing<br />

objective.<br />

2 - Gaining from Imitative Entry: Dynamic Durable Pricing with Rational<br />

Consumer Expectations<br />

Lu Qiang, City University <strong>of</strong> Hong Kong, ACAD P7701, 83 Tat Chee<br />

Avenue, Kowloon Tong,Hong Kong - PRC, qianglu@cityu.edu.hk,<br />

Wei-yu Kevin Chiang<br />

This paper investigates the impact <strong>of</strong> imitative entry on intertemporal pricing strategy<br />

<strong>of</strong> an innovator (brand-name company) selling a new durable in a two-period<br />

dynamic framework. While acting as a monopolist in the first period, the innovator<br />

faces competitive entry <strong>of</strong> an imitator in the second one. The market consists <strong>of</strong> loyal<br />

versus non-loyal segments <strong>of</strong> consumers who are heterogeneous in their valuation <strong>of</strong><br />

product. The loyal customers buy only from the innovator. Before deciding when to<br />

buy, they rationally anticipate the pricing policy to be followed by the innovator who<br />

is unable to credibly commit in advance to the second-period price. On the other<br />

hand, the non-loyal customers are price-sensitive and only act in the second period.<br />

In making a purchase decision, they compare the benefit <strong>of</strong> buying from the<br />

innovator against that from the imitator. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the<br />

equilibrium <strong>of</strong> a two-stage pricing game between the innovator and the imitator<br />

indicates that imitative entry may potentially benefit the innovator. We provide<br />

specific explanations and implications to this counter-intuitive finding by looking<br />

further into the dynamic pricing strategy <strong>of</strong> the innovator and the corresponding<br />

purchasing choice <strong>of</strong> the rational consumers.<br />

3 - KFC and McDonald’s Entry in China: Competitors or Companions?<br />

Qiaowei Shen, Assistant Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Marketing, The Wharton <strong>School</strong>,<br />

University <strong>of</strong> Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, JMHH 700,<br />

Philadelphia, PA, 19104, United States <strong>of</strong> America,<br />

qshen@wharton.upenn.edu, Ping Xiao<br />

In this paper, we study the entry <strong>of</strong> McDonald’s and KFC, the two largest fast food<br />

chain restaurants in the world, in China, which is the world’s largest emerging<br />

market. Our data covers the entire history <strong>of</strong> entry by the two chains from 1987<br />

when the first KFC outlet opened in Beijing up to year 2007, when more than 200<br />

cities have KFC or McDonald’s or both. We are particularly interested in how the<br />

duopoly western fast food chains may influence each other in their decision to enter<br />

a new city or open additional outlets in an existing market (city). We find that the<br />

scale <strong>of</strong> rival presence as indicated by the cumulative number <strong>of</strong> outlets has a positive<br />

effect on a chain’s entry decision after controlling for local economic conditions,<br />

regional time-invariant unobservables and time trend. We find evidence that such<br />

positive effect is due to firm learning about uncertain market demand. Furthermore,<br />

the effect varies by time period (e.g. before 1999 vs. after 1999) and by city type (big<br />

city vs. small city).<br />

MARKETING SCIENCE CONFERENCE – 2011 TC07<br />

21<br />

4 - Dominance and Innovation in a Dynamic Macro Environment<br />

Vincent Mak, Judge Business <strong>School</strong>, University <strong>of</strong> Cambridge,<br />

Judge Business <strong>School</strong>, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG,<br />

United Kingdom, v.mak@jbs.cam.ac.uk, Jaideep Prabhu,<br />

Rajesh Chandy, Chander Velu<br />

One <strong>of</strong> the most widely contested issues in innovation research is whether dominant<br />

firms tend to be lethargic or pioneering with innovations. Both theoretical and<br />

empirical evidence is divided on this topic. In this paper, we propose one way to<br />

reconcile these differences. We build a game-theoretic model that highlights a key<br />

driver <strong>of</strong> innovation by dominant as well as less dominant firms: the macro<br />

environment faced by these firms. Specifically, the model focuses on how changes in<br />

market pr<strong>of</strong>itability due to exogenous changes in competing firms’ macro<br />

environment affect the innovation strategies <strong>of</strong> these firms. We show that in<br />

environments with rapidly declining pr<strong>of</strong>itability, dominant firms are likely to be<br />

lethargic and innovate incrementally, while in environments with rapidly growing<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability, dominant firms innovate radically and ahead <strong>of</strong> competitors.<br />

Surprisingly, we also find that a firm in an environment with rapidly growing<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability might innovate at a later time (if at all) and earn a lower expected pr<strong>of</strong>it<br />

when its probability <strong>of</strong> succeeding with a radical innovation increases. Finally, we<br />

examine a case in which the macro environment is pr<strong>of</strong>itable throughout, and find<br />

that in such situations a hybrid innovation pattern can emerge whereby the<br />

dominant firm innovates radically but late.<br />

■ TC07<br />

Founders I<br />

ASA Special Session on the Marketing-Statistics<br />

Interface - III<br />

Cluster: Special <strong>Sessions</strong><br />

Invited Session<br />

Chair: Michael Braun, Massacusetts Institute <strong>of</strong> Technology, 100 Main<br />

Street, Cambridge, MA, United States <strong>of</strong> America, braunm@mit.edu<br />

1 - Customer Waiting Time and Purchasing Behavior: An Empirical Study<br />

<strong>of</strong> Supermarket Queues<br />

Andrés Musalem, Duke University, Fuqua <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> Business,<br />

100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC, 27708, United States <strong>of</strong> America,<br />

andres.musalem@duke.edu, Yina Lu, Marcelo Olivares,<br />

Ariel Schilkrut<br />

The design <strong>of</strong> services requires making decisions about service features, employee<br />

selection and training, staffing levels and standards <strong>of</strong> service quality. The traditional<br />

approach has been to design and manage services to attain a quantifiable service<br />

standard – for example, call centers are designed to guarantee that a fraction <strong>of</strong> their<br />

customers (say 95%) are served within a given waiting time (e.g., 30 seconds). These<br />

design decisions usually involve trade-<strong>of</strong>fs between the costs <strong>of</strong> sustaining a certain<br />

service standard versus the value that customers attach to this level <strong>of</strong> service. In<br />

contrast with extant literature that focuses on subjective measures <strong>of</strong> service quality,<br />

in this paper we measure the effect <strong>of</strong> objective measures <strong>of</strong> service quality – in<br />

particular, waiting time <strong>of</strong> customers in a queue – on actual customer purchasing<br />

behavior. Accordingly we develop a methodology which can be used to attach a<br />

financial tag on the implications <strong>of</strong> having customers waiting for service. Our paper<br />

uses a novel data set which was collected through digital cameras and image<br />

recognition s<strong>of</strong>tware. Conducting a pilot study in the fresh deli section <strong>of</strong> a large<br />

supermarket, we collected data on queue lengths and number <strong>of</strong> staff members<br />

providing service every 30 minutes during a 6 month period. In addition, we<br />

obtained point-<strong>of</strong>-sales (POS) data from all relevant transactions during this time<br />

period. The time-stamp <strong>of</strong> the POS transaction is used to link the snapshot data from<br />

the queue with the customer purchase data and data augmentation methods are used<br />

to account for the uncertainty about the exact queue length that customers<br />

experience. A key feature <strong>of</strong> the supermarket we study is that a large fraction <strong>of</strong> their<br />

purchases are from loyalty card holders. This is used to construct a panel data set <strong>of</strong><br />

customer purchases, which enables us to control for customer heterogeneity in<br />

purchasing behavior using Bayesian methods.<br />

2 - Forecasting Customer Purchase Rates Incorporating<br />

Temporal Variation<br />

Luo Lu, Stanford University, Sequoia Hall, Stanford, CA,<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America, luolu@stanford.edu, Zainab Jamal<br />

When predicting the future purchasing patterns <strong>of</strong> customers, the expected number<br />

<strong>of</strong> transactions in a future period is an important factor in the “lifetime value”<br />

calculations for each individual customer. Among the extant models that provide<br />

such capabilities, the BG/NBD model stands out. Under this framework, a major<br />

assumption is that the number <strong>of</strong> transactions made by a customer follows a Poisson<br />

process with a fixed transaction rate. However, in the real world the transaction rates<br />

may vary based on time. For example, in our empirical data from an online digital<br />

sharing service, we found a “seasonal pattern” which indicates that the customers<br />

intend to make more purchases in summer and winter. We also found that the<br />

customers make less purchases as time goes by, indicating an “annual pattern”. We<br />

replaced the homogeneous Poisson process in the BG/NBD model by a nonhomogeneous<br />

one to include the seasonal and yearly factors in the transaction rates<br />

and used a Bayesian framework to estimate the model at an individual level. The<br />

results demonstrate the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the proposed methods.

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