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Conference Sessions - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of ...

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shift in the demand curve. Most <strong>of</strong> the explanations proposed for this phenomenon<br />

are based on competitive interactions among firms. I focus on consumer-level insights<br />

that could provide a rationale for a countercyclical pricing scheme. I show<br />

theoretically that the optimal pricing scheme for a seasonal product could be<br />

countercyclical due to consumer heterogeneity with respect to seasonal shifts in<br />

demand. The monopolist then makes use <strong>of</strong> this heterogeneity to sell only to the<br />

higher valuation segment during low season. I also provide empirical support for this<br />

theory using two different datasets <strong>of</strong> canned soup sales. Using a store-level aggregate<br />

sales dataset, I provide evidence against alternative explanations and I document that<br />

the demand appears to become more price inelastic during high season. I show that<br />

this finding can be explained by the existence <strong>of</strong> a break in the demand curve due to<br />

presence <strong>of</strong> different consumer segments. On a different dataset <strong>of</strong> consumer-level<br />

purchases, I show that the fit <strong>of</strong> a purchase incidence model improves when it allows<br />

for consumer segments that differ in their valuations across seasons. The estimates<br />

obtained for segment specific product valuations are in line with the predictions <strong>of</strong><br />

the proposed model.<br />

2 - A Structural Model for a “Name Your Own Price” Mechanism with a<br />

Fixed Price Option<br />

Kerem Yener Toklu, Rice University, 6100 Main St, Houston, TX,<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America, kt3@rice.edu<br />

This paper provides an empirical analysis for a version <strong>of</strong> the “Name Your Own Price”<br />

mechanism used in an online marketplace where buyers also have the option to<br />

purchase the item at a fixed price determined by the seller. This particular sale type<br />

with the additional fixed price feature has not been paid much attention in the<br />

literature. Structural econometric techniques are employed to estimate the<br />

distribution <strong>of</strong> buyers’ valuations which is then used to find the optimal fixed price<br />

for the seller and quantify the value <strong>of</strong> information. First, a decision theoretic model<br />

is used and the optimal buying strategy is characterized. A nonparametric method is<br />

then proposed to estimate the distribution <strong>of</strong> values. To generalize the model for<br />

different buying strategies a behavioral model is also considered under weaker<br />

assumptions and parametric estimation is used to capture a number <strong>of</strong> sale and item<br />

covariates. Calibrated models are then used to run counterfactual simulations to find<br />

revenue maximizing fixed prices for sellers. Aside from characterizing buyer behavior<br />

and optimal selling strategies, the paper also studies the information asymmetry<br />

between sellers and buyers, and provides a way to quantify the value <strong>of</strong> information.<br />

It is prevalent in online market places that the quality <strong>of</strong> the item being sold may not<br />

be reflected perfectly on the sale webpage which raises an information asymmetry<br />

between sellers and buyers. The uncertainty in the quality <strong>of</strong> the item directly<br />

influences the value <strong>of</strong> buyers, and knowing this, sellers reveal information using<br />

different channels on the webpage. Amount <strong>of</strong> this information is used as a variable<br />

and simulations are run to measure the effect <strong>of</strong> information asymmetry on sale<br />

prices and quantify the value <strong>of</strong> information for buyers.<br />

3 - Framing Effects and Consumers’ Reactions to Corporate<br />

Social Responsibility<br />

Carmelo J. Leon, Department <strong>of</strong> Applied Economic Analysis,<br />

University <strong>of</strong> Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, C/Juan de Quesada, n∫ 30,<br />

Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain, cleon@daea.ulpgc.es,<br />

Jorge Araña, Christine Eckert<br />

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) might raise different reactions across consumers<br />

depending on the way they are framed in their marketing and selling process. In this<br />

paper we focus on the effects <strong>of</strong> alternative frames for CSR measures. Whereas<br />

previous research only focused on single evaluations <strong>of</strong> each CSR policy separately<br />

and thus ignored potential trade-<strong>of</strong>fs consumers face when deciding between<br />

different CSR-policies companies <strong>of</strong>fer, we utilize discrete choice experiments (DCE)<br />

that more realistically picture consumers’ every-day choices. Subjects were presented<br />

with alternative pr<strong>of</strong>iles <strong>of</strong> CSR measures and were divided into two treatments that<br />

varied according to the definition <strong>of</strong> the status quo alternative and the valuation<br />

question. The design <strong>of</strong> the experiments allowed us to compare the willingness to pay<br />

(WTP) a higher price for a product undertaking CSR measures and the willingness to<br />

accept (WTA) a lower price for a product with a lower CSR pr<strong>of</strong>ile. By disentangling<br />

the effects <strong>of</strong> differences in choice uncertainty (i.e. choice scale) and preferences<br />

between the two scenarios, we are able to show that the WTA/WTP gap exists only<br />

for some CSR policies but doesn’t show up for others. Our results further<br />

demonstrate that measures for WTA and WTP are significantly more dispersed in<br />

choice experiments with joint evaluations <strong>of</strong> different CSR policies than in single<br />

evaluation – which is likely to be caused by the availability <strong>of</strong> reference alternatives<br />

consumers use to form preferences in the former situation.<br />

4 - Pricing and Willingness-to-pay Estimation in B2B Markets<br />

Neil Biehn, Senior Director, PROS Pricing, 3100 Main Street, Houston,<br />

TX, 77002, United States <strong>of</strong> America, nbiehn@prospricing.com<br />

There has been considerable research, as well as the application <strong>of</strong> various marketing<br />

techniques, to capture consumers’ Willingness-to-Pay. In this talk, we discuss why<br />

many <strong>of</strong> the common techniques are difficult to implement in a B2B environment.<br />

We will also explore a more data driven approach to capturing the Willingness-to-Pay<br />

<strong>of</strong> a B2B customer and present results from its implementation.<br />

MARKETING SCIENCE CONFERENCE – 2011 TA15<br />

9<br />

■ TA15<br />

Champions Center V<br />

B2B: Relationships<br />

Contributed Session<br />

Chair: Alfred Zerres, Institute <strong>of</strong> Business-to-Business Marketing,<br />

University <strong>of</strong> Muenster, Am Stadtgraben 13-15, Münster, 48143, Germany,<br />

alfred.zerres@uni-muenster.de<br />

1 - A Theory <strong>of</strong> Bargaining Costs and Price Terms in the Absence <strong>of</strong><br />

Relationship-specific Investments<br />

Desmond (Ho-Fu) Lo, Assistant Pr<strong>of</strong>essor, Santa Clara University,<br />

500 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA, 95050,<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America, hlo@scu.edu, Giorgio Zanarone<br />

Firms <strong>of</strong>ten bring pre-existing assets such as brand and market strength into joint<br />

business ventures. We model a bargaining process and price terms in these ventures<br />

as a tension between saving ex ante contract design costs and facing ex post<br />

opportunism, in the shadow <strong>of</strong> judicial behavior. On the one hand, to save on design<br />

costs, parties can leave price open for future negotiations and face ex post dilution in<br />

their pre-existing assets through wasteful bargaining actions. On the other hand,<br />

parties can go through the effort <strong>of</strong> fixing the contract price ex ante and thus prevent<br />

opportunistic renegotiations through a credible threat <strong>of</strong> having the contract<br />

reinstated by courts. We show that firms prefer to specify the contract terms ex ante<br />

when the value <strong>of</strong> their pre-existing assets is high and the environment is not<br />

complex. Our theory adds to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) by (1) formalizing a<br />

bargaining process that is observed in the real world and its effect, together with the<br />

judicial principle <strong>of</strong> contract reinstatement, on price terms and (2) extending the TCE<br />

rationale to settings where the assets brought into production are not relationshipspecific.<br />

2 - Assessment <strong>of</strong> Purchasing Maturity in Small Business<br />

Jeffery Adams, Assistant Pr<strong>of</strong>essor, University <strong>of</strong> Houston-Downtown,<br />

College <strong>of</strong> Business, 320 N Main St, Houston, TX, 77002,<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America, adamsjeff@uhd.edu, Ralph Kauffman<br />

Relatively little research has been done on B-to-B buyer-supplier relationships in<br />

small and medium size business, and perhaps even less has been done on how to<br />

assess the level <strong>of</strong> purchasing development in such businesses. Successful marketing<br />

relationships with these smaller firms can hinge on the ability <strong>of</strong> marketers to assess<br />

the degree <strong>of</strong> purchasing maturity in such customers. “Purchasing maturity” can be<br />

defined as the readiness and ability <strong>of</strong> customer firms to engage in more highly<br />

developed complex and longer-term buyer-seller relationships. The primary objective<br />

<strong>of</strong> this study is to develop a means that marketers can use to measure purchasing<br />

maturity in particular small and medium size business customers or potential<br />

customers. Using data collected from a cross-sectional sample <strong>of</strong> small and medium<br />

size businesses in four NAICS sub-sectors, a measurement model is developed. Factor<br />

analysis, Pearson correlation, and stepwise regression are used in development <strong>of</strong> the<br />

model to identify factors that, to the degree that they are present, give indication <strong>of</strong><br />

the level or degree <strong>of</strong> purchasing maturity in a business. A scorecard is developed for<br />

application <strong>of</strong> the model to individual firms. The scorecard can be used by both<br />

marketers and customer management to assess the level <strong>of</strong> purchasing maturity that<br />

exists in the buying firm. The primary contribution <strong>of</strong> this research is the<br />

development <strong>of</strong> an additional tool for B-to-B marketers to assess the readiness <strong>of</strong><br />

existing or potential small and medium size customers to engage in higher-level<br />

buyer-seller relationships and thereby increase the seller’s market potential.<br />

3 - Integrative Negotiation Training: Enduring Effects <strong>of</strong> Asymmetrical<br />

and Symmetrical Training<br />

Alfred Zerres, Institute <strong>of</strong> Business-to-Business Marketing, University<br />

<strong>of</strong> Muenster, Am Stadtgraben 13-15, Münster, 48143, Germany,<br />

alfred.zerres@uni-muenster.de, Joachim Hüffmeier, Alexander<br />

Freund, Klaus Backhaus<br />

Almost every business deal in practice is shaped by negotiations as a dominant<br />

transaction mechanism (Anderson/Narus/Narayandas, 2009; Thompson, 2009). Thus,<br />

negotiation skills are crucial to ensure successful transactions for every business<br />

marketing manager and companies consequentially try to improve their marketing<br />

managers’ negotiation skills through respective training programs. As a consequence,<br />

negotiation training has become a multi-billion dollar industry alone in the US. But<br />

are these trainings worth their money? To address this question, we focus on two<br />

gaps in the negotiation training literature. While research has shown that negotiation<br />

training can successfully increase negotiation outcomes immediately after the<br />

training, little is known about its effectiveness across time. Furthermore, in all<br />

previous studies both conflicting parties were trained. From an applied perspective,<br />

this may well be a problematic feature <strong>of</strong> the literature, as firms can hardly train both<br />

parties in business negotiations. To address the related open questions, we conducted<br />

an integrative negotiation training experiment with a total <strong>of</strong> 360 participants (180<br />

dyads). We used a one-factorial design with training (no training, only seller trained,<br />

only buyer trained, and both parties trained) as between- and three measurement<br />

times as within-subjects factor (assessments before, immediately after, and 30 days<br />

after the training). Results reveal that integrative negotiation training is not only<br />

effective, but even increases in periods <strong>of</strong> non-practice. However, one-party<br />

negotiation training was only successful if the trained party was the seller and failed if<br />

the buyer received the training. This results pattern is discussed with respect to the<br />

broader negotiation literature.

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