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Conference Sessions - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of ...

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FB08 MARKETING SCIENCE CONFERENCE – 2011<br />

■ FB08<br />

Founders II<br />

The Long Run Consequences <strong>of</strong> Short Run<br />

Decisions II<br />

Cluster: Special <strong>Sessions</strong><br />

Invited Session<br />

Chair: K. Sudhir, Yale <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> Management, Yale <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> Management,<br />

New Haven, CT, United States <strong>of</strong> America, k.sudhir@yale.edu<br />

Chair: Ahmed Khwaja, Assistant Pr<strong>of</strong>essor, Yale University,<br />

New Haven, CT, United States <strong>of</strong> America, ahmed.khwaja@yale.edu<br />

1 - Dynamic Competition between New and Used Durable Goods<br />

Without Physical Depreciation<br />

Masakazu Ishihara, University <strong>of</strong> Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada,<br />

Masakazu.Ishihara05@Rotman.Utoronto.Ca, Andrew Ching<br />

Both theoretical and empirical studies on used goods markets have consistently<br />

assumed that used goods markets are perfectly competitive in a static sense, i.e., the<br />

quantity demanded for used goods is equal to the quantity supplied <strong>of</strong> used goods in<br />

every time period. This assumption significantly simplifies the analysis on the<br />

interaction between new and used goods markets, as used goods retailers are<br />

assumed to be price-takers and do not make a dynamic decision. However, none <strong>of</strong><br />

the previous studies have examined the validity <strong>of</strong> this assumption. In this paper, we<br />

examine the data from new and used video game markets in Japan and find evidence<br />

that this assumption is strongly violated in this market. The data set includes weekly<br />

sales and prices <strong>of</strong> new and used video games as well as weekly quantities <strong>of</strong> used<br />

games bought by used video game retailers from consumers and associated resale<br />

values. Our data show that on average, the inventory <strong>of</strong> used video games carried by<br />

used video game retailers keeps increasing even after the quantity demanded for used<br />

video games starts to fall. In order to rationalize this observed pattern <strong>of</strong> the used<br />

video game inventory, we propose a dynamic structural equilibrium model <strong>of</strong> new<br />

and used goods competition in which consumers, the manufacturer and used goods<br />

retailers are all forward-looking. The manufacturer sets prices <strong>of</strong> new games, and<br />

used good retailers set both prices and resale values <strong>of</strong> the used game. We then<br />

estimate the dynamic model using the Japanese video game data. We plan to use the<br />

model to quantify the welfare impacts <strong>of</strong> killing-<strong>of</strong>f the used video game market.<br />

2 - A Dynamic Model <strong>of</strong> Competition with Bundling<br />

Vineet Kumar, Harvard Business <strong>School</strong>, Boston, MA,<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America, vkumar@hbs.edu, Timothy Derdenger<br />

We develop a dynamic model <strong>of</strong> consumer purchases <strong>of</strong> hardware and s<strong>of</strong>tware<br />

bundles, where forward-looking consumers face a choice <strong>of</strong> purchasing a console<br />

bundled with specific games, or a standalone console that is expected to result in<br />

future sales <strong>of</strong> s<strong>of</strong>tware (games) to the owner <strong>of</strong> the hardware (console). We use the<br />

Dynamic BLP approach <strong>of</strong> Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2010) applied to aggregate<br />

data that tracks sales <strong>of</strong> videogame consoles and corresponding s<strong>of</strong>tware titles over<br />

time. The dynamic BLP algorithm simplifies the complexities <strong>of</strong> estimating a full<br />

dynamic model <strong>of</strong> forward-looking consumers on aggregate data. A short-term<br />

hardware console or bundle purchase decision made by the consumer thus has<br />

implications for future revenue from s<strong>of</strong>tware sales. We examine firm policies on<br />

bundling, including the choice <strong>of</strong> s<strong>of</strong>tware to <strong>of</strong>fer in the bundle, as well as<br />

evaluation <strong>of</strong> whether consumers should be able to self-select and create their own<br />

bundle. We also focus on understanding the dynamic implications <strong>of</strong> first-party<br />

bundles, where the console producer includes a game it owns within the bundle, in<br />

contrast with third-party bundles, where the hardware and s<strong>of</strong>tware producers are<br />

different firms.<br />

3 - A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model <strong>of</strong> User Generated Content<br />

Carl Mela, Duke University, The Fuqua <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> Business,<br />

100 Fuqua Drive, Durahm, NC, United States <strong>of</strong> America,<br />

carl.mela@duke.edu, Dae-Yong Ahn<br />

User content websites involve two behaviors; consuming content (e.g., reading<br />

reviews or viewing videos) and generating content (e.g., writing reviews or uploading<br />

videos). Users generate free information content for the reputational effect <strong>of</strong> being<br />

influential or popular. The consumption <strong>of</strong> content can generate utility via the<br />

pleasure <strong>of</strong> reading or the utility <strong>of</strong> information. Hence, user engagement involves<br />

the joint creation and consumption <strong>of</strong> content where each respective action can<br />

generate utility to a participant. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model <strong>of</strong><br />

joint consumption and generation <strong>of</strong> information content based on rational<br />

expectations. We estimate this model and conduct policy simulations using a<br />

proprietary data from a web site where users generate and consume content in the<br />

form <strong>of</strong> reviews and forum postings. Our approach is general and applies to contexts<br />

ranging from chat rooms to journal publications to video sharing sites. Our model has<br />

managerial implications relevant to web sites that seek to maximize site traffic and<br />

participation; these outcomes being relevant to the advertisers and users alike.<br />

48<br />

4 - A Dynamic Structural Analysis <strong>of</strong> Enterprise Knowledge Sharing<br />

Baohong Sun, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, United<br />

States <strong>of</strong> America, bsun@cmu.edu, Yingda Lu, Param Vir Singh<br />

Enterprise 2.0 systems (such as employee expertise sharing forums, employee blogs,<br />

and internal wikis) have been adopted in a number <strong>of</strong> organizations to overcome the<br />

barriers to intra-organizational knowledge sharing that have emerged as a result <strong>of</strong><br />

knowledge silos formed over the year. However, organizations are still struggling to<br />

understand the knowledge sharing behavior <strong>of</strong> employees on these systems, the<br />

design <strong>of</strong> these systems and devising policies to enhance knowledge sharing on these<br />

systems. We propose a theoretically grounded dynamic structural model with<br />

endogenized network formation that takes into account the “learning by sharing” and<br />

“knowledge spillover,” two salient features enabled by the public social platform.<br />

More specifically, our model recognizes the dynamic and inter-dependent nature <strong>of</strong><br />

knowledge seeking and sharing decisions and allows them to be driven by knowledge<br />

increment and social status building in anticipation <strong>of</strong> future reciprocal reward.<br />

Applying the model to a unique panel data on expertise sharing forum, we find that<br />

the seemly altruism behavior <strong>of</strong> knowledge sharing with peers can be better<br />

explained by a dynamic and interactive decision making in anticipation <strong>of</strong> future<br />

reward reciprocated by the community. During the competition for social reputation,<br />

there forms “Core/Periphery” where employees with high reputation are more likely<br />

to answer each other’s questions, discouraging users with low social status from<br />

participating. Interestingly, active learning by asking questions is more effective in<br />

improving knowledge than reactive learning by reading answers. A sensitivity<br />

analysis show that hiding the identity <strong>of</strong> the knowledge seeker breaks the<br />

Core/Periphery structure and improve the knowledge sharing by 35.7%.<br />

■ FB09<br />

Founders III<br />

Retailing III: Competition<br />

Contributed Session<br />

Chair: Bruce McWilliams, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Marketing, ITAM (Instituto<br />

Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico), Av. Camino a Santa Teresa No. 930,<br />

Mexico, DF, 10700, Mexico, bruce@itam.mx<br />

1 - If You Build It, Will They Come?: Anchor Store Quality and<br />

Competition in Shopping Malls<br />

Ravi Shanmugam, Assistant Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Marketing, Santa Clara<br />

University, 500 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA, 95053,<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America, rshanmugam@scu.edu<br />

The ability <strong>of</strong> shopping centers to attract customers and increase sales depends in part<br />

on their anchor stores, the small number <strong>of</strong> large-sized, high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile tenants located<br />

in every mall. In this paper, a theoretical model <strong>of</strong> competition between anchor and<br />

non-anchor stores in a shopping mall is developed, with the goal <strong>of</strong> explaining an<br />

observed pattern <strong>of</strong> choices <strong>of</strong> anchor-store quality levels made by mall developers. In<br />

particular, the relationship between a mall’s anchor-store quality levels, size, and<br />

measures <strong>of</strong> mall performance (visitor traffic and store pr<strong>of</strong>its) is examined. It is<br />

found that mall size, because <strong>of</strong> its relationship to the probability that consumers will<br />

find a “fit” between their preferences and the non-anchor store’s goods, has varying<br />

effects on price competition between the stores, visitor traffic, mall pr<strong>of</strong>its, and<br />

anchor quality levels chosen by mall developers. The primary analytical result is that<br />

mall size has a positive and concave, i.e. inverse U-shaped, relationship with the<br />

probability that the developer chooses a high-quality anchor over a low-quality one.<br />

The predictions <strong>of</strong> this model are then validated using a data set containing<br />

information about key strategic variables for major North American malls, showing<br />

that the proposed relationships are robust to the inclusion <strong>of</strong> inter-mall competitive<br />

effects and additional relevant controls.<br />

2 - Dynamic Competitive Intensity in Retail Markets: Drivers and<br />

Implications on Retailer Performance<br />

Geunhye Yang, PhD Candidate, University <strong>of</strong> North Carolina at<br />

Chapel Hill, Kenan-Flagler Business <strong>School</strong>, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599,<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America, Geunhye_Yang@unc.edu, Katrijn Gielens,<br />

Jan-Benedict Steenkamp<br />

Grocery retail markets have become highly concentrated. This trend has substantial<br />

implications for how retailers compete and perform. Still, competitive interactions<br />

between retailers in these markets have largely been neglected, the most important<br />

exception being the change in competitive interaction due to the entry <strong>of</strong> a “giant”<br />

retailer. Therefore, little is known about how powerful players in highly<br />

concentrated, ‘on-going’ markets compete and how it affects their performance. In<br />

this study, we measure (1) to what extent retailers react to the competitive actions <strong>of</strong><br />

their rivals, and (2) how competitive reaction sensitivities affect retailers’ category<br />

and overall performance. More specifically, we emphasize how retailers react to each<br />

other’s pricing and assortment decisions for their private labels (these are the brands<br />

for which retailers control the marketing mix entirely). We use reaction functions<br />

proposed by Leeflang and Wittink (1992, 1996) to capture competitive sensitivities<br />

and extend their approach to allow for time-varying reaction elasticities using<br />

Kalman filter inferences. These dynamic reaction elasticities allow us to assess when<br />

and how <strong>of</strong>ten retailers respond to competitive moves by (1) (strong) accommodation<br />

(e.g., if a rival retailer decreases its price, the focal retailer reacts by increasing its<br />

price), (2) (strong) retaliation (e.g., the focal retailer decreases its price when a rival<br />

does so), or (3) by doing nothing. Next, we relate these different types <strong>of</strong> reactions to<br />

category performance and store traffic. As such, we can evaluate when and to what<br />

extent competitive strategies are beneficial or detrimental.

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