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Program Managers lead Program (Project or Product) Management Offices.<br />

Program Management Offices (PMOs) are part of the transaction costs of overseeing<br />

contracts. They provide the PM with further resources to manage the acquisition of materiel,<br />

supporting warfighters as end-users. Many members of the acquisition workforce furnish<br />

either core or matrix support to a PMO.<br />

At the beginning of FY2000, the size of the DoD’s acquisition workforce was<br />

estimated to be 124,000 personnel (ADR, 2000). The Defense industry’s suppliers typically<br />

follow the project management methodology established by the PM, and often contractors<br />

will staff and operate their program offices to parallel that of the government programs they<br />

support. Both types of DoD managers, PMs and contracting officers, act as transaction<br />

agents to ensure that public funds are being used prudently to accomplish the mission, while<br />

also promoting public policy mandates (e.g., small and disadvantaged businesses), and<br />

ensuring that relevant Government regulations (e.g., safety) are enforced.<br />

The DOD 5000 series of regulations serves as overarching guidance for the<br />

acquisition of materiel—primarily materiel requiring new development and subsequent<br />

investment in production. DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, provides<br />

policies and principles to govern the management of all DoD acquisition programs. There<br />

are five major thrusts governing the overall acquisition system: 1) flexibility in shaping<br />

individual programs to meet needs, 2) responsiveness in achieving capabilities in accord<br />

with their timelines of need, and doing so in increments via evolutionary acquisition, 3)<br />

innovation via practices that reduce cycle-time and cost, 4) discipline in the adherence to<br />

goals, with program baseline parameters serving as control measures, and 5) effective<br />

management through decentralized responsibility and authority (DODD 5000.1, 2003).<br />

DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, establishes a<br />

management framework that translates mission needs and technological opportunities into<br />

stable, affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs (DODI 5000.2, 2003). The<br />

instruction provides procedures for operation of the acquisition management system in<br />

conjunction with a system of prioritizing and allocating funds (the Planning Programming,<br />

Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES)), as well as a system to generate materiel<br />

requirements (the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS)). Together,<br />

they produce bonafide transaction needs, resources and technical performance solutions.<br />

The successful interaction of these three decision-support and management systems are<br />

the governance mechanisms relied on to produce advanced warfighting capability.<br />

C) Cost, Schedule and Performance Attributes are Stratified<br />

The first FAR principle stated above of customer satisfaction (including “cost, quality,<br />

and timeliness of the delivered product or service”) encompasses many of the key features<br />

of acquisition transactions. Acquisition transactions can largely be categorized by their<br />

timeliness, dollar value, and technical performance requirements and characteristics (which<br />

are translated into measures of project management success).<br />

These characteristics are often identified and stratified in various policy and<br />

regulatory documents that affect acquisition procedures and governance. The TCE<br />

characteristics of uncertainty and complexity are largely incorporated within the parameters<br />

of cost, schedule, and performance. Asset specificity is not addressed per se; however, the<br />

DoD has long acknowledged the dangers of becoming “locked-in” to propriety technology (or<br />

unique expertise, i.e., human asset specificity) (DOD Guidebook, 2004). Interestingly, we<br />

observe much less of this cautionary language today, possibly because of highly inelastic<br />

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