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number of highly experienced Blackwater employees and a couple military personnel held off a
large number of attacking insurgents and reportedly inflicted numerous casualties. During this
operation, the small team of Americans received air support. Helicopters operated by
Blackwater pilots delivered ammunition to them while the engagement was still in progress.
Whether cleaning latrines, delivering fuel and ammunition, interrogating prisoners,
supporting operational planning, operating UAVs, supporting weapons systems in the field, or,
fighting pitched gun battles, contractors are not only present in current US military operations,
but provide vitally needed manpower and resources. Absent an unlikely substantial growth and
realignment (and return to the draft) of the US military, contractor support for military operations
seems destined to continue into the foreseeable future. Contract support is a vital element in the
projection of US military power. The question is not whether contractors should have such a
vital presence in the operational deployments of US forces. The last decade has resolved that
question. The key questions are how best to utilize and manage contract support in combat and
contingency deployments.
Perceived weakness and inconsistency in DOD policy and management of
“contractors accompanying the force.” The author’s previous research highlighted a number
of deficiencies or “contracting challenges” related to using support contractors in combat and
other contingency operations. Two of these were particularly emphasized. They were (1) the
need for training and (2) the need to enhance the contracting authority of the theater and joint
task force commander. The current research reinforces those earlier perceptions. However,
both areas (and particularly training) are complicated by an over-riding condition, namely,
contracting policy often does not fit the reality of the combat zone.
The discussion of training noted that while:
the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib may have been unique, the evident lack of
understanding about proper relationships and roles for contractors may not be equally
unique. Many soldiers at Abu Ghraib thought contractors were supposed to be fully
integrated in the chain of command and even assume supervisory roles over military
personnel. This view was shared by the OIC of investigations at the prison and even
articulated by a field grade Army spokesman who made comments about the situation
from the Pentagon. 35
The discussion continued: “Support service contracts are hard to manage. Maintaining a
team concept between contractor employees and government personnel that work side by side
in an office or on the battlefield is important. Maintaining formal distinctions between the two is
also required (primarily because personal service contracts are generally not authorized).” 36
The “proper roles” and “formal distinctions” mentioned in the previous quotations are
those that stem from government contract law and regulations. 37 The “team” concept and “chain
of command” are personnel management concepts; ones that are particularly important to the
35 Dunn (note 1), op. cit., 60.
36 Ibid., 61.
37 The primary procurement law applicable to DoD components is the Armed Services Procurement Act
(10 USC. chapter 137) implemented by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, FAR, (48 C.F.R. Parts 1-53)
and the DoD FAR Supplement, DFARS, (48 C.F.R. Parts 201-253).
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