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On Budget Allocation to Increase Operational Availability and<br />

Reduce Readiness Risk through Improvements in Weapon<br />

Systems Logistics<br />

Overview<br />

Presenter: Keebom Kang, <strong>Naval</strong> <strong>Postgraduate</strong> <strong>School</strong><br />

Kenneth Doerr, <strong>Naval</strong> <strong>Postgraduate</strong> <strong>School</strong><br />

Uday Apte, <strong>Naval</strong> <strong>Postgraduate</strong> <strong>School</strong><br />

Ira Lewis, <strong>Naval</strong> <strong>Postgraduate</strong> <strong>School</strong><br />

The goal of this research is to develop a decision support framework to inform the<br />

acquisition of logistic services for a weapon system. The primary element of this decision<br />

support framework is an explicit choice model of the tradeoff between life-cycle cost on the one<br />

hand and improvements in Operational Availability (Ao) on the other hand. This tradeoff is<br />

encountered when there are a number of opportunities to improve Operational Availability<br />

through the acquisition of logistics services for a weapon system with a limited budget, so that<br />

all opportunities cannot be pursued. In such a case, several criteria are important, including<br />

both average operational availability, as well as the risk that operational availability may fall<br />

below some planning threshold (which we call readiness risk).<br />

The Department of Defense (DoD) is increasingly interested in contractual agreements<br />

and public-private partnerships to improve weapon systems logistics. Such agreements and<br />

partnerships are often established under the umbrella of Performance Based Logistics (PBL).<br />

Under PBL agreements, performance outcomes are specified, and vendors are given a large<br />

degree of autonomy to determine the means of accomplishing those performance outcomes.<br />

Often, PBL agreements are established at the component level (e.g., depot-level maintenance<br />

of an aircraft engine), and a recent review by the Government Accountability Office 2 was<br />

supportive of component-level agreements for PBL, but critical of system level agreements.<br />

However, the DoD values performance at the systems level because only systems, and<br />

not components, help to determine war-fighting outcomes. Recent guidance has been directed<br />

toward five key performance criteria: 1) weapon system operational availability, 2) weapon<br />

system operational reliability, 3) weapon system cost per usage, 4) logistics footprint for a<br />

weapon system, and 5) response time required for weapon system logistics support. 3 .<br />

2 Government Accountability Office (2004). “Opportunities to Enhance the Implementation of Performance<br />

Based Logistics,” Report the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on<br />

Armed Services, U.S. Senate. August 2004.<br />

3 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (2004). PBL<br />

Purchasing Using Performance Based Criteria. Proceedings of the 2004 DoD Procurement Conference,<br />

Orlando, FL.<br />

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