Conceived in Liberty Volume 2 - Ludwig von Mises Institute

colony in Gualé (to be called "Georgia" in honor of King George II), which
would colonize and help the poor and needy of England. Indeed, because of
its humanitarian reputation, Georgia received tremendous publicity in the
English press. Meetings of the trustees were reported in detail, and Oglethorpe
was welcomed as a hero—replete with odes from leading poets such as
Alexander Pope—upon his return from trips to the new colony.
Even on its face it is a wonder that no one called the humanitarianism of
this scheme into question. If one is so eager to help the English poor, is it so
humanitarian to ship them to a new and unsettled land bordered by potential
enemies? But apart from this, the workings of the new experiment revealed
the logical consequences of outright altruism. For if A is to act as "his brother's
keeper," if he is to be in a position to do good to his fellow man, then he
must be his brother's keeper in more than one sense. For how can A be truly
responsible for (that is, keep) B unless he be given power to tell B what to do
and what not to do, that is, be his keeper in the unpleasant sense of jailer?
On the simplest level, for example, how can A be responsible for B's health
unless he is in a position to dictate B's food consumption and to force him to
wear rubbers in the rain ? To do good to another, the recipient must be made
to sit still and accept the largesse. And to be responsible for another, the
humanitarian must have power over him. This is why, in the stark but telling
phrase of the brilliant but neglected twentieth-century political thinker Isabel
Paterson, "the humanitarian sets up the guillotine."*
If, then, one is to set up a "humanitarian" colony for the poor and unemployed,
and as a corollary the colony is not to be run by the supposedly evil
motives of profit-making, then what are the consequences? The supposedly
cold and impersonal motives of profit furnish a potent checkrein on irresponsible
actions. To make profits one's production must be economic; specifically,
to build up a profitable colony it is necessary to induce settlers to come to that
colony and to be productive and economic. But the rejection of profit-making
as a motive gave the proprietors almost unlimited rein to exercise irresponsible
and arbitrary power over their charges. It also gave them a chance to indulge
in general and vague motives, the outcome of which might be truly reprehensible,
despite their superficial attraction for many people.
"•Isabel Paterson, "The Humanitarian with the Guillotine," in The God of the Machine
(New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1943), p. 241. More fully, Paterson points out that
"the humanitarian wishes to be a prime mover in the lives of others. He cannot admit
either the divine or the natural order by which men have the power to keep themselves.
The humanitarian puts himself in the place of God.
"But he is confronted by two awkward facts: first, that the competent do not need his
assistance; and second, that the majority of people, if unperverted, positively do not
want to be 'done good' by the humanitarians. . . . Shall A do what he thinks is good for
B and B do what he thinks is good for A? Or shall A accept only what he thinks is
good for B and vice versa? But that is absurd. Of course, what the humanitarian
actually proposes is that he shall do what he thinks is good for everybody. It is at this
point that the humanitarian sets up the guillotine" (ibid.).
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