RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

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Russian population. The third section describes the confusion in Moscow’s regional policy and its failure to find a strategy for dealing with the North Caucasus. This exposition of the overall problem is followed by a comprehensive overview of the conflicts in the North Caucasus in the fourth section. This overview describes how the specific factors of population density, ethnic diversity, economic decline, religious cleavages, and the experience of the deportations have triggered conflict in individual cases, and indicates how some republics have thus far managed to avoid violent conflict. The report concludes with a case study of Chechnya. It offers an explanation of how the structural legacy of the USSR, the political naiveté and poor judgment of Chechnya’s new leadership, and Moscow’s ad hoc policy combined to provoke a full-scale war on the territory of the Russian Federation. vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Administrative Structure of the Soviet Union: The administrative structure of the Soviet Union gave the national republics of the North Caucasus the forms of sovereignty but denied them the substance; made the issue of ethnicity a central feature of regional politics; and left a configuration of borders specifically designed to keep the peoples of the region in constant competition and make Moscow the sole arbitrator of the territorial system. Although the USSR was a highly centralized state and the Communist Party in Moscow dominated all decisionmaking, it had the form at least of a federation. This federation consisted of a descending hierarchy of administrative units based on a combination of territory and ethnicity, with some national groups having more privileges, more institutions and more opportunity to manage their own affairs than others. In spite of the fact that ethnicity was one of the building blocks of the Soviet Union, and individual administrative units were associated with a particular national group, in the majority of cases ethnic and administrative borders did not coincide. The Bolshevik creators of the system were anxious to prevent the total domination of any of the non-Russian groups in a particular territory, and the creation of coalitions of groups that could threaten Russian and thus Soviet rule. As a result, a policy of divide and rule was practiced, giving a deliberate arbitrariness to the administrative system. Different ethnic groups were jumbled together in the individual national-territorial units. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, those national groups at the top of the administrative hierarchy were able to secede and form independent states. The rest, including the republics of the North Caucasus, were not. Instead of being under the ultimate jurisdiction of a non-national suprastate, the USSR, which was formally dominated by a political party, the CPSU, they were now subordinate to a political entity that was controlled by another ethnic group. This perception of being under the jurisdiction of an ethnic group rather than a state is a crucially important one in the former Soviet Union. The ruling group is seen to monopolize political power and to deny access to resources of land, housing and jobs to members of other ethnic groups. At a time when these resources are at their most scarce, when salaries have declined, the social safety net has disappeared, and prices on basic foodstuffs have risen precipitously, the monopoly of political power by one group is viewed as a threat to the physical survival of others. As a result of this perception, the peoples of the North Caucasus, and indeed every other ethnic group in the former USSR that was denied its own independent state in 1991, feel that their future is jeopardized. Their national movements, and governments in the case of Chechnya, either want their designated republic to be given the right to secede, or want to have their ethnic group acknowledged as the equal of the dominant group through the creation of a federated state that will ensure political power and access to resources. vii
Page 1 and 2: “RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 3 and 4: PREFACE Background to the Report In
Page 5 and 6: “RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 7 and 8: and dependent on subsidies from the
Page 9: • Cleavages between Orthodoxy and
Page 13 and 14: 3. The failure of Russian policy: S
Page 15 and 16: SECTION I The Structural Legacy of
Page 17 and 18: Supreme Soviet and a Presidium of t
Page 19 and 20: Tenglik went so as far as to blocka
Page 21 and 22: The Soviet government of the Russia
Page 23 and 24: From 1991, the question of whether
Page 25 and 26: Russia, announced the formation of
Page 27 and 28: as a mediator in inter-ethnic confl
Page 29 and 30: After 1991, Abkhazia’s role as th
Page 31 and 32: members of the KNK all have a diffe
Page 33 and 34: SECTION III The Failure of Russia
Page 35 and 36: absolving the Ministry for National
Page 37 and 38: This activity has raised expectatio
Page 39 and 40: 1. Yeltsin’s March 1991 Visit to
Page 41 and 42: The first report recommended that,
Page 43 and 44: In response to the refusal of the K
Page 45 and 46: SECTION IV Territorial Disputes in
Page 47 and 48: inflammatory rhetoric, others have
Page 49 and 50: government, the expectation was tha
Page 51 and 52: 2. The secession of Chechnya from R
Page 53 and 54: epeated ultimatums to the Ingush to
Page 55 and 56: The refugee issue and the status of
Page 57 and 58: Government interventions have been
Page 59 and 60: Another territorial dispute in Dage
Page 61 and 62:
To protect their group rights in th
Page 63 and 64:
1991 the referendum on statehood wa
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a dual Cherkess-Abazin federal repu
Page 67 and 68:
The Krai’s ethnic composition is,
Page 69 and 70:
Other Circassian peoples and the KN
Page 71 and 72:
The Revival of the Cossacks in the
Page 73 and 74:
the region. These meetings and of i
Page 75 and 76:
The Cossacks are now perceived by t
Page 77 and 78:
in Kazakhstan. The 1991 Law on the
Page 79 and 80:
Chechnya was operating; 122 and a h
Page 81 and 82:
As modern civil society ceased to f
Page 83 and 84:
emergency session of the Checheno-I
Page 85 and 86:
Soviet weaponry, including tanks an
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consisted of the most radical facti
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In 1992-1993, the opposition’s re
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In the North Caucasian republics, t
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Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowl
Page 95 and 96:
The War in Chechnya and Implication
Page 97 and 98:
Conclusion As the discussion in the
Page 99 and 100:
APPENDIX 1 The Refugee crisis in th
Page 101 and 102:
was reversed in the late 1980s. 162
Page 103 and 104:
and the already high levels of unem
Page 105 and 106:
APPENDIX 2 The Islamic Factor in th
Page 107 and 108:
incorporating their principle figur
Page 109 and 110:
Since the war in Chechnya, and give
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