RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

In the North Caucasian republics, the level of violence in the war in Chechnya has prompted
feelings that the non-Russian population is completely dispensable as far as Moscow is concerned.
The war has also had a sobering effect on the movements for national self-determination. The
marked lack of protest from the international community over Moscow’s heavy-handed military
action has demonstrated that would-be secessionists will now be given short-shrift and that as far, as
the United States and other major powers are concerned, the dissolution of the USSR is over. In
launching the war, Moscow also demonstrated that it was more likely to respond to requests for
territorial-administrative change with force than with constitutional reform. To the North Caucasian
republics, regional policy in Russia seems to have been replaced by military might, and compromise
by subjugation. The parallels with the 19th century Russian-Caucasian Wars and the brutal
suppression of the region are not lost on North Caucasians. 140 In May 1995, as a direct consequence
of Chechnya, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev made a statement during a visit to the
United States about Russia’s right to use force in suppressing conflicts on its periphery. 141 The fact
that this statement came from the Foreign Minister extended the anxiety of the North Caucasus to
the former republics of the Soviet Union beyond the Russian Federation’s borders.
In terms of specific responses to the war, the reaction of Dagestan, Chechnya’s most
important neighbor has been extremely negative. Initially, radical groups in the Dagestani mountains
called for the creation of an Islamic Guard and Gazavat or holy war. The majority of the population
were, however, indifferent at first as a result of three years of cross border crime by Chechens,
robberies on the railways and major roads, and the theft of goods and cattle. 142 As the war dragged
on and the level of violence against the Chechen civilian population intensified, this indifference
changed to concern. Dagestanis became worried that the Russian military activities might spread
across the border, especially given the Chechen-Akkintsy population in the western districts of the
republic and the fact that Dagestan was used as a transit route for troops at the beginning of the
conflict in December 1994. Pressure was exerted on the Dagestani government to appeal to Moscow
to halt the military action and begin negotiations. The Dagestani government, itself, became
increasingly concerned about the destabilizing effect of the war on the republic’s delicate ethnic
balance. Prior to March 1995 when Dr. Magomedkhanov left the republic for the United States,
Dagestan had become the largest recipient of Chechen refugees—almost 150,000 by government
estimates, the majority of whom were housed with relatives and friends in the western provinces or
in Makhachkala.
The war has also had a further detrimental effect on relations between North Ossetia and
Ingushetia. Repeated bombardments of Ingush villages across the Chechen border—by mistake
according to the Russian military—and North Ossetia’s open support for Moscow’s action have
been considerable cause for alarm in Ingushetia. President Aushev of Ingushetia has been accused of
140 This information is based on interviews conducted by Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov in the North Caucasus
between December 1994 and March 1995.
141 ITAR-TASS, April 28, 1995.
142 This section is based on interviews by Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov in Dagestan between December 1994-
March 1995.
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