RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

the situation” in the event that the ANCCP did not comply. Yeltsin’s ultimatum simply strengthened
the resolve of Dudayev’s supporters who ignored the threat. Opposition movements to Dudayev and
the ANCCP did, however, spring up around the republic, centered on the Provisional Supreme
Soviet, liberal-democratic parties, and those elites threatened by Dudayev’s assumption of power.
Rival demonstrators thus clashed in the streets of Grozny.
On October 27, 1991, in the face of official protests from the Yeltsin government and the
Checheno-Ingushetia Provisional Supreme Soviet, Dudayev and the Executive Committee of the
ANCCP held presidential elections. The Executive Committee claimed that 77% of the electorate
had participated and, of these, 85% had elected Dzhokhar Dudayev as president. 131 On the basis of
this election, Dudayev declared the Law on the State Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic on
November 2, which was Chechnya’s de facto secession from the Russian Federation. He
simultaneously convened a session of the KNK in Grozny under the slogan of overturning the
imperial forces of Russia to emphasize the rupture with Moscow.
The opposition to Dudayev refused to accept both the elections and Dudayev’s declarations
and vowed to press ahead with the elections originally scheduled by Moscow and the Provisional
Supreme Soviet for November 17. As a result, Chechnya seemed likely to split into two parallel state
formations. This was changed, however, by the actions of the Russian government.
3. The First Russian Military Intervention in Chechnya:
Ignoring warnings from his advisors that the situation was explosive, on November 8, 1991,
Russian President Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia and ordered a total
of 2,500 interior ministry troops to the region. Dudayev responded by declaring martial law, and
mobilizing volunteers to the Chechen National Guard to protect the sovereignty of the republic. His
supporters surrounded the Interior Ministry building, hemming in an estimated 600 Soviet interior
troops that had already been airlifted into Grozny. Faced by the threat of Russian federal troops
descending on the republic, political groups which had previously opposed Dudayev now rallied
round and declared support. The resistance of the Provisional Supreme Soviet immediately
dissolved.
Fearing that attempts to implement the state of emergency would lead to bloodshed, the
Russian parliament voted to repeal Yeltsin’s decree. Soviet television subsequently showed several
hundred Russian troops leaving Grozny in tourist buses, as Chechen national guardsmen fired
automatic weapons in the air in celebration. To the Chechens, Moscow had capitulated before the
Chechen Revolution. Dudayev’s position as the protector of national interests was thus secured.
With the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the situation in Grozny stabilized. Dudayev lifted
martial law on November 21, 1991 and ordered his National Guard to withdraw. However, he
adhered to a November 26 deadline for the commencement of general conscription for a Chechen
army and granted every man over the age of 16 the right to bear arms, including automatic weapons.
In 1992, the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya left behind large arsenals of
131 There is no independent confirmation of this and opposition groups claim that the participation was low.
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