RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

• The restoration of Terek Cossack autonomy in the Mozdok district and its transfer from the jurisdiction of North Ossetia to Stavropol’. • The restoration of the pre-Revolutionary Cossack districts of Zelenchuksko-Urupsky and Batalpashinsky in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. • The restoration of Cossack autonomy in the Maikop district of Adygeia. • The creation of a Kuban Cossack republic in Krasnodar Krai, the entire territory of Adygeia, and portions of Stavropol’ and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. • The restoration of the Cossack oblasts of the Don, which extend across Krasnodar and Stavropol’ Krais and also imply territorial claims on historic Don Cossack lands within Ukrainian borders. • The restoration of the territory of the Sunzhensky Terek Cossacks in Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia to its pre-1928 borders, and the transfer of the enclave to Stavropol’. • The transfer of the Kargalinsky, Naursky and Shelkovsky districts, received by Checheno-Ingushetia in 1957, back to Stavropol’ Krai as traditional lands of the Terek Cossacks. • The restoration of other Terek Cossack lands and the creation of an autonomous republic under the jurisdiction of Stavropol’. The period between the summer of 1992 and the winter of 1993, saw the peak of the confrontation between Cossacks and the governments and peoples of the North Caucasus republics. In January 1992, representatives of the Union of Cossack Armies of Russia had held meetings in Moscow with top Russian officials, including Sergei Shakhrai (himself of Terek Cossack origin), to push for the creation of a federal commission that would draw up a law on the political and economic rehabilitation of the Cossacks in Russia. After this meeting, the Union of Cossacks of Southern Russia was established, bringing together the Terek, Kuban, Don and Stavropol’ Cossacks in a loose coalition in the North Caucasus. The Union of Cossacks of Southern Russia presented itself as a direct competitor to the KNK and issued a set of general demands, ranging from the recognition of the Cossacks as a repressed people, to the creation of national-territorial formations headed by an elected Ataman with representation in organs of local government at all levels. The Cossacks also demanded that the federal government and local authorities give concrete guarantees that land in the region would not be sold or transferred as a result of privatization without the permission of local Cossacks. In particular, this applied to any proposed sale of land to individuals from the non-Russian North Caucasian groups. Cossack leaders stressed that communal land ownership by Cossack communities was essential to Cossack cultural and social distinction. In addition, the Union of Cossacks of Southern Russia offered to form a Cossack military force to guard Russia’s international borders in 58
the region. These meetings and of increasingly radical demands and statements from Cossack leaders grabbed the attention both of Moscow and the North Caucasian republics. Moscow’s Policy Toward the Cossacks: Following the earlier example of the Russian Empire, Moscow sought to co-opt the Cossacks of the Russian Federation, harness their military traditions, and channel their energies away from confrontation with the state. In June 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree supporting “the Cossack revival movement and the restoration of Cossack economic, cultural and patriotic forms of selfgovernment” in the Russian Federation. The decree recognized the rights of Cossacks to practice traditional forms of local administration and land ownership in areas that would be defined by plebiscite. Under the provisions of the decree, Cossacks were to be given grants of land and Cossack regiments were to be created by the Ministry of Defense to defend international borders and maintain law and order. In March 1993, President Yeltsin signed an additional decree creating Cossack units as part of the Russian Federation’s armed forces in the North Caucasus. 113 The March 1993 Decree was specifically intended to address personnel shortages in the Russian forces of the North Caucasus Military District by taking advantage of Cossack desires to perform military service. Since the formation of the military district in 1992-1993, the Russian army had experienced considerable difficulty in creating the necessary infra-structure and in maintaining the requisite level of forces. In 1993 alone, 1,500 men deserted from units of the North Caucasus Military District, and the assessed strength of the ground forces was 38,000—20,000 men short of the district’s established strength of 58,000. In response to these shortages, a number of Russian military experts urged the creation of Cossack contingents to supplement the forces in Stavropol’ and Krasnodar under the jurisdiction of the military district’s headquarters. 114 President Yeltsin’s decrees, and reports that Cossack volunteers from villages around Vladikavkaz and Mozdok in North Ossetia had offered their services to the North Ossetian National Guard in its action against the Ingush, caused a stir among the North Caucasian national groups. The KNK made attempts to accommodate the Cossacks as an “indigenous people” of the region. A series of meetings were held and a flurry of agreements were signed between the KNK and the Cossacks. In Ingushetia, after the de-escalation of the conflict with North Ossetia, Ingush President Ruslan Aushev actively sought to co-opt the Cossacks to push his agenda for increased regional autonomy with the Russian government. President Aushev recognized the status of the Cossacks in the North 113 Decree of March 15, 1993 “On the Reforming of Military Structures, Frontier and Interior Forces on the Territory of the North Caucasian Region of the Russian Federation and State Support for the Cossacks.” 114 For a discussion of the problems of the North Caucasus Military District and the role of the Cossacks, see Lyudmila Leontyeva, “Where do Russia’s Southern Borders Pass?” Moscow News, No. 46, November 12, 1993; and also Michael Orr, “The Regional Military Balance: Conventional and Unconventional Military Forces Around the Caspian,” presentation at conference on Oil & Caviar in the Caspian (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, February 23-24, 1995). 59
Page 1 and 2:
“RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 3 and 4:
PREFACE Background to the Report In
Page 5 and 6:
“RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 7 and 8:
and dependent on subsidies from the
Page 9 and 10:
• Cleavages between Orthodoxy and
Page 11 and 12:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Administra
Page 13 and 14:
3. The failure of Russian policy: S
Page 15 and 16:
SECTION I The Structural Legacy of
Page 17 and 18:
Supreme Soviet and a Presidium of t
Page 19 and 20:
Tenglik went so as far as to blocka
Page 21 and 22: The Soviet government of the Russia
Page 23 and 24: From 1991, the question of whether
Page 25 and 26: Russia, announced the formation of
Page 27 and 28: as a mediator in inter-ethnic confl
Page 29 and 30: After 1991, Abkhazia’s role as th
Page 31 and 32: members of the KNK all have a diffe
Page 33 and 34: SECTION III The Failure of Russia
Page 35 and 36: absolving the Ministry for National
Page 37 and 38: This activity has raised expectatio
Page 39 and 40: 1. Yeltsin’s March 1991 Visit to
Page 41 and 42: The first report recommended that,
Page 43 and 44: In response to the refusal of the K
Page 45 and 46: SECTION IV Territorial Disputes in
Page 47 and 48: inflammatory rhetoric, others have
Page 49 and 50: government, the expectation was tha
Page 51 and 52: 2. The secession of Chechnya from R
Page 53 and 54: epeated ultimatums to the Ingush to
Page 55 and 56: The refugee issue and the status of
Page 57 and 58: Government interventions have been
Page 59 and 60: Another territorial dispute in Dage
Page 61 and 62: To protect their group rights in th
Page 63 and 64: 1991 the referendum on statehood wa
Page 65 and 66: a dual Cherkess-Abazin federal repu
Page 67 and 68: The Krai’s ethnic composition is,
Page 69 and 70: Other Circassian peoples and the KN
Page 71: The Revival of the Cossacks in the
Page 75 and 76: The Cossacks are now perceived by t
Page 77 and 78: in Kazakhstan. The 1991 Law on the
Page 79 and 80: Chechnya was operating; 122 and a h
Page 81 and 82: As modern civil society ceased to f
Page 83 and 84: emergency session of the Checheno-I
Page 85 and 86: Soviet weaponry, including tanks an
Page 87 and 88: consisted of the most radical facti
Page 89 and 90: In 1992-1993, the opposition’s re
Page 91 and 92: In the North Caucasian republics, t
Page 93 and 94: Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowl
Page 95 and 96: The War in Chechnya and Implication
Page 97 and 98: Conclusion As the discussion in the
Page 99 and 100: APPENDIX 1 The Refugee crisis in th
Page 101 and 102: was reversed in the late 1980s. 162
Page 103 and 104: and the already high levels of unem
Page 105 and 106: APPENDIX 2 The Islamic Factor in th
Page 107 and 108: incorporating their principle figur
Page 109 and 110: Since the war in Chechnya, and give
show all

RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?