RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

In general, in the North Caucasus, however, the national factor seems to be more important
than the Islamic revival and religious unity. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, religious
affairs in the North Caucasus were under the direction of the Religious Board for Muslims of the
North Caucasus which was subordinated to the CPSU. Once this body dissolved in 1988, Islamic
religious administration in the region was dispersed among 12 Muslim Religious Boards in the
various republics and 10 sub-organizations including 4 Muftiates and 6 Mukhtasibats. With this
devolution of religious authority, there was increasing fragmentation on an ethnic basis—leading to
the establishment of separate Dargin and Kumyk religious boards in Dagestan, for example. A
number of Islamic political parties also emerged in the early 1990s in the individual republics,
including the Islamic Democratic Party of Dagestan, and the Islamic Way in Chechnya, but no
single Islamic party was created for the North Caucasus.
Since the revival of Islam, the most public role of the Muslim clergy in the North Caucasus
has been in mediating the various inter-group conflicts in the region. As mentioned in Section IV,
religious leaders have frequently intervened in conflicts in Dagestan to convene a Maslahat or
meeting to conclude a peace agreement between opposing sides. As, for example, during the
disputes between Laks and Kumyks, and Chechens and Laks in 1992. The clergy’s influence is not
only the result of religious factors, but is also based on North Caucasian traditions of the prominent
role of clan elders. As the clergy are usually older men they command the traditional respect
accorded to the elders. The Muslim clergy, therefore, plays an integrating rather than unifying role in
North Caucasian society, exploiting both ethno-cultural traditions and religious beliefs to appeal to
the different national constituencies.
In terms of a broader revival of Islam in the Russian Federation as a whole, an Islamic
Cultural Center was established in Moscow in 1990 with some funding from the federal government.
The aim of the center was to build a mosque, publish a newspaper for the Russian Muslim
community, arrange conferences on religious issues, create a religious school, and provide religious
education in the different native languages for the broader population. The Center has, however,
been beset by financial difficulties and has had its construction projects in Moscow blocked by local
residents. The Center’s non-Muslim neighbors are frightened of the seeming appearance of a hotbed
of Islamic Fundamentalism on their doorsteps, and have appealed to Russian nationalist groups for
assistance. 180 As a result of the negative reaction to the revival of Islam in Russia, there is still no
single organizational structure for Russian Muslims. The administration of Islamic affairs is
subordinated to the All-Russian Center for the Coordination of Religious Administration, which was
established in Moscow in 1993.
A number of pan-Islamic political parties have, however, been established in Russia,
including the Islamic Renaissance Party based in Dagestan which has limited appeal outside the
North Caucasus, and the Union of Muslims and the All-Russian Nur (“Light”) movement which are
competing for the same constituency. In August 1995, the latter two organizations announced that
they intended to participate in the December 1995 parliamentary elections. 181
180 See, for example, Yelena Lebedeva, “Islamic Cultural Center Becomes the Eye of a Storm,” Moscow News,
September 30-October 6, 1994, No. 39.
181 See Laura Belin, “Muslim Organizations Prepare for Elections.” OMRI Daily Digest, August 1, 1995.
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