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Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowledge that the local authorities could not protect the
population in the case of another attack had encouraged the formation of illegal militias beyond the
control of the local authorities. The official was concerned that the general availability of firearms
and the high level of tension in the North Caucasus would create a situation where armed bands
would take matters into their own hands. He was particularly worried that there would be serious
repercussions for Stavropol’s indigenous Chechen population.
These concerns were echoed in the Russian press immediately after the Chechen attack on
Budennovsk by Dmitriy Kamyshev of Kommersant Daily, who wrote: “Clearly, in areas bordering
Chechnya, and not only there, not a few will be willing to use the terrorist act as a cause to crack
down on Caucasians. Considering the rampant violence in Budennovsk, it can be assumed that the
initiators of ‘Caucasian pogroms’ will find sympathy both with the general public and law
enforcement bodies wishing to take revenge for their killed comrades. And it will be politically
difficult for Moscow to make a decision to use force to stop the pogroms in a situation when the role
of ‘people’s avengers’ is taken on by, say, the Cossacks (who have already threatened the Chechens
with vendetta).” 147
Indeed, on June 24, Kommersant Daily reported that Kuban Cossack atamans in Krasnodar
Krai had called for all Caucasians to be resettled by July 1 or be repatriated forcibly by Cossack
contingents. Krasnodar’s administration had immediately rejected this ultimatum in an attempt to try
to keep the situation under control. However, in August 1995, Moskovskiye Novosti confirmed that
some ethnic Chechens had already been deported from Stavropol’ and Krasnodar, and that Cossack
meetings had demanded the eviction of all Chechens from Stavropol’. The paper indicated that, so
far, the Stavropol’ authorities had managed to avert large-scale pogroms, but the Cossacks had been
especially brutal in the Budennovsk district. Here 100 Chechen families out of approximately 500
had already fled their homes after threats and arson attacks.
Reports from Moscow in August 1995 also suggested that a territorial division of Chechnya
was planned by circles close to the Russian government. 148 These reports were based on statements
by Aleksei Kulakovsky, the Head of Administration of Mineral’nye Vody and the President’s
representative in the Stavropol’ Krai Administration, and an important player in the region with
aspirations to become the next Head of the Krai. Kulakovsky was close to the Russian negotiations
over Chechnya, and in the course of the negotiations he demanded that the territory on the left bank
of the Terek River in Chechnya be transferred to Stavropol’ Krai. Stanislav Govorukhin, a
prominent Russian nationalist and the chairman of the parliamentary commission investigating the
war in Chechnya, also admitted in July 1995 that a package of legislative proposals were pending in
the Russian parliament on the return of the Shelkovsky and Naursky districts of Chechnya to
Stavropol’. These were the districts included in Checheno-Ingushetia in 1957, and the two sets of
statements seem to indicate yet another round of territorial divisions in the North Caucasus to
compound the existing problems.
147 Dmitriy Kamyshev, “Budennovsk as Prologue,” Kommersant Daily (in English), June 16, 1995.
148 See Lyudmila Leontyeva, “A New Redivision?” Moskovskiye Novosti (in English), No. 51, 30 July-6 August
1995.
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