RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

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group of high-level Soviet functionaries who were opposed to the devolution of power, Yeltsin’s proposal did not succeed in stabilizing the Russian Federation. Tatarstan and Chechnya abstained from signing the Federal Treaty in March 1992, and a number of the actual signatories, such as Yakutia and Bashkortorstan, made official declarations of serious reservations. Russia’s oblasts also immediately protested what they perceived as special privileges accorded to the national republics in the treaty and demanded equal rights. The Dilemma of Post-Soviet Structural Reform: The protests of the oblasts highlighted the fundamental dilemma of post-Soviet structural reform in the Russian Federation: • should the ethno-territorial principle be retained with its asymmetry and special privileges given to the republics? • or should the Federation be based on self-administering units organized according to territorial size and economic principles, along the lines of the states of the USA and the German Lands? • or should the Federation be abolished altogether and a unitary, centralized state be created, with only limited administrative devolution to units akin to the old Tsarist gubernias? There is presently no consensus in Moscow on this issue and Russia’s politicians vacillate between the three positions. 25 Retaining the current structure demands its rationalization, and a coherent strategy for the devolution of an appropriate degree of power to the Federation’s non- Russian ethnic groups. It is opposed by many Russian political leaders and oblasts. The territorialadministrative principle, on the other hand, while facilitating the functions of the central government, implies a radical departure from the status quo and is strongly opposed by the national republics. The third option suggests an end to democratization and a return to the over-centralization of functions in the Soviet period. While the latter is favored by officials of the central government in Moscow and businessmen seeking a uniform legal framework for country-wide operations, 26 it is opposed by all the constituent units of the federation. The difficulties of reaching a consensus on the direction of structural reform are compounded by the necessity of creating a post-Soviet political system for the Russian Federation. 25 For the most recent in-depth discussion and illustration of this dilemma see Rafael Khakimov, “Russia and the Process of Federalization,” and “Appeal to President Boris Yeltsin from President M. Shaimiev, Tatarstan, President M. Rakhimov, Bashkortorstan and President M. Nikolaev, Sakha (Yakutia): For a Consistent Policy to Democratize and Federalize Russia,” in Bulletin of the Ethnic Conflict Management in the Former Soviet Union Network on Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict, Special Section, pp. 10-16, Conflict Management Group June 1995 (hereafter CMG Bulletin). 26 This information was obtained in interviews with Russian businessmen conducted by the SDI Project in June 1994. 8
From 1991, the question of whether Russia should be a presidential or a parliamentary republic and the revision of the Russian Constitution took precedence over the question of the respective rights of republics, oblasts and the federal center. As President Yeltsin and the Russian parliament vied for ultimate authority, the issue of structural reform was reduced to a pawn in the power struggle. For example, in August 1990, faced by declarations of sovereignty by the Mari, Komi and Tatar republics in the Volga region, Boris Yeltsin urged the Russian Federation’s republics to “take as much sovereignty” as they could swallow. In 1993, to win the support of the Council of the Heads of the Republics 27 in pushing through a presidential constitution for the Russian Federation against the wishes of the parliament, Yeltsin capitalized on this earlier statement, presenting himself as the guarantor of republican autonomy against hardliners in the Russian parliament. As a result of the power struggles at the center and the lack of consensus on the future structure of the Russian Federation, by the end of 1993, the Federal Treaty and a new Russian Constitution had all been concluded and brought into force, but no fundamental reform of the structure of the Federation had taken place. 27 This body was established by President Yeltsin in October 1992 to implement the basic principles of the Federal Treaty and discuss the administration of the Russian Federation on the basis of the new Constitution. See “Directive of the President of the Russian Federation On the Formation of the Council of the Heads of the Republics,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 30, 1992. 9
Page 1 and 2: “RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 3 and 4: PREFACE Background to the Report In
Page 5 and 6: “RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 7 and 8: and dependent on subsidies from the
Page 9 and 10: • Cleavages between Orthodoxy and
Page 11 and 12: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Administra
Page 13 and 14: 3. The failure of Russian policy: S
Page 15 and 16: SECTION I The Structural Legacy of
Page 17 and 18: Supreme Soviet and a Presidium of t
Page 19 and 20: Tenglik went so as far as to blocka
Page 21: The Soviet government of the Russia
Page 25 and 26: Russia, announced the formation of
Page 27 and 28: as a mediator in inter-ethnic confl
Page 29 and 30: After 1991, Abkhazia’s role as th
Page 31 and 32: members of the KNK all have a diffe
Page 33 and 34: SECTION III The Failure of Russia
Page 35 and 36: absolving the Ministry for National
Page 37 and 38: This activity has raised expectatio
Page 39 and 40: 1. Yeltsin’s March 1991 Visit to
Page 41 and 42: The first report recommended that,
Page 43 and 44: In response to the refusal of the K
Page 45 and 46: SECTION IV Territorial Disputes in
Page 47 and 48: inflammatory rhetoric, others have
Page 49 and 50: government, the expectation was tha
Page 51 and 52: 2. The secession of Chechnya from R
Page 53 and 54: epeated ultimatums to the Ingush to
Page 55 and 56: The refugee issue and the status of
Page 57 and 58: Government interventions have been
Page 59 and 60: Another territorial dispute in Dage
Page 61 and 62: To protect their group rights in th
Page 63 and 64: 1991 the referendum on statehood wa
Page 65 and 66: a dual Cherkess-Abazin federal repu
Page 67 and 68: The Krai’s ethnic composition is,
Page 69 and 70: Other Circassian peoples and the KN
Page 71 and 72: The Revival of the Cossacks in the
Page 73 and 74:
the region. These meetings and of i
Page 75 and 76:
The Cossacks are now perceived by t
Page 77 and 78:
in Kazakhstan. The 1991 Law on the
Page 79 and 80:
Chechnya was operating; 122 and a h
Page 81 and 82:
As modern civil society ceased to f
Page 83 and 84:
emergency session of the Checheno-I
Page 85 and 86:
Soviet weaponry, including tanks an
Page 87 and 88:
consisted of the most radical facti
Page 89 and 90:
In 1992-1993, the opposition’s re
Page 91 and 92:
In the North Caucasian republics, t
Page 93 and 94:
Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowl
Page 95 and 96:
The War in Chechnya and Implication
Page 97 and 98:
Conclusion As the discussion in the
Page 99 and 100:
APPENDIX 1 The Refugee crisis in th
Page 101 and 102:
was reversed in the late 1980s. 162
Page 103 and 104:
and the already high levels of unem
Page 105 and 106:
APPENDIX 2 The Islamic Factor in th
Page 107 and 108:
incorporating their principle figur
Page 109 and 110:
Since the war in Chechnya, and give
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