RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

countries (i.e. Turkey, Iran, and Jordan) in regional conflicts, ethnic Russians fear that the proposed North Caucasus Confederation will become an Iranian-style Islamic state. The inter-ethnic conflicts in the region, the regional economic crisis, the concomitant rise in crime, and the increased influence of traditional clan structures in a number of republics, have also engendered fears that any North Caucasian Confederation would be incapable of sustaining itself and would inevitably degenerate into a lawless state riven by clan conflicts. For ethnic Russians, therefore, the Mountain Confederation is a vision of the “Lebanonization” of the whole region. 46 Although the KNK has made some effort to assuage these fears, by establishing links with the Russian Cossack movements in the region and acknowledging the Cossacks as “among the indigenous Caucasians,” 47 it has not been able to overcome the perception that it is a secessionist and anti-Russian force. 46 This information is from interviews with local Russian officials conducted by Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov since 1991, and by Fiona Hill in the summer of 1995. For a piece that typifies Russia’s fears of the Lebanonization of the North Caucasus, see L.Ia. Dadiani and A.Iu. Shumikhin, “Livanizatsia” kak model’ etnosotsial’noi konfliktnosti i polozhenie v zone Kavkaza: sopostavitel’nyi analiz, Rossiiskii Nauchnyi Fond (Moscow, 1994). 47 In 1993, after President Yeltsin signed the Russian government’s “Decree on Reforming the Military Structure, Border and Security Forces on the Territory of the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation, and State Support for the Cossacks” the Cossacks became a force to be reckoned with. In response, the KNK organized a series of meetings with local Cossacks formations and an “Agreement on the Principles of Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus and the Cossacks of Southern Russia” was concluded. However, as is the case with all of the KNK’s declarations of principles, there were no concrete results from this agreement. 18
SECTION III The Failure of Russia’s Regional Policy The increasing demands for territorial change and structural reform in the North Caucasus and the crisis of national and regional leadership have not been met by a coherent response from Moscow. Russia has failed to formulate either a strategy for implementing structural reform or a regional policy for the Russian Federation. The Ministry for Nationalities and Regional Policy that is supposed to coordinate Moscow’s efforts is weak, and as a result, a number of other government agencies compete for influence over the future of the Russian Federation and two conflicting ideas have emerged in Russian politics as to what form the new post-Soviet Russian Federation should take. Instead of following from structured debates and eventual political consensus, regional policy in Russia is the sum of individual initiatives and is consequently confused. The legal framework established to regulate relations between Moscow and the subjects of the Russian Federation consists of four contradictory pieces of legislation: the 1992 Federal Treaty; the 1993 Russian Constitution; a set of bilateral treaties between Moscow and individual republics and oblasts; and a new draft law on the delimitation of powers between the center and the periphery. As a result of having no overall blueprint for the future of the Russian Federation, Moscow has resorted to improvisation and ad hoc measures to address the issue of conflict in the North Caucasus. Institutional confusion in Moscow: Theoretically, the conduct of regional policy in the Russian Federation is assigned to the Ministry of Nationalities and Regional Policy—a ministry which was created in 1992 on the basis of a pre-existing State Committee for Nationality Affairs (Goskomnats). In practice, however, policymaking has been diffused among a number of institutions, including: • the Ministry for Nationalities and Regional Policy; • the Russian parliament, under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Regional Policy, and the Subcommittee on Federal Relations; • the Presidential apparatus, under the President’s special advisor on nationalities issues and the Center for Ethno-political and Regional Studies; • the Russian Security Council, under the jurisdiction of specially convened subcommittees on regional issues; • the federal security and counter-intelligence services; • the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; • the Ministry of Internal Affairs; 19
Page 1 and 2: “RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 3 and 4: PREFACE Background to the Report In
Page 5 and 6: “RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 7 and 8: and dependent on subsidies from the
Page 9 and 10: • Cleavages between Orthodoxy and
Page 11 and 12: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Administra
Page 13 and 14: 3. The failure of Russian policy: S
Page 15 and 16: SECTION I The Structural Legacy of
Page 17 and 18: Supreme Soviet and a Presidium of t
Page 19 and 20: Tenglik went so as far as to blocka
Page 21 and 22: The Soviet government of the Russia
Page 23 and 24: From 1991, the question of whether
Page 25 and 26: Russia, announced the formation of
Page 27 and 28: as a mediator in inter-ethnic confl
Page 29 and 30: After 1991, Abkhazia’s role as th
Page 31: members of the KNK all have a diffe
Page 35 and 36: absolving the Ministry for National
Page 37 and 38: This activity has raised expectatio
Page 39 and 40: 1. Yeltsin’s March 1991 Visit to
Page 41 and 42: The first report recommended that,
Page 43 and 44: In response to the refusal of the K
Page 45 and 46: SECTION IV Territorial Disputes in
Page 47 and 48: inflammatory rhetoric, others have
Page 49 and 50: government, the expectation was tha
Page 51 and 52: 2. The secession of Chechnya from R
Page 53 and 54: epeated ultimatums to the Ingush to
Page 55 and 56: The refugee issue and the status of
Page 57 and 58: Government interventions have been
Page 59 and 60: Another territorial dispute in Dage
Page 61 and 62: To protect their group rights in th
Page 63 and 64: 1991 the referendum on statehood wa
Page 65 and 66: a dual Cherkess-Abazin federal repu
Page 67 and 68: The Krai’s ethnic composition is,
Page 69 and 70: Other Circassian peoples and the KN
Page 71 and 72: The Revival of the Cossacks in the
Page 73 and 74: the region. These meetings and of i
Page 75 and 76: The Cossacks are now perceived by t
Page 77 and 78: in Kazakhstan. The 1991 Law on the
Page 79 and 80: Chechnya was operating; 122 and a h
Page 81 and 82: As modern civil society ceased to f
Page 83 and 84:
emergency session of the Checheno-I
Page 85 and 86:
Soviet weaponry, including tanks an
Page 87 and 88:
consisted of the most radical facti
Page 89 and 90:
In 1992-1993, the opposition’s re
Page 91 and 92:
In the North Caucasian republics, t
Page 93 and 94:
Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowl
Page 95 and 96:
The War in Chechnya and Implication
Page 97 and 98:
Conclusion As the discussion in the
Page 99 and 100:
APPENDIX 1 The Refugee crisis in th
Page 101 and 102:
was reversed in the late 1980s. 162
Page 103 and 104:
and the already high levels of unem
Page 105 and 106:
APPENDIX 2 The Islamic Factor in th
Page 107 and 108:
incorporating their principle figur
Page 109 and 110:
Since the war in Chechnya, and give
show all

RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?