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Table 3. Current status of refugees and forced migrants in North Ossetia Status Percentage of respondents Planning to return to Georgia 22.0% Planning to stay in North Ossetia 66.0% Without resident status 74.0% With temporary resident status 20.0% With permanent resident status 6.0% Without permanent housing (i.e. living with relatives and friends, in hotels and dormitories) 91.0% With permanent housing 8.0% Dependent on state financial assistance, charity and relatives 44.0% Living on savings or the sale of belongings 16.0% Experiencing serious material difficulties 47.0% Living on the edge of starvation with insufficient funds for proper nutrition Table 4. Reasons cited by refugees for the failure to resolve their problems Reason Percentage of respondents The state’s lack of financial resources for resolving the refugee problem The lack of legal provisions for regulating the status of refugees 34.0% 49.8% 37.0% Bureaucracy of local authorities 15.5% Bureaucracy of central executive organs and general unwillingness to deal with the refugee problem 12.5% Significantly from the political point of view, 77% of the refugees who took part in Dzutsev’s survey were aged between 20 and 59 years, accounting for the most economically viable segment of the population, while approximately half of all those surveyed were without any kind of employment in North Ossetia. 165 Of these unemployed refugees, 50% expressed a willingness to be completely retrained for a new occupation and 14% were prepared to change professions in order to find work. In spite of this willingness, however, the general economic crisis in the North Caucasus 165 Figures from the Migratory Service of the Republic of North Ossetia, suggest that only 6,000 out of 30,000 Ossetian refugees and forced migrants of working age have found jobs, which implies that 80% of the 20-59 age group are out of work. See CMG Bulletin, June 1995, p.51. 88
and the already high levels of unemployment suggest that the majority of the refugees will not be integrated into the North Ossetian economy. The refugee crisis in the North Caucasus has exacerbated the general problems posed by high rates of unemployment in the region. These include: the strain on local housing and infrastructure; the accompanying threat of epidemics; the rise in crime and social unrest that results from the enforced idleness of young, healthy males; the threat perceived by residents of the republics from newcomers ‘stealing their jobs;’ and the additional burden placed on the state and the welfare system at a time of economic crisis. The inability of local governments to deal with the scale and the seriousness of this problem owing to a lack of resources and trained cadres is a consequent threat to regional stability. Discontent with the government and the frustration among refugees, registered in Dzutsev’s survey, has led to the establishment of opposition movements among refugees agitating for the resolution of their status in North Ossetia and other republics. The frustration among the Ossetian refugees is shared by their hosts. At a time of economic and political crisis and fierce competition over scarce resources, common ethnic heritage is no guarantee of harmonious relations. This is confirmed by recent reports from North Ossetia which suggest that residents of the republic associate the deteriorating economic situation and its attendant rise in crime with the influx of refugees. 166 In February 1995, under pressure from the indigenous population, the Central Electoral Commission of North Ossetia denied forced migrants and refugees the right to vote in the March 1995 parliamentary elections, depriving several former refugees who were already registered as candidates of critical support. Pushing the refugees to the margins of the political process in such a manner seems more likely to encourage the polarization of North Ossetian society and politics than to assuage the fears of the ‘indigenous’ Ossetian population––especially given the fact that the majority of Ossetian refugees show no desire to return to South Ossetia and there is, in any case, no official provision for their repatriation. In this regard, North Ossetia serves as a mirror for all those republics and krais in the North Caucasus that have taken in large numbers of refugees from the region’s many conflicts. The War in Chechnya and the Problem of Refugees: The refugee crisis in the North Caucasus has been greatly aggravated by the war in Chechnya. By June 1995, according to the Russian Federal Migration Service, the war in Chechnya had added 380,000 refugees and forced migrants to more than 130,000 already officially registered in the North Caucasus before December 1994 (of whom over 80,000 were already from Chechnya). By the end of April 1995, an estimated one third of the Chechen population (450,000) had become refugees, most of them (360,000) scattered throughout the North Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russian Federation. 167 166 CMG Bulletin, June 1995, p.51. 167 OMRI Daily Digest, No. 86, 3 May 1995. 89
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“RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
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PREFACE Background to the Report In
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“RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
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and dependent on subsidies from the
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• Cleavages between Orthodoxy and
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Administra
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3. The failure of Russian policy: S
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SECTION I The Structural Legacy of
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Supreme Soviet and a Presidium of t
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Tenglik went so as far as to blocka
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The Soviet government of the Russia
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From 1991, the question of whether
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Russia, announced the formation of
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as a mediator in inter-ethnic confl
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After 1991, Abkhazia’s role as th
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members of the KNK all have a diffe
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SECTION III The Failure of Russia
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absolving the Ministry for National
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This activity has raised expectatio
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1. Yeltsin’s March 1991 Visit to
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The first report recommended that,
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In response to the refusal of the K
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SECTION IV Territorial Disputes in
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inflammatory rhetoric, others have
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government, the expectation was tha
Page 51 and 52: 2. The secession of Chechnya from R
Page 53 and 54: epeated ultimatums to the Ingush to
Page 55 and 56: The refugee issue and the status of
Page 57 and 58: Government interventions have been
Page 59 and 60: Another territorial dispute in Dage
Page 61 and 62: To protect their group rights in th
Page 63 and 64: 1991 the referendum on statehood wa
Page 65 and 66: a dual Cherkess-Abazin federal repu
Page 67 and 68: The Krai’s ethnic composition is,
Page 69 and 70: Other Circassian peoples and the KN
Page 71 and 72: The Revival of the Cossacks in the
Page 73 and 74: the region. These meetings and of i
Page 75 and 76: The Cossacks are now perceived by t
Page 77 and 78: in Kazakhstan. The 1991 Law on the
Page 79 and 80: Chechnya was operating; 122 and a h
Page 81 and 82: As modern civil society ceased to f
Page 83 and 84: emergency session of the Checheno-I
Page 85 and 86: Soviet weaponry, including tanks an
Page 87 and 88: consisted of the most radical facti
Page 89 and 90: In 1992-1993, the opposition’s re
Page 91 and 92: In the North Caucasian republics, t
Page 93 and 94: Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowl
Page 95 and 96: The War in Chechnya and Implication
Page 97 and 98: Conclusion As the discussion in the
Page 99 and 100: APPENDIX 1 The Refugee crisis in th
Page 101: was reversed in the late 1980s. 162
Page 105 and 106: APPENDIX 2 The Islamic Factor in th
Page 107 and 108: incorporating their principle figur
Page 109 and 110: Since the war in Chechnya, and give
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