RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

Conclusion
As the discussion in the report has shown, the structural legacy of the USSR provides the
basic framework for conflict over political power and access to resources in the Russian Federation
and the other successor states to the Soviet Union. The main features of this legacy are the
politicization of ethnicity as a consequence of the creation of national-territorial administrative units
with “titular nationalities;” disputes over the configuration of old administrative and new
international borders from frequent territorial divisions and modifications; and weak national
leadership and the absence of regional political institutions as a result of a lack of training facilities
for local cadres in the autonomous units and the over-centralization of the Soviet state.
In the North Caucasus, a number of other factors have exacerbated the structural legacy to
make the region the most volatile in the Russian Federation. These factors include the North
Caucasus’ extreme ethnic diversity; religious cleavages both between ethnic Russians and North
Caucasian peoples and among the North Caucasian peoples; a high population density with
accompanying shortages of land and housing, especially in the mountainous areas of the republics; a
general economic collapse across the region and the concomitant rise in unemployment and fall in
living standards; the long history of struggle against Moscow’s rule; and the repression of the North
Caucasian peoples by both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. The combination of these factors and the
overall structural legacy have produced political, economic and territorial disputes in every republic
and krai of the North Caucasus region and have encouraged confrontation between the region and
Moscow.
Since 1991, Moscow has not addressed the factors for conflict in the North Caucasus and has
instead adopted an ad hoc approach toward the region, vacillating between policies and failing to
follow-through on the implementation of crucial pieces of legislation. In individual republics such as
Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia conflicts have been defused and largescale
violence avoided only by virtue of the willingness of the republican leadership and socioeconomic
organizations to make significant political and economic concessions to placate aggrieved
groups. In other republics such as North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Chechnya, where the leadership has
been unwilling to find a basis for compromise or to make concessions, violence has erupted.
In none of the republics have either the concessions or the violence resulted in the resolution
of the basic disputes. Nor are the disputes likely to be resolved unless there is a fundamental change
in the structure of the Russian Federation inherited from the USSR and unless Moscow formulates a
coherent policy for all the North Caucasus republics. Although political forces in Chechnya and
other republics have called for the intervention of international institutions in regional disputes, there
is little that international organizations such as the OSCE or the UN can achieve within the existing
political framework. 152 They cannot bring about a change in borders, or an elevation in political
status, or introduce new mechanisms for power-sharing between groups in individual republics
without the complicity of the Russian government. The most that the international community can
152 Appeals for international intervention in the North Caucasus were a constant feature of the interviews conducted
by members of the Working Group for this report.
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