RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

the region. These meetings and of increasingly radical demands and statements from Cossack
leaders grabbed the attention both of Moscow and the North Caucasian republics.
Moscow’s Policy Toward the Cossacks:
Following the earlier example of the Russian Empire, Moscow sought to co-opt the
Cossacks of the Russian Federation, harness their military traditions, and channel their energies
away from confrontation with the state.
In June 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree supporting “the Cossack
revival movement and the restoration of Cossack economic, cultural and patriotic forms of selfgovernment”
in the Russian Federation. The decree recognized the rights of Cossacks to practice
traditional forms of local administration and land ownership in areas that would be defined by
plebiscite. Under the provisions of the decree, Cossacks were to be given grants of land and Cossack
regiments were to be created by the Ministry of Defense to defend international borders and
maintain law and order. In March 1993, President Yeltsin signed an additional decree creating
Cossack units as part of the Russian Federation’s armed forces in the North Caucasus. 113
The March 1993 Decree was specifically intended to address personnel shortages in the
Russian forces of the North Caucasus Military District by taking advantage of Cossack desires to
perform military service. Since the formation of the military district in 1992-1993, the Russian army
had experienced considerable difficulty in creating the necessary infra-structure and in maintaining
the requisite level of forces. In 1993 alone, 1,500 men deserted from units of the North Caucasus
Military District, and the assessed strength of the ground forces was 38,000—20,000 men short of
the district’s established strength of 58,000. In response to these shortages, a number of Russian
military experts urged the creation of Cossack contingents to supplement the forces in Stavropol’
and Krasnodar under the jurisdiction of the military district’s headquarters. 114
President Yeltsin’s decrees, and reports that Cossack volunteers from villages around
Vladikavkaz and Mozdok in North Ossetia had offered their services to the North Ossetian National
Guard in its action against the Ingush, caused a stir among the North Caucasian national groups. The
KNK made attempts to accommodate the Cossacks as an “indigenous people” of the region. A series
of meetings were held and a flurry of agreements were signed between the KNK and the Cossacks.
In Ingushetia, after the de-escalation of the conflict with North Ossetia, Ingush President Ruslan
Aushev actively sought to co-opt the Cossacks to push his agenda for increased regional autonomy
with the Russian government. President Aushev recognized the status of the Cossacks in the North
113 Decree of March 15, 1993 “On the Reforming of Military Structures, Frontier and Interior Forces on the
Territory of the North Caucasian Region of the Russian Federation and State Support for the Cossacks.”
114 For a discussion of the problems of the North Caucasus Military District and the role of the Cossacks, see
Lyudmila Leontyeva, “Where do Russia’s Southern Borders Pass?” Moscow News, No. 46, November 12,
1993; and also Michael Orr, “The Regional Military Balance: Conventional and Unconventional Military
Forces Around the Caspian,” presentation at conference on Oil & Caviar in the Caspian (School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London, February 23-24, 1995).
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