RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

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None of these disputes in the North Caucasus is the result of ancient tribal hatreds. The fact that a political or economic issue has assumed an ethnic dimension is the direct result of the linkage of territory and ethnicity in the USSR. This is emphasized by the fact that, prior to Russia’s incursion into the North Caucasus, when the current administrative structure and borders first began to take shape, there was no record of ethnic conflict. There were disputes between groups over grazing rights in mountain pastures, but no instances of violence either on the basis of ethnicity or because of the seizure and colonization of another group’s territory. The conflicts in the North Caucasus can not be solved by violence. They can only be solved by a change of policy in Moscow and by the willingness of the national leadership of the North Caucasus to remove ethnicity from the political and economic disputes of the post-Soviet transition. Chechnya is a tragedy that is doomed to repeat itself unless political structures in the Russian Federation evolve. x
SECTION I The Structural Legacy of the USSR The structural legacy of the USSR is the key to understanding the instability in the North Caucasus. Indeed, it is the key to understanding the difficulties faced by all of the former republics of the USSR in building independent states and in forging a new relationship with Moscow. The forms of national sovereignty created by the Bolsheviks to administer the multi-ethnic state inherited from the Russian Empire have left an indelible mark on post-Soviet politics. They were based on a compromise brokered by Lenin and Stalin between the demands of the Russian Empire’s disparate ethnic groups for self-determination and the Bolshevik ideal of a unitary party and state. 6 In the 1920s, the territorially and historically based provinces of the Russian Empire were replaced with a hierarchy of national-territorial units in an asymmetrical federation: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Administrative Structure of the USSR: Each national-territorial administrative unit in the USSR was granted a degree of autonomy, or special rights and privileges, by the center. 7 The number of these rights and privileges was dependent on the unit’s position in the hierarchy, with those at the top theoretically having the most autonomy from the center: 1. Union Republics (SSRs). These were the building blocks of the USSR. They included the Russian Federation and 14 other republics which were ascribed to the most populous and historically important non-Russian national groups—the “titular” nationalities. Each union republic had a border with a foreign country in addition to borders with other union republics; 2. Autonomous Republics (ASSRs). These were sub-divisions of the larger union republics, designated as the territories of national minorities who were neither strategically located nor numerous enough to merit a union republic; 6 Prior to the Russian Revolution, non-Russian national groups accounted for more than 40% of the Russian Empire’s total population. According to the census of 1906 “Russians” had a clear majority of 65.5% only if Ukrainians and Belarussians were counted as ethnic Russians. 7 Under the Soviet Constitution these national-territorial units are considered to be legal entities or “subjects.” The units at the top of the hierarchy, the Union Republics, are “subjects” of the USSR, while the smaller units from Autonomous Republics to Autonomous Okrugs are “subjects” of the Union Republic of which they are a part. In the case of the republics of the North Caucasus, they are subjects of the Russian Federation. 1
Page 1 and 2: “RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 3 and 4: PREFACE Background to the Report In
Page 5 and 6: “RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 7 and 8: and dependent on subsidies from the
Page 9 and 10: • Cleavages between Orthodoxy and
Page 11 and 12: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Administra
Page 13: 3. The failure of Russian policy: S
Page 17 and 18: Supreme Soviet and a Presidium of t
Page 19 and 20: Tenglik went so as far as to blocka
Page 21 and 22: The Soviet government of the Russia
Page 23 and 24: From 1991, the question of whether
Page 25 and 26: Russia, announced the formation of
Page 27 and 28: as a mediator in inter-ethnic confl
Page 29 and 30: After 1991, Abkhazia’s role as th
Page 31 and 32: members of the KNK all have a diffe
Page 33 and 34: SECTION III The Failure of Russia
Page 35 and 36: absolving the Ministry for National
Page 37 and 38: This activity has raised expectatio
Page 39 and 40: 1. Yeltsin’s March 1991 Visit to
Page 41 and 42: The first report recommended that,
Page 43 and 44: In response to the refusal of the K
Page 45 and 46: SECTION IV Territorial Disputes in
Page 47 and 48: inflammatory rhetoric, others have
Page 49 and 50: government, the expectation was tha
Page 51 and 52: 2. The secession of Chechnya from R
Page 53 and 54: epeated ultimatums to the Ingush to
Page 55 and 56: The refugee issue and the status of
Page 57 and 58: Government interventions have been
Page 59 and 60: Another territorial dispute in Dage
Page 61 and 62: To protect their group rights in th
Page 63 and 64: 1991 the referendum on statehood wa
Page 65 and 66:
a dual Cherkess-Abazin federal repu
Page 67 and 68:
The Krai’s ethnic composition is,
Page 69 and 70:
Other Circassian peoples and the KN
Page 71 and 72:
The Revival of the Cossacks in the
Page 73 and 74:
the region. These meetings and of i
Page 75 and 76:
The Cossacks are now perceived by t
Page 77 and 78:
in Kazakhstan. The 1991 Law on the
Page 79 and 80:
Chechnya was operating; 122 and a h
Page 81 and 82:
As modern civil society ceased to f
Page 83 and 84:
emergency session of the Checheno-I
Page 85 and 86:
Soviet weaponry, including tanks an
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consisted of the most radical facti
Page 89 and 90:
In 1992-1993, the opposition’s re
Page 91 and 92:
In the North Caucasian republics, t
Page 93 and 94:
Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowl
Page 95 and 96:
The War in Chechnya and Implication
Page 97 and 98:
Conclusion As the discussion in the
Page 99 and 100:
APPENDIX 1 The Refugee crisis in th
Page 101 and 102:
was reversed in the late 1980s. 162
Page 103 and 104:
and the already high levels of unem
Page 105 and 106:
APPENDIX 2 The Islamic Factor in th
Page 107 and 108:
incorporating their principle figur
Page 109 and 110:
Since the war in Chechnya, and give
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