RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

The first report recommended that, instead of working with the new political forces such as
the KNK and the national movements, Moscow establish alternative organizations in the North
Caucasus. The separatist urges of the nationalist movements could only be overcome, the report
concluded, if Moscow concentrated its efforts on increasing the popularity of as many pro-Russian
socio-political groups in the region as possible.
The second report, which outlined the tenets of Russia’s policy toward the region, affirmed
that “assisting the creation and growth in popularity of pro-Russian oriented social movements” was
the primary method of tackling national separatism in the North Caucasus. Drawing on the
experience of the decree on the creation of the Ingush republic and the subsequent conflict between
Ingushetia and North Ossetia over the Prigorodny district, the report also confirmed that a
moratorium should be imposed on the division of the existing republics in the region, and further
suggested that disputed territories be placed under the jurisdiction of the President of Russia. 60
Both reports grossly over-estimated the impact of “national separatism” on the region. In
fact, while seeking to change the territorial and administrative configuration of the region, the
majority of the national movements in the North Caucasus have been in favor of remaining within
the Russian Federation. Their “separatist tendencies” have been just that–“tendencies” limited to the
realm of rhetoric and political protest rather than separatist acts.
The major factor behind this restraint is the traditional weakness of the economies of the
North Caucasus republics. As noted in the introduction, the republics of the North Caucasus are
economically dependent on the Russian Federation, which makes complete independence a less than
attractive option, except for the most radical groups. As a result, with the exception of Chechnya, the
republics have sought the renewal of their union with Moscow before pressing for the reform of the
Russian Federation. All the republics signed the March 1992 Federal Treaty. Although Adygeia,
Dagestan and Karachaevo-Cherkessia rejected the new Russian Constitution in the December 1993
referendum, their rejection was not a prelude to secession. The North Caucasian republics seek
increased autonomy and concrete guarantees of economic and political rights from Moscow, not
independence.
In spite of these facts, the Security Council reports did not consider the possibility of using
economic leverage to forge a new relationship with the North Caucasus. Instead, the reports were the
starting point for the creation of a succession of regional organizations which would be disposed
towards Moscow and would provide a counter-weight to the KNK and the other national
movements. After 1992, Moscow indulged, and urged groups in the region to indulge, in the creation
of a profusion of organizations.
This policy has also been unsuccessful. The result is a dizzying array of associations,
congresses and unions, all competing for the same constituencies. Regional politics has been
60 Vasil’eva and Muzaev, op. cit, p.23; “Commission to Discuss National Policy on North Caucasus,” Interfax,
December 17, 1992, and “Russia Drafts Concept of Ethnic Policies in North Caucasus,” Interfax, January 6,
1993.
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