RUSSIA'S TINDERBOX - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

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The Cossack Atamans of Stavropol’ also renewed their appeals to the Russian President for the return of these districts to Stavropol’ in the summer of 1995. In July 1995, Aleksandr Traspov, a Russian Duma Deputy from Stavropol’ Krai interviewed by Moskovskiye Novosti noted in response to the appeals that “when not only pure Russian territories but also ethnic formations are involved in this process, then everybody in the region will be committed to a common idea: against Chechnya.” Moskovskiye Novosti’s reporter confirmed that Chechens in the region feared that there would indeed be a territorial redivision of the republic which would address the contradictions of the structural legacy of the USSR by giving parcels of land to Stavropol’, Ingushetia and Dagestan, and leaving Chechnya with only a tiny ethnic core. 80
The War in Chechnya and Implications for the Future: As stated in the introduction to this report, the final political status of Chechnya within the Russian Federations still the main issue in the conflict with Moscow. It will not be resolved until Moscow decides what the future structure of the Russian Federation will be. Likewise, any interim agreement on Chechnya that creates some kind of provisional status for the republic will set a precedent for the structure of the Federation. Thus, the future of Russia’s regional policy hinges on Chechnya and vice-versa. The major problem in finding a solution is the fact that there is no unity in decisionmaking in Moscow and that there are too many opposing ideas for the structure of the Russian Federation. It is likely, therefore, that Moscow’s contradictory and vacillating approach toward Chechnya and the North Caucasus will continue for the near future. Moscow’s current proposal for Chechnya is that a transitional government must be created, elections held, and legitimate government authorities formed, before the status of Chechnya can be negotiated. 149 The Chechens have countered that the status of the republic must be negotiated first. In terms of even implementing its current proposal, Moscow has the additional problem of finding Chechen leaders acceptable both to it and the broad mass of Chechens. It is not clear that the members of the opposition singled out by Moscow—Umar Avturkhanov, Saslambek Khadzhiev and Beslan Gantamirov—are those leaders. After the brutality of the Chechen war, it will not be an asset for these men to have been chosen by Moscow. One alternative leader is Ruslan Khasbulatov, the former Chairman of the Russian parliament and erstwhile highest-ranking Chechen in the Russian Federation. Khasbulatov formerly enjoyed considerable popularity in Chechnya. After his return to the republic in spring 1994, following an official pardon for his role in the October 1993 confrontation between President and Parliament in Moscow, he became for a while the focus of anti- Dudayev opposition in his home region of Tolstoi-Yurt. Khasbulatov has kept face with the Chechens because he stood up to Yeltsin in 1993 and has since not been directly implicated in the Moscow-supported opposition that brought war to the republic. In the summer of 1994, prior to the Russian military intervention, many Chechens believed that based on his considerable experience in Moscow, Khasbulatov would be able to bring them out of the confrontation with the Russian Federation. 150 Khasbulatov is, however, as unacceptable to Moscow as Dudayev precisely because of Yeltsin’s October 1993 debacle with the parliament. In the dual absence of any resolution of Chechnya’s status and of convincing alternative leaders to Dudayev, the fighting in Chechnya looks set to continue. Contradictions within the Chechen negotiating team, its lack of experience in high-level negotiations and the continued divisions within the Chechen opposition suggest that a third party mediator and guarantor of a settlement will ultimately be required to push things through. However, although Russia has allowed 149 For a discussion of Moscow’s proposal see interview with new Russian Nationalities Minister, Vyacheslav Mikhailov, in Yelena Dikun, “A Problem Has Found a Specialist,” Obshchaya Gazeta (in English), No. 31, 3-9 August 1995. 150 This section is based on extensive interviews conducted by Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov in Chechnya in 1994. 81
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“RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
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PREFACE Background to the Report In
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“RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
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and dependent on subsidies from the
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• Cleavages between Orthodoxy and
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Administra
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3. The failure of Russian policy: S
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SECTION I The Structural Legacy of
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Supreme Soviet and a Presidium of t
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Tenglik went so as far as to blocka
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The Soviet government of the Russia
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From 1991, the question of whether
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Russia, announced the formation of
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as a mediator in inter-ethnic confl
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After 1991, Abkhazia’s role as th
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members of the KNK all have a diffe
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SECTION III The Failure of Russia
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absolving the Ministry for National
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This activity has raised expectatio
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1. Yeltsin’s March 1991 Visit to
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The first report recommended that,
Page 43 and 44: In response to the refusal of the K
Page 45 and 46: SECTION IV Territorial Disputes in
Page 47 and 48: inflammatory rhetoric, others have
Page 49 and 50: government, the expectation was tha
Page 51 and 52: 2. The secession of Chechnya from R
Page 53 and 54: epeated ultimatums to the Ingush to
Page 55 and 56: The refugee issue and the status of
Page 57 and 58: Government interventions have been
Page 59 and 60: Another territorial dispute in Dage
Page 61 and 62: To protect their group rights in th
Page 63 and 64: 1991 the referendum on statehood wa
Page 65 and 66: a dual Cherkess-Abazin federal repu
Page 67 and 68: The Krai’s ethnic composition is,
Page 69 and 70: Other Circassian peoples and the KN
Page 71 and 72: The Revival of the Cossacks in the
Page 73 and 74: the region. These meetings and of i
Page 75 and 76: The Cossacks are now perceived by t
Page 77 and 78: in Kazakhstan. The 1991 Law on the
Page 79 and 80: Chechnya was operating; 122 and a h
Page 81 and 82: As modern civil society ceased to f
Page 83 and 84: emergency session of the Checheno-I
Page 85 and 86: Soviet weaponry, including tanks an
Page 87 and 88: consisted of the most radical facti
Page 89 and 90: In 1992-1993, the opposition’s re
Page 91 and 92: In the North Caucasian republics, t
Page 93: Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowl
Page 97 and 98: Conclusion As the discussion in the
Page 99 and 100: APPENDIX 1 The Refugee crisis in th
Page 101 and 102: was reversed in the late 1980s. 162
Page 103 and 104: and the already high levels of unem
Page 105 and 106: APPENDIX 2 The Islamic Factor in th
Page 107 and 108: incorporating their principle figur
Page 109 and 110: Since the war in Chechnya, and give
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