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Nine competing drafts for the republic’s constitution were also put into circulation, each of which offered different principles for representational parity and rotating political appointments. The consensus among political analysts in the republic was that the failure of one of the republic’s five principle ethnic groups to dominate politically and socially had brough ram to promote the development of the Karachai people. Dzhamagat also proposed that Karachai autonomy, in addition to monetary compensation for property and other material loss during the deportations, must be integral parts of any development program. The implementation of a program with these elements would greatly increase Karachai economic and political influence in the republic and thus the status of the Karachai elite, giving it the opportunity to seize control of the presidency. In response to the Karachai initiatives, the republic’s Russian and Cherkess populations revived their own demands for separate national-territorial entities and both proposed that these entities be transferred back to the jurisdiction of Stavropol’ Krai. The Russian national movement, Rus’, also suggested that as a result of the failure to produce a new constitution and elect a new parliament, Karachaevo-Cherkessia no longer existed as a legal entity and should be dissolved, with the territory reverting back to Stavropol’. In February 1995, a transitional government in the form of a Coordinating Council was created by a joint session of all the Peoples of the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia in an effort to guide the republic through the constitutional minefield, minimize the radical demands of the national movements, and keep the republic together. 100 Krasnodar: Since the dissolution of the USSR, Krasnodar has become the key Russian-dominated territory on the Russian Federation’s southern border and its only outpost on the Black Sea. Russia’s five remaining Black Sea ports are in Krasnodar Krai, including Novorossiisk and Tuapse, the termini of the Caspian-Black Sea oil pipeline. Krasnodar is also Russia’s border with Georgia and the troubled republic of Abkhazia. administrative workers and also as the directors of collective farms. See Evgeny Kritskii and Vladimir Bolshov, “Karachaevo-Cherkessia: An Analysis of Ethnopolitical Problems,” CMG Bulletin June 1995, pp. 45-47. 100 The Coordinating Council comprises three representatives from each of the five main ethnic groups. See Kritskii and Bolshov, CMG Bulletin, June 1995. 52
The Krai’s ethnic composition is, however, complex. Although Russian’s account for 85% of the population according to the 1989 Soviet census, a good number of these Russians identify themselves as Cossacks—around 27% of the total Russian population. 101 In addition, Ukrainians comprise 3.9%, 102 Armenians 3.6%, 103 and Adygeis 2.3%, with these three groups concentrated in specific districts. Krasnodar is also densely populated, with a density of 60 people per square kilometer in contrast to 8.4 per square kilometer in the Russian Federation as a whole. The population pressure in the Krai has been increased by a steady flow of predominantly Russian migrants and refugees—for example, 203,878 between 1988-1991 and almost 80,000 in 1993. 104 The territorial disputes that are a feature of the intensifying competition for land and housing in Krasnodar are the legacy not of the deportations but of the settlement of Russians and Cossacks in the Tsarist period and the division of the North Caucasian peoples in the 1920s and 1930s. Adygeia: Adygeia was formerly an AO within Krasnodar Krai until it was upgraded to an autonomous republic in July 1991 and transferred from the Krai’s jurisdiction. Although the republic is the titular territory of the Adygei people, the Adygei account for only 22% of the total population with ethnic Russians comprising 68%. In part because of their minority status within their own republic, the Adygei national movement proposes the unification of the Circassian peoples of the western North Caucasus (collectively referred to as the Adyge in Russian sources), of which the Adygei, Shapsug, Cherkess, and Kabardinians were all part from Tsarist times until the late 1930s when they were 101 Figures for those Russians identifying themselves as Cossacks in Krasnodar Krai (i.e. by having one or more ancestor who belonged to the Cossack military caste) are based on the results of a public opinion survey carried out in the Krai in the summer of 1992, the results were published in Kubanskii Kur’er, September 18, 1992 (Krasnodar). Those who carried out the survey estimated that as many as 80,000 people were actively affiliated with Cossack organizations based on the region’s history as the traditional base of the Kuban Cossacks. The Kuban Cossack leader, Ataman Gromov, has also claimed 341,000 registered members of his organization (this information was obtained in an interview with Brian Boeck in 1993). 102 Before the Russian Revolution, approximately 80% of Krasnodar’s population was Ukrainian-speaking––due to the fact that a Ukrainian dialect was the language used by what was then a predominantly Kuban and Don Cossack population with strong ties to the Ukrainian steppe. Soviet Russification policies in the 1930s have been largely responsible for the dramatic decline in Ukrainian language use in the region. There are presently no mass Ukrainian national movements in the Krai, although there is a small Ukrainian cultural organization in Krasnodar. 103 Although they are not directly involved in any territorial disputes, relations between the Armenians and Cossack have been particularly strained, especially after an influx of Armenian refugees into the Krai as a result of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the increasing economic crisis in Armenia. The Armenians are concentrated in the Black Sea region around Tuapse and Sochi where they account for 20% of the population. Cossack groups accuse the Armenians of attempting to ‘infiltrate’ the region and of being heavily involved in crime and land speculation. See, for example, reports on the increasing tension between Armenians and Cossacks in Severnyi Kavkaz, July 1, 1992. 104 See Severnyi Kavkaz, No.130, July 30, 1992, and Alexander Kritskii, “Krasnodar: Ethno-Demographic Situation,” in CMG Bulletin, October 1994, pp.30-33. The 1994 figures for migrants and refugees are not yet available. 53
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“RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
Page 3 and 4:
PREFACE Background to the Report In
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“RUSSIA’S TINDERBOX” Conflict
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and dependent on subsidies from the
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• Cleavages between Orthodoxy and
Page 11 and 12:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Administra
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3. The failure of Russian policy: S
Page 15 and 16: SECTION I The Structural Legacy of
Page 17 and 18: Supreme Soviet and a Presidium of t
Page 19 and 20: Tenglik went so as far as to blocka
Page 21 and 22: The Soviet government of the Russia
Page 23 and 24: From 1991, the question of whether
Page 25 and 26: Russia, announced the formation of
Page 27 and 28: as a mediator in inter-ethnic confl
Page 29 and 30: After 1991, Abkhazia’s role as th
Page 31 and 32: members of the KNK all have a diffe
Page 33 and 34: SECTION III The Failure of Russia
Page 35 and 36: absolving the Ministry for National
Page 37 and 38: This activity has raised expectatio
Page 39 and 40: 1. Yeltsin’s March 1991 Visit to
Page 41 and 42: The first report recommended that,
Page 43 and 44: In response to the refusal of the K
Page 45 and 46: SECTION IV Territorial Disputes in
Page 47 and 48: inflammatory rhetoric, others have
Page 49 and 50: government, the expectation was tha
Page 51 and 52: 2. The secession of Chechnya from R
Page 53 and 54: epeated ultimatums to the Ingush to
Page 55 and 56: The refugee issue and the status of
Page 57 and 58: Government interventions have been
Page 59 and 60: Another territorial dispute in Dage
Page 61 and 62: To protect their group rights in th
Page 63 and 64: 1991 the referendum on statehood wa
Page 65: a dual Cherkess-Abazin federal repu
Page 69 and 70: Other Circassian peoples and the KN
Page 71 and 72: The Revival of the Cossacks in the
Page 73 and 74: the region. These meetings and of i
Page 75 and 76: The Cossacks are now perceived by t
Page 77 and 78: in Kazakhstan. The 1991 Law on the
Page 79 and 80: Chechnya was operating; 122 and a h
Page 81 and 82: As modern civil society ceased to f
Page 83 and 84: emergency session of the Checheno-I
Page 85 and 86: Soviet weaponry, including tanks an
Page 87 and 88: consisted of the most radical facti
Page 89 and 90: In 1992-1993, the opposition’s re
Page 91 and 92: In the North Caucasian republics, t
Page 93 and 94: Moscow. Since Budennovsk, the knowl
Page 95 and 96: The War in Chechnya and Implication
Page 97 and 98: Conclusion As the discussion in the
Page 99 and 100: APPENDIX 1 The Refugee crisis in th
Page 101 and 102: was reversed in the late 1980s. 162
Page 103 and 104: and the already high levels of unem
Page 105 and 106: APPENDIX 2 The Islamic Factor in th
Page 107 and 108: incorporating their principle figur
Page 109 and 110: Since the war in Chechnya, and give
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