Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
behind Western intellectual interest in the region, and the relatively recent
beginnings of worldwide Western supremacy.
Hence, Curtis maintains that the concept of Oriental despotism
does not stem from ignorance or racism: “The ‘Orient’ was a reality,
not a fiction devised by the West” (67). He admits the prevalence of factual
deficiencies in the historic works that he examines and their authors’ use of
oriental despotism as a metaphor to warn against the possibility of absolute
rule in Europe. By doing so, yet at the same time upholding these works’
contemporary relevance, Curtis risks committing a fallacy that he is critical
of, or assuming an ever unchanging image of the East.
Curtis’s greatest scholarly feat in this book is a balanced
and insightful analysis of the European perceptions of Islamic polities in
the Middle East, North Africa, and Mughal India. The bulk of his research
is devoted to the six major Western European theorists who wrote on the
Oriental or Islamic world at different historical periods. Despite travelogues
and comparisons of the East and the West by philosophers including Machiavelli,
Bodin, and Francis Bacon, Montesquieu is “the first writer to formulate
in detail the concept of Oriental despotism” (73). As such, Montesquieu left
a profound influence on all future discussion of the subject. According to
Montesquieu, despotism is essentially Oriental in nature, and its main causes
are climate, terrain, and the Islamic religion. In cold and temperate climates,
“peoples have a spirit that leads to a sense of liberty and an independence
lacking in the South” (83). In contrast, a hot climate produces an indolence
of mind and body, timidity, and a lively imagination (which is connected to
strong passion and sexuality). In despotisms, women are subdued and slavery
is prevalent. Paradoxically, on the one hand, despotisms are natural to territories
that lack natural defenses (86), on the other hand, despotisms are
happiest when they are isolated and their people are ignorant of the possibility
of free government (97). Montesquieu equated Christianity with mildness
and nondespotic politics; in contrast, Islam was a religion of the sword, and
its doctrine of predestination and rigid fate led to indolence, passivity, and
obedience. While in other political orders, religion is a check on political
power, in despotic countries “it is fear added to fear” (87). As a result, the
Oriental world is socially static, politically immutable, and economically
backward. Although Curtis states that “Montesquieu’s images of despotic
government were less historically accurate than his analysis of the European
countries with which he was familiar,” he nevertheless accepts them as a
“logically compelling” description of absolute government (101).