Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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2 7 6 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Maimonides says in the Introduction, the man who does not allow himself “to be drawn on together with intellect” would perceive “that he had brought loss to himself and to his religion” (6). One whose intelligence is perfected cannot but feel that he has done a disservice to himself and to his religion if he abandons reason for religion’s sake. Maimonides’ remarks concerning the dangers of abandoning reason, as well as his observation at 2.25:328 that were eternity demonstrated the Torah could more easily be metaphorically interpreted in light of this truth than it could in light of the truth of God’s incorporeality, suggest that he wished to assure those who subscribe to the Aristotelian eternity position that they, too, have a place in the community, and indeed that they occupy the most exalted place. So, too, all Maimonides’ attempts to reconcile Aristotelian views with Scripture are best construed as attempts to assure the philosophically inclined that they need not abandon the Torah, though they ought not to look to its surface text to provide truths that are best gotten elsewhere. A case in point might be 3.13:455, where Maimonides offers an interpretation of Job 4:18-19. The biblical verses read as follows: “Behold, he puts no trust in his servants; and his angels he charges with folly: how much more those who dwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust, who are crushed before the moth?” Taking “servants” to mean spheres, Maimonides contends that the verses teach that the spheres have no trustworthy existence. And he goes on: “For, according to our opinion, they are made; according to the opinion of those who prefer the doctrine of the eternity of the world, they are caused. And their part in existence is not trustworthy or fixed if compared to Him, may He be exalted, the absolutely necessary being.” Maimonides’ assertion that the point is valid either way might well serve as an assurance to one who leans toward the eternity view that he need not on that account be dismissive of the Torah. Another such assurance may be found at 1.71:181, where Maimonides implies that the eternity of the world need not spell the end of prophecy. Indeed, if we exclude from consideration Maimonides’ endorsement in 2.25 of the literal interpretation of the Torah’s Account of the Beginning, if, that is, we take seriously instead his repeated repudiations of the literal interpretation of biblical parables, it begins to seem very probable that he sides with Aristotle on the question of the world’s origins. For, despite his own efforts to argue for the creation thesis, he openly concedes that “the opinions held by Aristotle regarding the causes of the motion of the spheres— from which opinions he deduced the existence of separate intellects,” while
Creation as Parable in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed 2 7 7 not demonstrated, “are, of all the opinions put forward on this subject, those that are exposed to the smallest number of doubts and those that are the most suitable for being put into a coherent order” (2.3:254). Maimonides immediately goes on to say that “these sayings also are in harmony with many sayings of the Law and, more particularly, with what is explained in the generally known midrashim.” Strikingly, Maimonides concludes this passage by saying that he will set forth Aristotle’s opinions and proofs “so that I may cull from them what agrees with the Law and corresponds to the sayings of the Sages, may their memory be blessed.” Maimonides is telling us here, in effect, that although he will affirm only those Aristotelian opinions and proofs that are consonant with the Torah and the Midrash, nevertheless, Aristotle’s opinions and proofs remain generally, and not only on those occasions when they accord with Scripture and the Rabbis, “those exposed to the smallest number of doubts.” (Chapter 2.3 is a very short one that makes only this single point.) In closing, let us ask what we are to make of Maimonides’ assertion in the Introduction to Part 3.415 and in 2.29:346 that the Guide’s first purpose and chief aim is to explain the Account of the Beginning and Account of the Chariot. If indeed he, following the Rabbis, does not intend to reveal what is not to be revealed and does not think the Torah’s account can be regarded as literally true (as, as we have seen, he indeed says at 2.29.346), what is it that Maimonides will explain? A second look at Maimonides’ statement shows that in both places he promises to explain only “what can be explained,” that is, he has no intention of openly revealing what must remain hidden, that is, the true secrets, those mysteries that it is forbidden for one person to reveal to many others. We should not, then, expect anything that Maimonides conveys openly to be an explanation of the secrets and mysteries of the Account of the Beginning or the Account of the Chariot: the explanation of those things will be itself hidden and only hinted at. It might even be the case that Maimonides is playing on the ambiguity in the phrase, “to explain what can be explained” (tabyīn mā yumkin tabyīnihi), which may signify either that Maimonides is prepared to explain all that can be explained of the Account of the Beginning and Account of the Chariot, or that his intent is only to identify just what there is—and just how little there is—in the Account of the Beginning and Account of the Chariot that can (or may) be explained. If Maimonides’ purpose in the Guide is to indicate just how tight the restrictions are on what may be openly divulged about these mysteries, perhaps the contradiction between his explicit endorsement of creation as literally presented in the Torah, on the one hand, and his general
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Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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