Spring 2010 - Interpretation

Political Science and the Irrational
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of at least intellectually defending ourselves against both the unenlightened
pursuit of one’s own “lowly” good, on the one hand, and the potential zealotry
of religion’s pursuit of a “higher” good, on the other.
Alcibiades, or On the Nature of Man
As soon as Socrates approaches Alcibiades, it becomes
immediately clear from the beginning of their conversation that the youth
has all the esteemed advantages of life: good looks, connections, wealth,
ambition, power, and, as we find out later on and elsewhere, a natural talent
for politics. Perhaps what is most striking in Socrates’ introductory speech
and Alcibiades’ tacit endorsement of it, however, is the extent of the latter’s
supposed ambition. Not only does Socrates suggest that Alcibiades would
rather die than be forced to simply maintain his affluent position in Greek
society, he even “knows” Alcibiades would rather die than to be granted a
future ascension to power merely over all of Europe. Indeed, Socrates goes so
far as to attribute to the youth an insatiable desire to make known his name
and power over “all mankind” (Plato 1987, 105c). And yet, what remains even
more shocking than this claim is Socrates’ subsequent assertion that all of
this can come to pass only with his (and his god’s) help (105e).
After having thus garnered Alcibiades’ attention with this
mysterious and presumably misplaced bravado (a bravado that follows on
the heels of a band of haughty suitors who were put to flight by Alcibiades’
own extreme haughtiness [103b]), Socrates proceeds to ask what the young
man will possibly say to convince his fellow Athenians that he in particular
should be granted the prerequisite or introductory political rule necessary
for his would-be worldly success. Must not Alcibiades claim to be more competent
and knowledgeable, i.e., know what is better with respect to political
things, than his fellow countrymen (106c)? Of course, the answer to this
question is so obvious to Alcibiades that Socrates’ question must be reduced
to asking both what such knowledge is about and what it is ultimately for so
as to acquire any depth. Alcibiades, however, is only partially successful in
meeting these requirements. For while he is able to suggest that his superior
knowledge and right to rule is founded in his (superior) ability to deliberate
on matters of war and peace (107d), he is yet unable to articulate what is better
with respect to war and peace or what the ends of war and peace are.
The difficulty surrounding the answer to this latter question,
however, is no doubt due to Socrates’ tautological rhetoric (107d-109a). For
even though Socrates suggests that those who have knowledge of a matter