Spring 2010 - Interpretation

Questioning Northrop Frye’s Adaptation of Vico
2 9 1
that “my essence is God” (la mia essenza è Iddio) who “thinks in us” (pensa
in noi), so that “as I enter into God, that is the only and true Entity, I truly
cognize not being [io conosco veramente non essere]” (ibid.). By entering into
the mind of his divined Author, i.e. by interpreting the authority of God,
“with true mind” (veramente) Vico acquires conscience, rather than science
or knowledge (gnōsis), of “not being” (on “interpretation,” cf. SN44, Bk. II.3:
“Of Poetic Logic,” iv, concluding paragraphs; and Bk. IV.7). Man’s attempt to
attain to the infinite wisdom of God—his divinatory attempt to “enter into
the Mind of God” (entrare nella Mente di Dio; cf. Correzioni, Miglioramenti, e
Aggiunte Terze, addition to p. 223)—coincides with man’s conscience of “not
being” (non essere), and thus of not being his own true author or creator.
Precisely by being denied possession of infinite wisdom coinciding with “the
totality of reason,” man remains “participant of reason”; precisely by remaining
non-authoritative interpreter of authority, man acquires understanding
of that of which he is not author (ibid.; on “the perfect mind of the sage,” see
Risposta 1711, par. 24).
By forsaking the attempt to understand what we do not
make or create (outside of ourselves), we remain entirely reliant upon the
“wisdom” of the senses that is “human stolid foolishness” (stultitia humana;
De Uno, Bk. I, Ch. XXVII and LXVIII.3; SN44, Bk. III.1.i, par. 2), whereby
our understanding is haplessly determined “by the ultimate circumstances
of facts” (compare Risposta 1711, par. 24; SN44, “Idea of the Work,” concluding
paragraphs; Bk. IV.9.ii, and 14.ii, last par.). Herein rests the “recurring”
(ricorso) of “the barbarism of sense” (la barbarie del senso) through a reflection
imposing itself ad hoc (a placito) or dogmatically upon things (SN44,
“Of the Elements,” XXI; “Of the Principles,” last par.; Bk. II.2.iv, par. 1-2 and
second half; Bk. II.7.i, last par.; “Conclusion of the Work,” par. 2-3). Ultimately
by forsaking “participation in reason” in favor of acquisition of “most
certain” (certissima) divine wisdom, man places himself in the hands of fate
(De Antiquissima, Ch. I.2, par. 7). For “where men in human things do not
see reason, and all the more if they see it contrary [to their wishes or expectations],
they acquiesce in the inscrutable counsels that hide in the abyss of
Providence Divine” (Bk. IV.9.i; compare Bk. IV.9; “Of the Elements,” X; and
SN30, Bk. II.7, par. 5).
Rather than returning to a “world eternal and God always
operating ad extra”—whereby outside of the determination of law nothing
would be held as “true” (compare Risposta 1711, part 2, par. 3, and SN44,
Bk. IV.14.ii, par. 3 and 7)—Vico adapts to Christianity the “foolish” wisdom