Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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2 7 4 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n it this way” or “This is what God’s wisdom required.” But, he contends, on the eternity assumption one must have recourse to “unseemly answers in which there would be combined the giving the lie to, and the annulment of, all the external meanings of the Law with regard to which no intellectual man has any doubt that they are to be taken in their external meanings” (329-30). Yet, Maimonides, as we have seen, is not methodologically disposed to interpret the Torah as literally as possible. Moreover, for at least some of the questions on this list Maimonides furnishes naturalistic answers, consonant with the eternity assumption. For example, to the question, why did God choose a particular prophet rather than another, Maimonides’ answer is that prophecy devolves upon one who has perfected himself morally, spiritually, and intellectually (see 2.32). To the question, why did God not implant in human nature the observance of the commandments, his answer is that free will is itself a feature of human nature (see 2.48). For the rest, Maimonides’ answer might be that there is no answer, that the world follows its natural course without divine intervention. Indeed, it is the assumption that the world was created—along with its corollary that events need not have occurred as they did—that causes us to wonder why particular things are the way they are. (See Weiss 2007.) There is nothing to wonder at if everything is necessary, for so long as the grand scheme reflects God’s wisdom, all that is part of it is “best” as it is (even if His wisdom and goodness surpass human understanding). It is worth noting that but four chapters later, in 2.29, Maimonides reverses himself with respect to taking the Torah text in its external sense on the matter of creation. And perhaps he does so not only there, but even earlier, that is, even before 2.25, for he says: “All these assertions are needed if the text of Scripture is taken in its external sense, even though it must not be so taken, as shall be explained…” (2.17:298). Although Pines suggests that the explanation Maimonides refers to here is the one found in 2.30 where he discusses creation as a temporal act (298, n.8), it is highly unlikely that Maimonides’ warning against taking Scripture literally, including with respect to creation, can be confined to just this one aspect of it. For, first, it is significant that Maimonides’ point in this passage of 2.17 is that his preceding arguments for creation—perhaps the strongest he has—are only required if Scripture is read literally. (These arguments contend that one cannot infer from the way something is in a mature state how it was in the gestational state.) Second, Maimonides makes it clear that figurative—not literal—reading is the default mode for parables; and creation, he tells us in the Introduction in no uncertain terms, is a parable. Third, in 2.29, Maimonides cautions against teaching others what one understands about creation except “in flashes.”
Creation as Parable in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed 2 7 5 As he says, creation harbors secrets, mysteries (see, too, 1.76), things one is forbidden to explain openly. How likely is it that these hidden mysteries are limited to creation’s being a temporal act? Having warned his reader in 2.29 that creation is one of the great mysteries whose secrets it is forbidden to divulge, he concludes that therefore not everything in the Torah’s account should be taken literally. Although it is true that Maimonides says only that “not everything” in the text of the Account of the Beginning (presumably Gen. 1) should be read literally, he could hardly be expected to say here that “nothing” in the text should be read literally, having just explicitly advocated in 2.25 that the creation account be taken in its most literal external sense. Furthermore, if there were only very little in the Account of the Beginning that is not to be taken literally, this would not adequately explain why “the men of knowledge” were “chary of divulging [the truth] with regard to it,” or why the Sages would have “expatiated on its being kept secret and on preventing the talk about it in the presence of the vulgar” (2.29.346-47). Thus, even though in the following chapter, 2.30, Maimonides re-affirms his commitment to creation, he makes a point of saying in 2.29 that “the external sense of these texts leads either to a grave corruption of the imagination and to giving vent to evil opinions with regard to the deity, or to an absolute denial of the action of the deity and to disbelief in the foundation of the Law.” (Indeed, Maimonides implicitly signals that he supports creation even in 2.29 itself, where he says he agrees with Aristotle on only half his view, that is, on the eternity of the world a parte post, presumably disagreeing with him on the other half, the eternity of the world a parte ante. See, too, 1.71 and 2.23, where Maimonides warns against tendentious reasoning yet still affirms his belief in creation.) Maimonides insists, moreover, that those who lack knowledge of the sciences should refrain “from considering these texts merely with the imagination… it is obligatory to consider them with what is truly the intellect after one has acquired perfection in the demonstrative sciences and knowledge of the secrets of the prophets” (347; emphasis added). In Maimonides’ warnings against reading the Torah’s text literally we see that for him there is no less danger in taking the Torah in its literal or external sense than there is in failing to do so. Reading the Torah figuratively poses a danger to those whose intellects are weak, but reading it literally is perilous for those who are philosophically and scientifically sophisticated. In order for these latter individuals to remain within the fold, they must be able to see the Torah’s deeper meaning, its true science. For, as
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Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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