Spring 2010 - Interpretation

2 8 4
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
SN44, “Of the Elements,” XVI, XLVII). While, following the Aristotle of
medieval scholasticism, Vico reads “science” as necessarily pertaining “to
universal and eternal things” (de universalibus et aeternis; SN44, “Of the
Elements,” XXII), Vico’s scienza is not knowledge of the eternal sempliciter,
but of the civil dawn of eternal things—of a birth divined in the fables of
authoritative “Theologian Poets.” Accordingly, the Scienza Nuova presents
itself as a “civil, reasoned theology” of its own principles or origins, which
are merely “certain” or poetic for the imaginative faculty we have in common
with beasts, but “true” “in God” (ibid., “Idea of the Work,” par. 2, and Bk. II,
Introduction, “Of Wisdom Generally,” par. 3; compare Risposta 1711, part 2,
par. 1-3; SN44, “Of the Elements,” LIX; “Of the Method,” par. 1; SN30, Bk.
IV.12.iii: “Corollary,” last par.).
Vico remains critically bent upon origins—at every turn of
argument showing that all attempts to resolve the origins of civil society into
the product of human ingenuity result in relapses into “barbarism” (barbarie),
or in the utter demise of the will (SN44, “Of the Elements,” XLII; “Of the
Method,” par. 2; Bk. II.1.ii, §7; Bk. II.2.vi, §4; Bk. II.2.vii, §1; Bk. II.3, par. 1;
“Conclusion of the Work,” second sentence). The ricorso or “recurring-course”
that Frye finds in Vico is inseparable from the corso or “course” characterizing
the nature (natura) or birth (nascimento) of civil things: Vico’s ricorso
(never in the plural) is the diastole of a systole for civil society, understood as
a living unit or “nation” (compare De Antiquissima, “Dedication,” Risposta
1711, part. 3, par. 14; and SN30, Bk. II.5.viii, par. 3). Hence, with Vico, speaking
of origins is tantamount to speaking of “the common nature of nations”
out of which emerge all human customs (SN44, Bk. I.104). Not by chance is
the Scienza Nuova bent upon demonstrating the originally civil meaning of
“fables” (favole): the supposedly “mythical” or “fabulous” (mithicae = fabulosae)
origins of civil society are “civil” (civili; cf. inter alia, SN44, “Idea of the
Work,” par. 5; Bk. I.1 and 22; “Of the Elements,” LIV; Bk. II, preface; and Bk.
III.1.v, par. 1). In reality, there can be no development of civil society from a
mythical age into a human or rational age.
The distinction between the “three ages” that Frye welcomes
as Vico’s special contribution to modern literary criticism is nothing
more than a heuristic tool Vico borrowed from what he calls the “conceit”
(boria) of ancient Egyptians’ imagination (ibid. and SN44, Bk. I.1, par. 8). On
account of the imagination of nations, the origins of civil society are private
property—or, to speak with the Godfather, cosa nostra: “our own business.”
Vico’s account of civil society finds private property, an imaginary suum