Spring 2010 - Interpretation

Questioning Northrop Frye’s Adaptation of Vico
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rather than legere) or a “reading-within,” Vico’s poetic Authors, his “Theologian
Poets” (Poeti Teologi), merely feign Science, and therewith Authorship
or Authority—for they hold sway over the mere “signs” of things, rather than
things themselves (compare ibid., Ch. I, Introduction; Ch. I.2, esp. last par.;
SN44, “Of the Method,” par. 1-2). True Authority and Science entail intellection,
or the perfection of reason: “in God, that is all reason, reason and
authority are one and the same thing” (ibid., Bk. IV.9.i). Having resolved its
contents within its own being-form, mind is mens purissima, a perfectly
pure mind in which Existence converts completely into Being (hence Vico’s
warning that God is, whereas man exists, i.e. he is always “somewhere”—“c’è,”
rather than simply “è”; Risposta, 1712, par. 12ff.; see also De Antiquissima,
Ch. I.1; Ch. VI, par. 2; and Ch. VII.1, par. 2).
Yet, precisely by denying us access to real intellection or reasoned
wisdom, i.e. to the consummation or end of philosophy, Vico leaves
us faced with the challenge of reading or “going about gathering” (andar
raccogliendo) things outside of our limited minds, understanding what we
read (De Antiquissima, Ch. I, Introduction: “De Vero et Facto”; on merely
imaginative reading, compare SN44, “Idea of the Work,” par. 1, and “Of the
Method,” par. 6). The fact that we cannot really read things themselves within
our finite minds—thereby converting things into the nominal sense of certainty
we have of them (De Uno, Ch. LXXXII-LXXXIII, CLXXXV.11; SN44,
“Of the Principles,” par. 5; De Antiquissima, Ch. VII.2)—leaves us with two
permanently viable alternatives: (1) we may read things imaginatively within
our minds, thereby feigning wisdom and authority; or (2) we can truly read,
“gather,” or “collect” things outside of our finite minds, i.e. we can reason, not
by dwelling upon, but by interpreting and thus questioning the authoritative
nominal or “geometric” forms in which we commonly divine things
themselves, in the attempt to access the “metaphysical” interiority of those
same forms, without attempting to “impiously” replace our conventional
forms of authority with any other form, and least of all with that of our private
sense of certainty (SN44, “Of the Method,” par. 2; Bk. II.2.iv, concluding
paragraphs; Bk. IV.7; Risposta, 1712, part 4, par. 10; De Antiquissima, Ch.
I, par. 1; Ch. III and Ch. IV.11). In either case, with man, reasoning is never
truly resolved in “knowledge” (scientia or gnōsis; cf. De Antiquissima, Ch. I,
Introduction, par. 2; and Ch. I.2, par. 2): to reason is for us to penetrate the
surface of things, remaining “practically” empty-handed—ignorant without
pretense; not wise, though arguably honest (on “honesty,” cf. De Uno, Ch.
XVIII); not dwelling upon, but penetrating all opinions; never resolving
reason in pleasure or self-satisfaction.