Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
theoretical reason and sophia; practical reason and phronesis have instrumental
value, equivalent to the science of medicine. “The ergon that must be
performed well for the sake of that energeia is accomplished, we are told, in
accordance with phronesis and ethical virtue” (NE 1144a6-9; Burger, 125).
Insofar as the exemplar for sophia is not Socrates, but the pre-Socratic philosophers
(NE 1141b6-8; Burger, 120), we might be driven to conclude that while
Aristotle acknowledges the importance of Socratic phronesis for the human
ergon, he wishes to go back to the pre-Socratic philosophers for the highest
end (telos). Burger, however, wonders whether the pre-Socratic understanding
of sophia and the telos is perhaps an “imagined possession” of perfection
and wisdom, and whether Socrates’ constant questioning and knowledge of
ignorance might not be “the reality of love of sophia” (130).
Sophia, rooted not in the passions but in mind, can lift its
sights higher than the (mere) completion or perfection of what one is lacking
to the completion or perfection that stands truly alone and independent: the
whole cosmos, or at least the highest things in the cosmos. What greatness of
soul only dreamed of, sophia claims to achieve (NE 1179a22-32; Burger, 206,
82-87). The culmination of this view arrives in book 10, and seems to leave us
with two realms: the practical (necessary, but low) realm of human concerns
and human action, and the theoretical (divine and ideal) realm of the gods,
the whole cosmos, and the highest things.
Burger, however, invites us to reconsider whether this is,
indeed, Aristotle’s conclusion. First of all, it is not his last word. The identification
of sophia with pure contemplation of the highest things, in complete
isolation from other human beings and in complete abstraction from oneself
as a human being, is followed by a very practical call to action, part of which
is legislation: the establishing of good rules to train and educate the passions
to provide individuals a good beginning toward becoming virtuous. Furthermore,
as Burger points out, if one notes carefully Aristotle’s language (a point
she has been stressing all along), the praising of the purely theoretical life
is “nothing but a common opinion,” a mere speech, the likes of which he
warned us against early on (206, 207-8, 52; NE 1105b12-14); it is also hedged
with several qualifications (“seems to be,” “as it is believed,” etc.). Then, she
reminds us of Aristotle’s insistence that the goal of his work “is not to theorize
and to know, but to act” (208, referring to NE 1095a4-9). “It is necessary
… not just to know about virtue but to have and use it—unless, Aristotle adds
at this late point, there is some other way we become good” (208, referring to
1179a35-b4).