Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
Ahrensdorf’s central observation regarding the Colonnus
play is that Oedipus must prove himself deserving of human protection and
divine reward. Apologetics, in other words, make up the action of the play,
suggesting, says Ahrensdorf, that “if we human beings hope that the gods
will reward us, we cannot simply reject reason but must have recourse to
it” (57). Oedipus argues: (1) that he is not to be despised and cast out for his
patricide and incest, because these actions were committed unknowingly; (2)
that he is not to be punished for his angry violence at the cross-roads, because
he was entitled to defend himself against the king’s party; and (3) that he is
piteous and deserving of favor, because others abused him deliberately, such
as his parents in exposing him and his sons in expelling him. Ahrensdorf
explains that the second argument and the third are not consistent, since
the second supposes that self-interest (self-preservation) exonerates, while
the third supposes that the interests of others are culpable. (Of course the
contradiction depends on a conflation of self-preservation with self-interest
in all of its manifestations and thus on a denial of evil, which Sophocles
might not intend.) Ahrensdorf concludes that Oedipus is rational (engaged
in apologetics) up to the point where reason supports his case for immortality
and divine approval; after which he resorts to anger to defend his sense
of desert. Oedipus is angry in the Colonnus play, says Ahrensdorf, because
anger “naturally gives rise to the heartening belief that justice demands that
you be aided and that the unjust be punished, and hence that there be gods
who favor you as you deserve and punish your enemies as they deserve” (71).
Righteous indignation proves to be yet another avenue to religious piety.
King Theseus stands in stark contrast to Oedipus the wanderer.
Theseus is not angry, despite suffering exile himself. He is not angry
with Oedipus for his polluting crimes nor with Creon for his contemptuous
bullying. Theseus understands, remarks Ahrensdorf, that people act out of
self-interest and that it makes little sense to be angry with them for doing
as nature requires. Theseus’s own interest, as king of an insignificant city, is
to establish its reputation for piety by providing protection to Oedipus. The
reputation, however, is divorced from the reality, insofar as Theseus is not
particularly pious himself—e.g., he shares power with no religious authority.
Theseus is calculating and calm, unburdened by anger, piety, or patriotic zeal.
And yet his rationalistic rule recognizes the importance of pious hopes in
his subjects and pious fears in his enemies. Thus the extension of sanctuary
to Oedipus is useful to Thebes even if the gods are unmoved, uninvolved, or
non-existent. Moreover, the risks incurred by offending more powerful Thebes
are less serious than they appear, since the Theban royal house is torn by