Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
nature—the mental/mute, the physical/expressive, and the psycho-physical
as mythological intersection of silence and speech (compare the whole gist
of Bk. IV and De Uno, Bk. I, Ch. CLII.3). There is no progress from one to
another, in time; rather, at any given time one aspect of man may be more
manifest to man than others, in which case man falls prey of delusion or
conceit. But human nature presupposes all three—the silent (eternal/mental),
the spoken (physical/temporal), and an original or natural civil coincidence
of the two (SN44, “Idea of the Work,” par. 11). It follows that Vico’s “ages” are
not historical “eras.” His “three ages” are themselves borrowed from myth:
they are mythical or fabulous entities, the natural civil meaning of which
Vico sets out to demonstrate (cf. e.g., ibid., “Idea of the Work,” par. 5, and
Bk. II.2.iv, par. 12). The temporality of the “three ages” presupposes their
true eternity: the “three ages” ultimately point to the triadic nature of the
civil world, composed of what is mute (eternal ideas), what is half-mute and
half-spoken (laws), and what is completely outspoken (our naked physicality;
SN44, Bk. I.9 and Bk. II.4.ii, middle paragraphs), but that as such remains
determined by a non-physical objective-form. Since we do not “make” our
bodies, we do not make an inalienable component of civil society; and, in
spite of men’s delusive tendency to assume that what they make is eo ipso
“true,” the true fails to resolve truth in itself. Even the True God is not identical
to truth proper: the Author of civil society is not identical to the faculty
through which civil society is constituted. Cognizing God is not equivalent
to attaining to His infinite wisdom (infinita sapienza; compare SN44, “Conclusion
of the Work,” par. 4, and SN30, “Idea of the Work,” par. 12).
But in their ignorance, men pretend to be rulers or authors
of the universe—“the universe of human sense” (cf. e.g., SN44, “Of the
Elements,” I and Bk. II.3, par. 1; cf. also De Ratione, Ch. V, par. 1, and De
Antiquissima, “Conclusion”); they thereby mistake a faculty for its seat.
Through this “impious” or “atheistic” error, men look upon themselves as
authorities over that which stands outside of them, as if the world “outside”
of man were devoid of its own original author and order. The deluded man
asserts himself, his own sense of certainty, as the author of all order; in his
mad conceit he senses that outside of the reaches of his own will there is only
Chaos. De facto, he identifies the civil or ordered World (Mundum) with his
own private property. But being convinced by other men’s superior might
that they too share in authority, the deluded man concedes that men make
order through collaboration within the natural boundaries of a Nation. Yet,
when even the will of one Nation fails to conquer the universe, the stolid
fool (lo stolto) begins divining authorship in something outside of his Nation.