Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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2 9 2 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of “blind” philosophers, i.e., of the poetic “Epicurean” or “monastic” “philosopher of the senses” (filosofo de’sensi; ibid., Bk. II.2.vii, §6, and “Of the Elements,” V). Now, Christians “believe [the world to be] created in time” ex nihilo; for they believe in a divine creator that is the supra-national infinite seat of the will (animo), saving men from the bonds of law—a God containing all things as dispositions of his Verb, Wisdom or Authority, through which He is capable of freeing men from the limits of the civil world (compare Risposta 1711, part. 2, par. 3; De Uno, Bk. I, Ch. V-VIII and XIII). Given the overtly supra-national character of its God, Christianity draws a distinction between “what is generated” (genitum) and “what is made” (factum; De Antiquissima, Ch. I.3, par. 4; Ch. I.2, par. 1 and 9): “in God” or sustained by God’s authority, things are “generated” internally (ad intra) “from what is eternal” (ab aeterno), but “made” externally (ad extra) “in time” (in tempore)—whereby the Christian God confirms the “philosophical” distinction between physicality and legality, or between bodily motion and its nominal form (compare ibid. and Ch. VI-VII.2): while “the created true converts with the made, the uncreated true [converts] with the generated” (ibid., Ch. I.1, par. 4). But “the uncreated true” (increatum verum) is none other than the divine authority that political philosophy—as Vico’s own “philosophy of authority” (filosofia dell’autorità)—sets out to interpret (compare SN44, “Of the Method,” concluding paragraphs, and “Idea of the Work,” par. 2). On Vico’s account it is really possible for man to “enter into the Mind of God,” i.e. to partake in the totality of reason, although it is not possible for man to contain or comprehend all of the elements of things within his own mind—a feat that Christianity, no less than Vico, asserts to be accomplished in God. Things themselves (res ipsae) are irreducible to the “knowledge” we have of them. Indeed, though we may have a certain sense or “conscience” of nature, we cannot have rational science or true, complete knowledge of nature (compare De Antiquissima, Ch. I, Introduction: “De Vero et Facto”; and De Uno, Ch. LXIX.3). The only Science we may have of nature is “practical” or poetic, i.e. feigned, and as such essentially incomplete. Vico’s denunciation of human wisdom as merely practical or poetic is already implicit in his denying to man God’s perfecta ratio, aeterna ratio infinita, or complete coincidence of authority/order and mind/form (compare De Uno, Ch. IV-VI, XVII, LXIX.3; SN44, “Idea of the Work,” par. 2; and De Antiquissima, Ch. III.2). Properly speaking, complete knowledge or Science belongs to God alone: human science or wisdom is merely poetic, rather than “reasoned.” Insofar as knowledge proper is intellection (intelligere
Questioning Northrop Frye’s Adaptation of Vico 2 9 3 rather than legere) or a “reading-within,” Vico’s poetic Authors, his “Theologian Poets” (Poeti Teologi), merely feign Science, and therewith Authorship or Authority—for they hold sway over the mere “signs” of things, rather than things themselves (compare ibid., Ch. I, Introduction; Ch. I.2, esp. last par.; SN44, “Of the Method,” par. 1-2). True Authority and Science entail intellection, or the perfection of reason: “in God, that is all reason, reason and authority are one and the same thing” (ibid., Bk. IV.9.i). Having resolved its contents within its own being-form, mind is mens purissima, a perfectly pure mind in which Existence converts completely into Being (hence Vico’s warning that God is, whereas man exists, i.e. he is always “somewhere”—“c’è,” rather than simply “è”; Risposta, 1712, par. 12ff.; see also De Antiquissima, Ch. I.1; Ch. VI, par. 2; and Ch. VII.1, par. 2). Yet, precisely by denying us access to real intellection or reasoned wisdom, i.e. to the consummation or end of philosophy, Vico leaves us faced with the challenge of reading or “going about gathering” (andar raccogliendo) things outside of our limited minds, understanding what we read (De Antiquissima, Ch. I, Introduction: “De Vero et Facto”; on merely imaginative reading, compare SN44, “Idea of the Work,” par. 1, and “Of the Method,” par. 6). The fact that we cannot really read things themselves within our finite minds—thereby converting things into the nominal sense of certainty we have of them (De Uno, Ch. LXXXII-LXXXIII, CLXXXV.11; SN44, “Of the Principles,” par. 5; De Antiquissima, Ch. VII.2)—leaves us with two permanently viable alternatives: (1) we may read things imaginatively within our minds, thereby feigning wisdom and authority; or (2) we can truly read, “gather,” or “collect” things outside of our finite minds, i.e. we can reason, not by dwelling upon, but by interpreting and thus questioning the authoritative nominal or “geometric” forms in which we commonly divine things themselves, in the attempt to access the “metaphysical” interiority of those same forms, without attempting to “impiously” replace our conventional forms of authority with any other form, and least of all with that of our private sense of certainty (SN44, “Of the Method,” par. 2; Bk. II.2.iv, concluding paragraphs; Bk. IV.7; Risposta, 1712, part 4, par. 10; De Antiquissima, Ch. I, par. 1; Ch. III and Ch. IV.11). In either case, with man, reasoning is never truly resolved in “knowledge” (scientia or gnōsis; cf. De Antiquissima, Ch. I, Introduction, par. 2; and Ch. I.2, par. 2): to reason is for us to penetrate the surface of things, remaining “practically” empty-handed—ignorant without pretense; not wise, though arguably honest (on “honesty,” cf. De Uno, Ch. XVIII); not dwelling upon, but penetrating all opinions; never resolving reason in pleasure or self-satisfaction.
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Volume 37 Issue 3 Spring 2010 237 2
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Political Science and the Irrationa
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Political Science and the Irrationa
Page 9 and 10: Political Science and the Irrationa
Page 27 and 28: Creation as Parable in Maimonides
Page 49 and 50: Questioning Northrop Frye’s Adapt
Page 59: Questioning Northrop Frye’s Adapt
Page 75 and 76: Book Review: Greek Tragedy and Poli
Page 81 and 82: Book Review: Plato’s Meno 3 1 3 P
Page 83 and 84: Book Review: Plato’s Meno 3 1 5 c
Page 85 and 86: Book Review: Aristotle’s Dialogue
Page 91 and 92: Book Review: God and the Founders 3
Page 93 and 94: Book Review: God and the Founders 3
Page 95 and 96: Book Review: The Dilemma of Progres
Page 101 and 102: Book Review: Orientalism and Islam
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Spring 2010 - Interpretation

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