MISSING PIECES - Inter-Parliamentary Union

THEME 6
vation to acquire or not a gun, prices and resources constrain the means
to do so. The diagram below illustrates a demand framework; all three
dimensions of demand provide crucial elements and opportunities for
interventions.
Preference refers to overlapping
PRICE
PREFERENCE
RESOURCE
AVAILABILITY
social, cultural, economic, and political
motivations. This category could
include, for example, socially constructed
ideas about masculinity, a
perceived need for self-protection,
or a desire to carry out a livelihood
option, requiring a gun, whether
legitimate or criminal. Multiple preferences
can operate at the same time.
A further distinction needs to
be made between deep preferences,
corresponding to universal and immutable
needs such as the need for
personal security or identity, and derived preferences, or coping strategies
for dealing with a challenge to a deep preference—for example, the
acquisition of a firearm in reaction to a need (deep preference) for personal
security. Importantly, acquiring a gun will probably be only one of several
options for satisfying a deep preference. The extent to which one
option is preferred over others will be influenced by such factors as cultural
patterns and the degree to which there are available substitutes. For
example, the derived preference for small arms might be stimulated by the
familiarisation with, or normalisation of, guns in a particular society.
Derived preferences are dynamic across time and space. For example,
a homeowner’s preference for regarding a gun as necessary for family
protection may change if he/she feels community-watch schemes or
changes to policing begin to provide sufficient security, even as his/her
deep preference—for security for their family—remains an important
motivating concern. It is also important to recognise that preferences are
not necessarily confined to the individual, but can also be collectively
realised.
“Our approach to the complex problem of illicit small arms must be
an integrated and comprehensive one. . . . we will never be able to
stop the flow of illicit weapons as long as we only focus on the supply.
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