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“cottage industries” that cluster in whichever industry the government is attempting to stimulate. For this reason, the government was in a position to underrate promising innovations that businesses pitched to it. Throughout its existence, MITI came dangerously close to preventing several innovative developments. 4 For instance, in the early 1950s, MITI initially prevented the development of an experimental transistor radio before relenting two years later and allowing the investment. Had MITI stuck with its original intuition, the company that created this early radio, Sony, might never have been given the chance to develop. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know what other promising innovations did not get the benefit of a second chance from the experts at MITI. We can see the firms and industries that thrived under MITI; we cannot see those that the government prevented from developing by favoring some over others. Widespread corruption in Japanese industrial policy has led to inefficient investment and low growth. 5 Officials collude with businessmen to rig the competitive bidding process for public investment. In the practice of dango, the industry rotates which firm will win the bid and allows the chosen firm to secure a higher-thannormal contract amount. After they retire, the bureaucrats who engage in this corruption receive kickbacks and cushy positions in the firms that they regulated, a practice known as amakudari, or “the descent from heaven.” Cronies receive benefits unavailable to outsiders. The growth of these corrupt practices has increased with the pace of the growth of government intervention in the Japanese economy. Sociologists Chikako Usui and Richard Colignon, for instance, find a positive INDUSTRIAL POLICY 95
elationship between the prevalence of amakudari within the country’s financial sector and the growth of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) that regulates that sector. 6 Evidence of corruption between industry and government in state industrial planning calls into question the true motivation behind the plans. Olson uses Japan as a prime example of the rise and decline of nations due to interest-group politics. He notes that after policy disruptions eliminate old political connections and networks, businesses concentrate on productive activity because they can no longer secure political favors. 7 Industrial policy in Japan favors some Japanese businesses over others, creating incentives for business leaders to develop political connections so that they can be among the privileged. Over time, connections become increasingly important to business profitability, and an entrepreneurial economy evolves into one in which success is based on political favoritism and cronyism. As we have noted in previous chapters, Olson argues that such a system leads to the decline of nations. Note that Olson made this argument in the early 1980s, well before Japan’s financial crisis in 1991 that led to its “lost decade” of economic stagnation in the 1990s. Japan’s rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s laid the foundation for South Korea to implement similar policies to try to join the global economic community with export-led growth. 8 Political power changed hands several times in the decades following the war’s end before it was finally seized by Park Chung-hee, an ambitious military general with grand plans for the South Korean economy, in 1961. Park’s leadership experience was steeped in military logistics and the planning 96 LIBERALISM AND CRONYISM
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LIBERALISM AND CRONYISM Two Rival P
Page 4 and 5:
LIBERALISM AND CRONYISM: TWO RIVAL
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CONTENTS Introduction 1 Chapter 1:
Page 10 and 11:
INTRODUCTION People often see polit
Page 12 and 13:
who have the power to make decision
Page 14 and 15:
CHAPTER 1: LAYING A FOUNDATION Befo
Page 16 and 17:
hijacking of the term to describe a
Page 18 and 19:
esources can be taken from some for
Page 20 and 21:
suffers from “market failure,”
Page 22:
is a group of cronies in a dictator
Page 25 and 26:
ecause it permits voluntary exchang
Page 27 and 28:
people’s economic well-being. The
Page 29 and 30:
consumer demands. Examples of rent-
Page 31 and 32:
the Politburo and the needs of conn
Page 33 and 34:
consider the benefits and costs of
Page 35 and 36:
upon state privilege and disproport
Page 37 and 38:
their loyalty to the socialist stat
Page 39 and 40:
cronyism from gripping every area i
Page 41 and 42:
communism are well documented and w
Page 43 and 44:
Accountability was embodied by refo
Page 45 and 46:
despite comprising only 3 percent o
Page 48 and 49:
CHAPTER 5: FASCISM Fascism, the pol
Page 50 and 51:
use the sword of the Nazi state to
Page 52 and 53:
planners created a back door for in
Page 54 and 55: CHAPTER 6: CORPORATISM Corporatism
Page 56 and 57: puts men and their possibilities in
Page 58: that this form of guided capitalism
Page 61 and 62: therefore provide sufficient benefi
Page 64 and 65: CHAPTER 8: PROGRESSIVISM Progressiv
Page 66 and 67: people who argue for limited govern
Page 68: Security, Medicare, and Medicaid do
Page 71 and 72: the direct election of senators, ch
Page 73 and 74: argue for narrow individual interes
Page 75 and 76: their roots to diverse sources of i
Page 77 and 78: promises to assume a company’s de
Page 79 and 80: enefits for his former venture capi
Page 81 and 82: prices of firms within the textile
Page 83 and 84: ment the power to make decisions an
Page 85 and 86: of social justice, cronyism has an
Page 87 and 88: for women in the twentieth century,
Page 89 and 90: ecause it advocates granting these
Page 91 and 92: should pay the same as comparable b
Page 93 and 94: way, the US government replaced the
Page 95 and 96: an individual, social justice advoc
Page 98 and 99: CHAPTER 12: CRONY CAPITALISM AND DE
Page 100 and 101: subsidies, political connections di
Page 102 and 103: CHAPTER 13: INDUSTRIAL POLICY The t
Page 106 and 107: of complex systems. He applied this
Page 108 and 109: South Korean industrial policy gave
Page 110: The degree to which Japan’s and S
Page 113 and 114: to get involved in lobbying to prot
Page 116 and 117: CHAPTER 15: LIBERALISM VERSUS CRONY
Page 118: that power will arise with another
Page 121 and 122: with power support each other to ma
Page 123 and 124: an incentive to cooperate for the b
Page 125: environmental movement often advoca
Page 129 and 130: 6. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action,
Page 131 and 132: 12. James Heinzen, “The Art of th
Page 133 and 134: CHAPTER 5: FASCISM 1. Peter Temin,
Page 135 and 136: CHAPTER 8: PROGRESSIVISM 1. Terry L
Page 137 and 138: 16. Bruce Yandle, “Bootleggers an
Page 139 and 140: 3. Eamonn Fingleton, “Japan’s I
Page 142 and 143: FURTHER READING Acemoglu, Daron and
Page 144 and 145: ABOUT THE AUTHORS Randall G. Holcom
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