austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil

298
THE TRIUMPH OF EVIL
�
ent, the amount of labor per unit of capital employed, and the quality of the capital
(t.e., the technology level) than of financial efficiency.
II. This official economic blackmail was supported by a massive number of individual
militant threats of physical violence made unofficially and illegally against rep
resentatives of other political parties, especially against the communists (Der Tagesspiegel,
1990n), who nevertheless mustered almost 20% of the vote, and who have continued
to receive about 115 of the vote in eastern Germany throughout the subsequent
elections of the 1990s (Autorenkollektiv, 1995).
12. An indication of the effectiveness of the West German election strategy is pro
vided in surveys. In mid-December 1989, 71% of all East Germans were in fa vor of
Socialism, and 73% were fo r preserving the East German state independent of West
Gennany (Bahrmann and Links, 1994). By February 1990, the number of East Gennans
in fa vor of unification had risen dramatically to 76%, although only II% would have
voted for the West German conservative parties at that time (Der Tagesspiegel, 1990g).
13. Surveys of other Eastern European countries reveal similar levels of dissatisfaction
with capitalism, with at least half of all Eastern Europeans believing that they were
better off under communism (Investors Business Dai�y, 1993). Capitalist media propaganda,
the costs and risks associated with turning back, threats of Western boycotts, and
political repression have so far kept Eastern European countries from returning to their
prior system, as explained throughout this book.
14. The destruction of the economy in the eastern provinces is also used to make
the residents there feel inferior, subservient, and powerless. A typical example of the
misleading nature of this psychological warfare can be fo und in the agricultural sector,
where heavy West German government subsidization of family fa rms (Economist, 1991)
made it very difficult for the East German collective fa rms to compete in the New Order
of "free trade." As a result, agricultural production fe ll by 1/3 in the eastern provinces
in the year after unification (Frankfu rter Allgemeine, 1991 ). According to conservative
West German propagandists, this collapse of East German agriculture stemmed from
the "inefficiency" of collective farms! While East German agricultural output per hectare
of land and per fa nn worker was significantly less than in West Germany, even West
Gennan anticommunists admit that one contributing cause was the far lower level of
mechanization of East German fa rms (Thiele, 1998). This situation in turn reflected the
lower level of capital and wealth in East Germany in general (stemming, once again,
from its reparations payments), so that East German agriculture and collectivization
may very well have been very efficient for its level of resources. For instance, East Ger­
many had only 1/6 as many harvest combines per acre as West Germany in the 1980s
(Kusch et at., 1991) but harvested about Yz as much agricultural output per fann worker
(Thiele, 1998). Some studies have indeed discovered Eastern European agricultural col­
lectives to be relatively efficient (Meurs, 1999), including in East Germany (Gregory
and Leptin, 1977), and even in cases where private fa rming has appeared to be more
productive, the cause may well be better land and weather, more mechanization, and
other input advantages, as Thiele and Brodersen ( 1999) found when comparing agricultural
productivity in eastern and western Germany.
15. These figures represent additional amounts that would have to be spent over and
above the costs that are currently being incurred for these undesirable characteristics
NOTES 299
of capitalism. For instance, in the capitalist USA, over 10% of GDP is currently spent
or lost due to crime. In particular, approximately 2% of GDP is spent on public Jaw­
enforcement (including for over half a million public police, as well as for criminal
court and prison costs), approximately 3% ofGDP is lost in the form of stolen property
(lqely paid for by higher insurance premiums), and about 5% ofGDP is lost due to the
medical costs, suffering, and lost wages of victims of violent crime (US News & World
RtpOrl, 1994). Another 1% ofGDP is spent on private security, including for well over
a million security guards (Reynolds, 1994). Evidence of the fact that capitalism causes
crime is provided by Japan, which has moved toward a more ·market-oriented society
in the 1990s with all its side-effects of unemployment and homelessness, and the result
hiS been an enonnous increase in crime (Tyson, I 998).
16. Legal proceedings have actually found corruption among the East German lead­
en to� fa ir� trivial (in comparison to the corruption in West Germany or America),
�lly tnvolvmg only privileged use of vacation spots in East Germany, or acceptance
of g�fts from the West, whose value could be measured in thousands of Marks (Krenz,
1990).
CHAPTER 5
': Having first fa llen by over 40% to under 2/5 that of western German output per
Clplll between 1989 and I 991 (back to the 1960 ratio), output per capita in eastern
�y expe�enced a brief rapid spurt of growth in the mid-1990s (driven by tax­
llltCnt
tves � vtded by the united German government to invest into eastern Gennany).
However, th1s short-term rapid growth raised output per capita to only about half that
of western Gennany where it has since stabilized at a level well below the 2/3 ratio of
1989.
2· Deviations between market exchange rates and purchasing power parity exchange
Illes � occur not only due to barriers to trade (including transportation costs and
�ettng/distribution expenses, as well as artificial barriers such as tariffs and quotas)
1 �� due to the existence of nontradable goods and services like housing (Kravis and
�y . 1988).
ld�· Si m ply giving citizens shares in state-owned companies that they can immediately
may � t only lead to mass sales at distressed prices but might also cause excessive
= � the German government sell off all state-owned assets as soon as possible to
�on and inftation (Ciampi, 1 998). The plan actually used in eastern Gennany
and utilized the very limited proceeds from this distressed sale of capi­
111 to 1�estors
!lill �� r educe the enormous costs of unification incurred Although the overall
ilitiatt �-y fl
oretut, almost all of the existing capital stock in the eastern part of Germany
led to a depression which resulted in Jess outside capital investment than
� (199�) r �rts that the Deutsche Bank and five other Gennan institutes
4. OWrled by entities outside eastern Germany (Der Spiegel, 1997b).
� the dechne m real GNP to be over 400/o in eastern Germany in 1990-9 1.
E..t �cial �erman government sources indicate National Income in the former
'-ea. 198 provmces to have fallen from only 275 billion Marks to 181 billion Marks
._by 9 . and I 99 I (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1 992), prices in eastern Gennany
0enn1n -;,:'':"" ted 13 .8% over that same 2-year interval, as estimated by five West
ctal and economic research institutions (Osmond, 1992). In real terms